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Abstract 
The background to this study is as follows. In June 2004, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued its International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework, commonly referred to as 
Basel II. This document placed emphasis on corporate governance as a key factor in a 
bank's soundness, to which a banking supervisor should pay attention in deciding the 
style of supervision that is appropriate for a given bank. Basel II also emphasised 
transparency and market discipline as factors which could reinforce the quality of 
corporate governance. In addition, the BCBS has issued guidelines addressing the 
need for minimum international standards of corporate governance for banks to help 
reduce systemic risk and enhance the integrity of financial markets 
The Islamic Financial Services Board has issued a number of documents concerning 
the application of the principles of Basel II to Islamic banks, that is to say, banks 
which raise and invest funds in accordance with the rules and principles of the 
Shari'ah. Among other things, Islamic banks neither charge nor pay interest, and 
deposits are placed with them by investment account holders (IAH) on a profit- 
sharing and loss-bearing basis. This latter feature has major corporate governance 
implications, as does the obligation of Islamic banks to operate in accordance with 
Shari'ah rules and principles. 
Islamic finance has become a significant phenomenon on the world financial scene. 
The annual growth in assets of Islamic financial institutions (IFI) has been estimated 
as 10% in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and almost 15% worldwide 
over the past 10 years. 
This study addresses some key issues in corporate governance in Islamic banks. It 
deals with the special features of Islamic banks particularly with regard to (i) the 
relationship between the IAH and the Islamic bank and how it affects the issue of 
corporate governance; (ii) the corporate governance implications of the obligation of 
an Islamic bank to operate in accordance with the rules and principles of the Shariah; 
and (iii) issues of transparency and market discipline in Islamic banking. 
ii 
The research was conducted by using an embedded case study approach. The case 
studies were conducted on four Islamic banks operating in three countries, Bahrain, 
Qatar, and Kuwait which apply different regulatory approaches to Islamic banks. The 
four banks surveyed were seen to be applying different practices in areas that raise 
various key issues in corporate governance. 
The conclusions of the study point to a number of significant corporate governance 
problems and shortcomings in Islamic banking, connected notably with the following: (i) 
Islamic banks mainly operate in emerging market environments where, among other 
things, the conditions for market discipline are not satisfied; and (ii) regulatory and 
supervisory regimes designed for conventional banking fail to address some key 
characteristics of Islamic banks. This is shown to have implications for the regulatory 
regime and the style of supervision required in order to address the corporate governance 
problems and shortcomings that were identified. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
Chapter 1 
An Overview of the Research 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with issues of corporate governance in Islamic banks. In the 
literature on corporate governance, the case is made by authorities such as the OECD 
and the BCBS that banks are a special case, both because they have fiduciary 
responsibilities for handling funds deposited by members of the public, and also for a 
related reason, namely the systemic risk to the banking system as a whole if there is a 
$run' on a bank. As this thesis will explain, Islamic banks are a special case within 
banks, for two main reasons: (a) their 'depositors' place funds in Profit Sharing 
Investment Accounts, that is, on a profit-sharing and loss-bearing basis, and thus do 
not have the protection accorded to creditors; and (b) Islamic banks receive funds on 
the strict understanding that these funds will be managed in a way that is compliant 
with the Shariah rules and principles of Islamic commercial jurisprudence. 
Protection of Investment Account Holders (IAH) and Shariah compliance are thus 
two major issues in the corporate governance of such institutions. One of the main 
characteristics of governance in an Islamic bank is the existence of Shariah 
Supervisory Boards (SSB). The role of the SSB is to issue authoritative opinions 
(fatwas) on matters of Shariah compliance, with regard to the products and services 
offered by the Islamic bank, and to issue an annual report attesting to such 
compliance. 
The globalization of financial markets necessitates minimum international standards 
of corporate governance for banks that can be transmitted into financial systems in a 
way that will reduce systemic risk and hence the integrity of financial markets 
(Alexander, 2004 p. 1017). Banks are often more opaque than non-financial entities, 
because of the complexities of the financial instruments with which they deal. 
At the time that this research was being carried out, the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) issued its International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
I 
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and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework (BCBS 2004), commonly referred to as 
Basel II. Basel Il is significant for the subject-matter of this thesis because its 
approach to capital standards is based on three "pillars". Pillar I deals with capital 
measurement and capital adequacy, while Pillar 2 is concerned with the supervisory 
review process and Pillar 3 with disclosure and market discipline. Pillars 2 and 3, in 
particular, are intended for application in well-developed financial systems and 
market environments. The intent is to facilitate a "hands-off' approach to banking 
supervision in which the supervisor evaluates the supervisee banks' internal systems, 
including notable corporate governance, in order to determine how "hands-off' the 
supervision may be, and relies as far as possible on market discipline, aided by 
transparency, to keep supervisee banks in order. An important set of issues which this 
research addresses concerns the extent to which the quality of corporate governance 
of Islamic banks, and the state of market discipline and the information environment 
in the markets where most Islamic banks operate, are such that the "hands-off' 
approach favoured in Basel II would be applicable. 
Broadly speaking, corporate governance is a set of structures and procedures to assist 
the stakeholders of an enterprise in assessing the performance of the management and 
make sure that management behaviour is consistent with the interests of the 
stakeholders. This raises the key questions: who are the stakeholders, and what are 
their rights? The answers to these questions differ according to the model of 
corporate governance being applied. 
There are two main models of corporate governance: the USA/TJK or "shareholder" 
model, and the continental European or "stakeholder" model. As its name implies, the 
shareholder model focuses on shareholders as the key stakeholders, whereas in the 
stakeholder model other stakeholders are considered important. The UK/TJSA model 
is related in a more straightforward way to one of the economic theories most often 
evoked to analyse corporate governance issues, namely Agency Theory. This may be 
attributed to historical reasons: Agency Theory was originally developed to analyse 
issues of governance that arise when there is separation of ownership and control in 
2 
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industrial corporations. In this theory, shareholders are considered as "owners" and 
management is considered as having control. 
It is to be noted that the topic of corporate governance (CG) in Islamic banks is 
relatively new and therefore the literature in this area is sparse and there is a lack of 
well-developed theories. Nevertheless, this research will make use as far as possible 
of existing theories in order to identify research issues and questions. 
One of issues this research aims to address is the importance of transparency in the 
development of the Islamic banking sector. In this regard, the roles played by the 
IFSB (in issuing regulatory standards) and AAOIFI (in issuing accounting, 
governance and auditing standards) are crucial in developing transparency and market 
discipline. 
The following section provides the foundation for the thesis. It discusses the problem 
to be investigated and the historical background, research objective, the significance 
of the study, and the research plan. 
1.2 Research Problem and Historical Background 
IAH represent the main source of funding for a majority of the Islamic banks. The 
relationship between the Islamic bank and IAH involves a number of governance 
issues. 
The status of LAH in Islamic banks creates a governance problem that can be 
characterised as an "agency problem" (see chapter 2) since IAH are not in a position 
to influence the decisions of management, for example, they have no right to appoint 
members of the Board of Directors or external auditors. IAH are therefore mainly 
dependent on the shareholders to monitor performance of the management of banks, 
so that their decisions should benefit the interests of both IAH and shareholders. 
3 
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Archer & Karim (1997) suggest that there may be 'vicarious monitoring' that works in 
the interests of LAE, but this depends on there not being any significant conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and IAH. This situation is compounded where there are 
weak or inadequate governance structures (Archer and Karim, 2006 p. 135). 
Such a situation affects the interests of the IAH negatively, as demonstrated by an 
example where the dividend yield rate of the shareholders is much higher than the rate 
of return paid to IAH. This may se em anomalous insofar as the IAH are supposed to 
share profits with the shareholders. The influential factor in such a difference is the 
profit allocation formula used to allocate profits between shareholders and IAH, 
including the share of the LAR profit allocated to the bank as a fee for managing the 
funds of the IAH, combined with the leveraging effect resulting from the high ratio of 
IAH funds to shareholders' funds. 
In Islamic banks, the SSB's role is to ensure that the banks operate in accordance with 
Shari'ah. In reality, the SSB's function is limited to reviewing the bank's contracts 
before their implementation (ex ante); however, they do not verify the implementation of 
the contracts (ex post) since they rely on a type of internal audit function known as the 
Internal Shariah Review (ISR) to do this on their behalf. 
The unique feature of governance in Islamic banks is the existence of the SSB. The role 
and duties of the SSB differ from one bank to another. Because the SSB members are 
part-time they normally appoint an ISR to help the SSB in their duties carrying out the ex 
post review of the bank's compliance with Shariah. 
The SSB's reports differ from one bank to another. To improve this situation, the 
AAOIFI issued Shariah governance standards to guide the SSB and ISR in conducting 
their duties. 
The majority of Islamic banks operate in what may be characterised as a weak 
information environment, including a lack of adequate information intermediaries (such 
as financial analysts and rating agencies producing reports on financial institutions). 
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Furthermore, in such markets the IAH are passive investors unlike investors in developed 
financial markets many of whom react to the information they receive. This puts 
additional challenges on the banking supervisors or regulators to protect the interests of 
the LAH. 
Information intermediaries need an adequate level of transparency in order to do their 
work. Transparency and market discipline are crucial in developing Islamic banking, but 
one of the challenges facing the development of Islamic banks is the passive attitude of 
the IAH. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The primary objective of the study is to examine corporate governance practices in 
Islamic banks. The following are the other objectives of the study: 
a) To study the impact of the degree of shareholder concentration for protecting the 
interests of the LAH. 
b) To assess the role of SSB in providing assurance via the report they produce as to 
the bank's compliance with Shariah. 
c) Given the lack of adequate implementation of applicable financial reporting 
standards (specifically, AAOIFI Financial Accounting Standards), to study the 
impact of this on the ability of UH to assess the performance of Islamic banks. 
d) To assess the role of the banking supervisors in enhancing transparency in Islamic 
banking, thereby protecting, among others, IAH interests. 
5 
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1.4 Significance of the Study 
The rationale for undertaking this study is the fact that there has been very little 
extensive and in-depth research in the area of Islamic banking despite its importance 
and rapid growth as mentioned earlier. The reasons for considering corporate 
governance are (a) the unique status of UH in Islamic banks and (b) the issue of 
Shari'ah compliance. 
The IAH have some characteristics of both conventional bank depositors and 
investors in a mutual fund. Such an equivocal status requires a good governance 
framework to protect the interest of the IAH as they neither benefit from the 
protection accorded to creditors nor enjoy the governance rights normally given to 
equity investors. 
And without good governance and adequate disclosures, financial intermediaries will 
rate Islamic banks lower than conventional banks which will increase the cost of 
capital for Islamic banks. 
An important factor which makes this study important, is the fact that banking 
supervisors or regulators apply different supervisory frameworks to Islamic banks. 
For example, in Bahrain the supervisor has developed specific regulations for Islamic 
banks, while some other national supervisors subject Islamic banks to the same 
principles as those applied for regulating conventional banks. 
Here, the roles of the IFSB (in issuing regulatory standards) and AAOIFI (in issuing 
accounting, governance and auditing standards) are very critical in standardizing the 
regulatory and accounting practices among Islamic banks. 
It may be worth mentioning that the researcher is a professional central banker with a 
number of years experience of the supervision of Islamic banks. This experience 
naturally colours the perspective adopted in this research. 
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1.5 Research Plan 
Given the relative novelty of the research topic and the state of relevant theory, as 
well as data availability, it was decided to adopt a case study approach to this 
research. Case studies were carried out on four Islamic banks, using an "embedded" 
case study design in which the four banks were the main units of analysis, while a 
number of sub-units were identified in each bank to permit cross-sectional 
comparisons. 
Figure 1.1 shows the research plan of this study. It starts with an introductory 
chapter, followed by three chapters relating to the literature review and Islamic 
banking practices (ch. 2 to ch. 4). Chapter 5 sets out the development of the research 
issues, and chapter 6 the research design and methods. Chapters 7 to 10 cover the 
four case studies. Chapter II covers analysis and comparison. The last chapter 
covers the researcher's conclusions and final remarks. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature on Corporate Governance 
This chapter will review the literature on Corporate Governance. This chapter is 
important in widening the knowledge of the researcher on corporate governance and 
in helping to develop the research questions. 
2.1 Corporate Governance in General 
2.1.1 GeneraI Introduction on Corporate Governance 
The intellectual debate in corporate governance first arose from considering the 
implications of the separation between ownership and control in industrial 
corporations that had occurred with the emergence of large firms with widely 
dispersed shareholdings in certain countries (notably the USA and the UK) in the 
early decades of the 20d' century (see particularly Berle and Means, 1932). It was 
noted that the owners were not really able to control the management, which implied 
that ownership and control were separated. A major reason for this is asymmetry of 
information, since the management is much better informed about the firm's condition 
and prospects than the owners. Still earlier (Smith, A 1776 p. 700) had stated the 
problem as follows: "the directors of joint stock companies are managers of other 
people's money, hence, it can not be expected that their actions will be taken with 
same vigilance as if they are the owners of the company. Therefore, negligence and 
profusion will always exist in the management of the company". Similar views were 
expressed by Alfred Marshall (1920). 
These considerations led to the development of Agency Theory, which considers the 
owners (or shareholders) as "principals" and the management as "agents" who have an 
obligation to act in the interests of the principals but are able to put their own interests 
first. Agency Theory further considers mechanisms that may be employed to align 
the interests of the agent with those of the principals, namely "bonding" and 
"monitoring". Bonding consists of incentives for the agent to undertake actions that 
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in the interests on the principal and to avoid actions that are contrary to those 
interests. Monitoring is the use by the principal of information provided in order to 
observe the actions of the agent, and requires mitigation of the problem of asymmetry 
of information. 
Following Berle and Means, Coase (1937) and Fama and Jensen (1983 b) also took 
the view that the essence of the agency problem is the separation of ownership and 
control. 
The classic formulation of Agency Theory thus considers the principals to be the 
shareholders who are considered to be the "owners" of the corporation. This has 
given rise to an approach to corporate governance that is known as the Shareholder 
Theory. There is, however, an alternative approach, known as the Stakeholder 
Theory, in which stakeholders (i. e. principals) other than shareholders are considered. 
In this chapter, we first consider the Shareholder Theory as it is based on the classic 
formulation of Agency Theory. Then, the Stakeholder Theory is considered, bearing 
in mind certain limitations of the Shareholder Theory when applied to financial 
institutions such as banks, and in particular to Islamic banks whose profit-sharing 
investment account holders constitute a class of principal distinct from shareholders. 
For example, according to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) 
"Corporate governance is a set of relationships between a company's management, its 
board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders. Good corporate governance should 
provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are 
in the interests of the company and shareholders and should facilitate effective 
monitoring, thereby encouraging firms to use resources more efficiently". In addition, 
Edwards and Nibler (2000) defined corporate governance as a system of mechanisms 
that reduces information asymmetries and eases monitoring of the suppliers of 
extemal debt to firms. 
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2.1.2 Agency Theory and the Shareholder and Stakeholder Theories of 
Corporate Governance 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) characterized the contract between the owner-manager 
and shareholders as an agency relationship. They claimed that an agency relationship 
is a contract involving one or more principals who engage another person (the agent) 
to perform certain duties on their behalf by delegating some of their decisions (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976 p. 308). This development of Agency Theory led to what is 
known as the Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance. 
The Anglo-American model of corporate governance which exists in the United 
Kingdom and United States reflects the Shareholder Theory, being aimed at 
maximising shareholder value, along with typical capital market and ownership 
features. This is contrasted with the German and Japanese conceptions of the 
company as a social institution, leading to the Stakeholder Theory of corporate 
governance which gives consideration to a number of classes of stakeholder including 
shareholders, creditors and employees. 
2.1.3 Definitions of Corporate Governance 
It follows from the above that definitions of corporate governance differ according to 
whether a Shareholder Theory or a Stakeholder Theory approach is adopted. As 
noted above, the classic problem of corporate governance as indicated by Berle and 
Means (1932) is due to the separation between the owners and managers. Zingales 
(1997), however, argued that corporate governance is a system by which directors and 
managers (or insiders) act in the best interest of outside investors (creditors and 
shareholders). 
Mayer (2000) argued that "a basic question that corporate governance raises, if one 
thinks of it as really being concerned with performance accountability, its whether or 
not it leads to efficiency in terms of the management of corporations, whether or not 
incentive arrangements, such as shareholding arrangements, are giving rise to 
11 
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adequate managerial efficiency". In contrast, John Wolfensohn, World Bank previous 
president, emphasised the need to mitigate the asymmetry of information and 
indicated that the purpose behind corporate governance should be "fairness, 
transparency, and accountability". 
In dealing with problems that result from the separation of ownership and managers, 
corporate governance focuses on the internal rules of the board of directors and the 
creation of independent audit rules for disclosure of information to shareholders and 
creditors (Sullivan, 2000). 
Tricker (1984) defined corporate governance as the "processes by which companies 
are run". Others believe corporate governance is implemented in corporations to 
restore investor confidence in markets that experienced financial crisis-as in the case 
of Malaysia, Japan, and Russia. 
Academics and practioners are of the view that good corporate govemance creates 
competitive advantage and realises value (Corporate Govemance, 2001). 
Others like Shleifer and Vishny (1997 p. 737) have argued that corporate governance 
is a means of satisfying providers of finance to corporations such that they get returns 
on their investment. Other authors, like Kaplan and Norton (2000), claim that 
corporate governance is intended to establish a connection between directors, 
managers, employees, shareholders, customers, creditors, and suppliers to the 
corporation. 
2.2 The SharehoIder Theory of Corporate Governance 
2.2.1 Agency Theory and the Classic Formulation of the Problem of Corporate 
Governance 
In addition to what has been stated above, the Agency Theory is part of a broad 
research programme addressing information asymmetry. The theory deals with the 
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incentives given by the principal to motivate the agent to work for the advantage of 
the agent (Macdonald, 1984 p. 415). 
For the agent to work to the benefit of the principal may involve certain costs. Such 
costs are associated with the cost of monitoring by giving adequate incentives for the 
agent to limit the aberrant activities of the agent (the agent means the management 
and the board of directors) and also to ensure that there is no asymmetry of 
information. Jensen and Meckling (1976 p. 81) argued that it is impossible for the 
agent to work for the benefit of the principal without any cost. This is called agency 
cost. 
Agency costs arise from the following: 
1. The monitoring expenditure by the principal to regulate the agents' 
conduct. 
2. Bonding expenditure by the agent to help assure the principal that the 
agent will not take actions which would damage the interests of the 
principal and will indemnify him if such actions are undertaken. 
3. Residual loss, which covers the loss to the principal if the agent's 
decisions deviate from the decision which would have been made by 
the principal if he had the same information and talent as the agent. 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983a p. 327): 
"An agency problem exists because contracts are not costlessly 
written and enforced. Agency costs include the costs of 
structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among 
agents with conflicting interests, plus residual loss incurred 
because the cost of enforcement of contracts exceeds the benefits". 
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To enhance the level of monitoring by the principal on the agent and to monitor any 
self-interested action by managers at the expense of owners (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) argued for a representation of non-executive board members with greater 
responsibilities to act as watchdog on the board of directors. 
In addition, Finkelstein & D'Aveni (1994) argued for the separation of the 
chairmanship from the position of chief executive officer since non-separation would 
restrict the monitoring of the board over the management. Recliner and Dalton (1991) 
advocated such views by indicating that companies "where a separation exists 
between chairmanship and CEO" out-perform the unitary structures of management 
on three different profitability measures. Also Donaldson & Davis (1991) claimed 
where a separation exist between the chairmanship and CEO, companies have 
achieved higher return on equity. 
However, other writers like Donaldson & Barney (1990) have expressed a different 
view, by claiming that firms where the chairman is also the CEO will perform better 
since any ambiguity regarding responsibility for firms' processes and outcome will be 
avoided. 
2.2.2 Separation of Ownership and Control 
As indicated by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003 p. 10) the canonical agency problem 
exists between the owners (shareholders) and the management. One solution they 
suggest is to provide strong management incentives contractually. 
However, in most large corporations, shareholders are too diffuse and uninformed to 
set incentives for management. Tberefore, they will have no power to monitor 
effectively the behaviour of management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 p. 10). 
Levine (2003 p-4) argued that in principle diffuse shareholders can exert corporate 
governance by directly voting on crucial issues, such as mergers, liquidation, and 
fundamental changes in business strategy and indirectly by election the board of 
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directors. However, a variety of factors, however, keep diffuse shareholders from 
effectively exerting corporate control. There are informational asymmetries between 
managers and small shareholders and managers have enormous discretion over the 
flow of information. Small shareholders frequently lack the expertise to monitor 
managers and cannot bear the cost of monitoring. This situation has led to little 
monitoring by the shareholders of the management (Levine, 2003 p. 4). 
To ensure that management behaviour is properly monitored for the benefits of all 
shareholders, some authors like Shleifer and Vishny (1997 p. 26), argued that 
concentrated (majority) shareholders would have the incentive to collect information 
and monitor the management, thereby mitigating the problem of small shareholders 
lacking the expertise and resources to perform monitoring. The latter would in effect 
be "free riders" on the monitoring efforts of the major shardholders. Vishny (2003 
p. 5) likewise argued that majority shareholders(O or large blocks of shareholders 
(concentrated shareholders) could elect their representatives to the board of directors 
and exercise managerial control more effectively than an ownership structure 
dominated by small, comparatively uninformed shareholders. 
These considerations have given rise to a proposition that effective corporate 
governance relies on "responsible shareholders" who perform monitoring not just for 
their own narrow interests but on behalf of the wider community. 
No definition is provided for majority-owned/controlling shareholdings, but the assumption is any 
shareholding (one family, one block of shareholders where their interest is the same) above 50% is 
logically deemed to represent majority ownership (concentrated shareholders or dominate 
shareholders) and hold half seat or above in the board of directors. 
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This proposition and the "concentrated shareholders hypothesis" have been criticized 
by a number of authors on the grounds that concentrated ownership implies wealthy 
investors who work for their own interests at the possible expense of minority 
shareholders, debt holders, and other stakeholders. Caprio and Levine (2002, p. 6), for 
example, argued that large investors may pay themselves special dividends, exploit 
business relationships with other firms they own. These latter views are supported by 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985); Zingales (1994). 
The latter argument is applicable in Germany, where large commercial banks, through 
proxy voting arrangements, often control over a quarter of the votes in major 
companies (Franks and Mayer, 1994). 
Furthermore, large shareholders may seek to shift the assets of the firm to higher-risk 
activities since shareholders benefit on the upside, while debt holders share the costs 
of failure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Thus, Fama. and Jensen, (1983a p. 5) argued that to mitigate the agency problem there 
is a need to develop a controlling process to ensure that the decisions are taken for the 
benefits of the investors. 
Berle and Means (1932 p. 71) originally pointed out that, although the legal theory 
operates on the premise that the shareholders are the owners of the business and hence 
can exercise their rights, in economic reality the shareholders did not control the 
company. 
This argument is supported by empirical research, which reveals that actual voting at 
222 annual general meetings was as follows: 
"In simple terms, a total of 45.46% of the share capital was voted, 41.61% of which 
was voted by corporate bodies. However, having taken the divergence of the 
economic interests of the agent (manager) from those of the principal (shareholders in 
the firm) led to the emergence of what is called the "internal agency problem". 
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A sample analysis of the split of the total shareholdings between corporate and private 
shows that 47% of the total shares held by private holders were voted (Baird, 1999 
p. 7 1). 
The Board of Directors is an economic institution, which in theory helps to mitigate 
the agency problem by providing a means for stakeholders to control the management 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 p. 7). They also argued (2003 p. 8) that, despite the 
absence of formal theory on the matter a major conflict exists within the boardroom 
between the CEO and the independent directors. The CEO wishes to maintain his 
position and increase his/her benefits while the independent directors have the 
incentive to maintain board independence in order to monitor the CEO and replace 
hini/her in case his/her performance is poor. However, this view assumes that the 
independent directors are truly independent, which is highly questionable insofar as 
the CEO may influence their appointment. 
As Archer and Karim (1997) point out, the divergence of the economic interests of the 
agent (manager) from those of the principal (shareholders in the firm) leads to the so- 
called "internal agency problem", as distinct from the "external agency problem" that 
arises between existing and prospective capital providers when a firm seeks to raise 
new capital. 
Jensen (1989) argued that the classical method to control agency problem is a system 
of incentives, which makes the interests of the management align with the interests of 
the shareholders. However, other authors like Canyon and Leach (1994); and Ogden 
and Watson (1996) have claimed that empirical evidence suggest that the system of 
inventives does not effectively reduce the agency problem. However, Bushman and 
Smith (2003 p. 68) argued that pure market forces motivate managers to work for the 
benefit of firms' owners including market competition, the market for corporate 
control and labour market pressure (Fama, 1980). 
Given the widespread separation of control of fimns between owners and 
management, research on corporate governance has typically focused on mitigating 
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agency problems. The Shareholder Theory, as we have seen, has both its advocates 
and its critics. Some of the latter tend to look to the Stakeholder Theory. 
2.3 The Stakeholder Theory 
2.3.1 Introduction to Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder Theory takes a somewhat different view of principal-agent relationships 
in the firm. The basic element is that firms are managed for the optimal satisfaction 
of stakeholders, which is different from Shareholder Theory. "Stakeholders" are 
defined as those parties that are affected by, or could affect, the company (Cook and 
Deakin, 1999 p. 1), and stakeholders are considered as principals. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue for the recognition of stakeholder claims from 
property rights based on pluralistic notions of distributive justice. Based on this right, 
legitimate stakeholders are those who have a 'moral interest' or 'stake' in the 
existence of the company. 
Blair (1995) defined stakeholders as those who have economic interests related to the 
long-term economic success of the company. Slinger and Deakin (1999) defined 
stakeholders as those whose relationship with the enterprise cannot be completely 
contracted for, but upon whom the enterprise will depend for its success and 
prosperity. 
Mitchell et al (1997) identify urgency, legitimacy, and power as the three elements 
related to stakeholders, stating that these three are indicators of the amount of 
attention the management needs to consider in their relations with stakeholders. 
Frooman (1999 p. 193) identifies Stakeholder Theory as a theory of managing 
potential conflicts of interest between stakeholders (i. e. principal-principal problems) 
stemming from divergent interests. 
18 
Chapter 2 Review of Literature on Corporate Governance 
The critics of the Stakeholder Theory, such as Stemberg (1997 p. 5), point out that this 
theory explicitly denies that corporations should be accountable just to their "owners": 
instead the management should be accountable to all their stakeholders. But such 
critics do not believe that such a requirement for accountability is realistic, as it is not 
clear how it can be enforced (except perhaps by cumbersome regulations). 
2.3.2 The Impact of Stakeholder Theory on Corporate Governance 
Kay and Silberston (1995 p. 8 8) highlight a different perspective by arguing that: 
"if a company is not "owned" by its current shareholders, and the 
shareholders are simply one of number of stakeholders groups, each 
of whom enjoys claims against it, and then there is no reason to think 
that the interest of shareholders does or should enjoy priority over 
the interests of these other stakeholders". 
In countries like Germany and Japan it is believed that to achieve prosperity of the 
economy, they implemented what is called social peace inside the corporation. For 
example, in Germany, after the Second War World full-parity codetermination by 
labour and shareholders was introduced in the coal and steel industry. In 1976, the 
government in Germany decided that half of the membership of the supervisory board 
(the board which lays down the polices and strategy of the corporation) of larger firms 
would represent stakeholders other than shareholders; however, the chairman of the 
supervisory board is a shareholder representative. This step is seen as a step to 
strengthen the role of other stakeholders particularly the trade unions. 
The Stakeholder Theory is applied in various countries in continental Europe, e. g. 
Germany, Austria and Sweden. A similar system exists in Japan, where the 
employees are typically given job security for life to establish social peace within the 
organization and they have a strong say in running the company. 
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This suggests that the Stakeholders Theory is applied in countries Such as Germany to 
enhance the position of other stakeholders such as employees and creditors to be of 
the same importance as the shareholders. This means that management of the 
enterprise should work for the benefits of all stakeholders with no priority given to 
one over the other. 
2.4 The Political Influence on Corporate Governance 
2.4.1 The Impact of the Neo-Liberal System on the Agency Theory 
The political system of a country has an influence on the model used in corporate 
governance simply because the issue of corporate governance has an impact on the 
country's welfare, at the corporate and individual levels. 
In this respect, policy-makers will have reasons to influence the structure of large 
corporations. Roe (2003 p. 6&7) stated that for example, there is a strong political 
will in the USA to separate ownership from control in large listed corporations. This 
policy has led to the emergence on the one hand of large shareholders who influence 
the strategy of the corporation and on the other hand of dispersed shareholders who 
hold no influence on the enterprise. 
In countries like USA and UK, the relevant political philosophy is Neo-Liberal. This 
ideology requires less intervention by the government in the capital market and allows 
the market to regulate itself and gives more priority to the shareholders over other 
interested parties of corporation. In most of these countries the common law system 
is in force and it gives more protection to shareholders over other parties (Cook and 
Deakin, 1999 p. 5). 
Adams (2002) argued that in a neo-liberal or Pluralist state, the government leaves 
much of the economic planning to the vagaries of the market. This suggests that the 
role of the state may merely be to act as a "referee" in the struggle among societal and 
interest groups. 
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In UK the neo-liberal philosophy has been predominant since 1979. In that year when 
the Conservative party came to power, it decided to make the country a more 
enterprising and market-based society similar to the USA system. 
Warren (2000 p. 58) argued that due to the above change, the legitimacy of UK 
companies as a creator and distributor of wealth becomes questionable. The 
employee's security and welfare become less important. 
The advocates of stakeholder' theory criticize the Anglo-American system (Cook and 
Deakin, 1999 p. 23) by arguing that during the hostile takeover of corporations, the 
main say is in the hand of shareholders and other important interests tend to be 
neglected. 
2.4.2 The Impact of Neo-Corporatism, on the Stakeholder Theory 
The Stakeholder Theory is related to a political philosophy called neo-corporatism, 
which is based on combination of a society's culture and history as well as of cultural 
and social changes that occur with modernisation, economic development and 
industrialisation. Neo-corporatism. typically stresses the roles of employers' 
organisations, labour unions and the government within a tri-partite structure of 
economic management. 
It is important to mention that in countries applying the neo-liberal approach the stock 
market plays a more vital role since the shareholder base of listed companies is widely 
diversified. By contrast, in the countries adopting the neo-corporatist approach, the 
shares of companies are not diversified and are mainly held by large institutions such 
as banks or family holding companies which hold them as long term investments. 
Furthermore, unlike neo-liberalism and pluralism, under the neo-corporatism the 
government plays a central role in regulating and organizing the social and economic 
interests of society. 
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The Stakeholder Theory has been characterized as an "insider" approach to corporate 
governance, since governance is performed by a supervisory board which has access 
to inside information about the firm. In contrast, the shareholder theory has been 
characterized as an "outsider" approach to corporate governance, as it places much 
reliance on the role of public disclosure and "market discipline" to monitor 
management. 
Magone (2002) claimed the new globalisation thrust has put pressure on neo- 
corporatism, which emphasises stakeholder rights within a national community, to 
give way to a view that explicitly acknowledges the need to compete in world-wide 
markets. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Agency Theory was established to address the agency problem between the principals 
(owners) and the agent (management). It was indicated in this chapter that agency 
problems exist where the owners are not the managers of the enterprise. Agency 
Theory pointed out that agency problem exist because the actions that the managers 
that may take may not to the best interest of the shareholders. In addition, agency 
problems are aggravated to the extent that information asymmetry exists between the 
owners and the managers. 
Furthermore, agency problems exist particularly in large corporations where 
shareholders are too diffuse and unable to monitor the actions of the management. 
To address such agency problem, some authors like Vishny (2003 p. 50) argued that 
large shareholders may elect their representative in the board of directors because they 
are able to monitor the actions of the agent (managers) more effectively. 
This is called the "concentrated shareholders hypothesis", and some authors like 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997 p. 26) argue that these concentrated shareholders would 
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manage the agent more effectively on behalf of all shareholders (the other 
shareholders being effective free-riders). 
The latter theory has been criticized on the ground that the concentrated shareholders 
will work for their own benefit rather for the benefit of small shareholders. 
Some authors believe that the Agency Theory works mainly to address the agency 
problem between the shareholders and the managers and ignores the interest of other 
stakeholders. 
It is important to mention that Agency Theory in its classical form is more relevant to 
countries applying the neo-liberal political system. In such countries like the USA 
and UK the stock market is more efficient since the shareholder base of listed 
companies is widely diversified. 
The Stakeholder Theory has emerged to address the agency problem between the 
agent and a wider set of stakeholders including shareholders, employees, depositors in 
case of bank, etc. While the neo-corporatist background of Stakeholder Theory may 
be problematic in a world of globalised markets, the literature on the corporate 
governance of banks in general, and Islamic banks in particular, suggests that the 
exclusive focus on shareholders in the Shareholder Theory is a significant 
shortcoming in the context of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 
The Main Models of Corporate Governance 
3.1 Introduction 
There appears to be a great difference of corporate governance mechanisms. This 
chapter will discuss the UK and the USA models with special emphasis on corporate 
governance of banks. 
The UK and USA model are characterized as a system with a large shareholder base 
(dispersed shareholders), accountability by the management. is primarily to 
shareholders. The UK and USA model of corporate governance are both more 
relevant to the Agency Theory where shareholders are given more powers over other 
stakeholders. 
Franks and Mayer (1994) argued that the differences in corporate governance models 
between counties are not due to the way in which financial systems are used to fund 
the companies, but rather because of the way in which ownership and control are 
organized. The Anglo-American model is known as the shareholder model. 
The UK system is different from the USA model with regards to the subsidiary role of 
the government in establishing the model of corporate governance, where the private 
sector seems to have played the primary role in shaping the corporate governance in 
the eighties and later years. 
On the other hand, the USA model of corporate governance is a system which is 
legally binding. The USA, unlike the UK allows the chairman of the enterprise to be 
the chief executive. 
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3.2 The Evolution of the UK Model of Corporate Governance 
3.2.1 The Development of the UK Models 
The system of corporate govemance in the UK, as in the USA, appears to give the 
shareholders more control compared with other interested bodies of the enterprise. 
Cook and Deakin (1999 p. 3) argued that shareholders are treated as the [sole] owners 
of the enterprise and as having the residual rights and control. However, Deakin and 
Slinger (1997) indicated that it is difficult to obtain support within the practioners and 
specialist that the shareholders "own" the enterprise. 
The companies' acts in 1948 allowed the establishment of the exempt private 
company which did not require private companies to make its balance sheet and profit 
and loss account available to the public. This was for the revision benefit of "family" 
private company. In 1962, the Jenkins Report was issued as a result of an enquiry 
into the state of Britain's company laws. 
In 1967 a new act was issued, the new act abolished the status of the exempt company 
and new requirements for the reporting of company accounts were introduced. 
Warren (2000 p. 9) claimed that these changes were aimed to keep the shareholders 
informed of the company's activities. Despite these changes, the 1967 act adopted 
some of the recommendations that came up in the 1962 Jenkins Report. 
Starting from the mid 1970s there was debate on whether the notion of shareholder 
value ignored the claims of other stakeholders to be represented in the company. This 
debate led to the endorsement in 1973 of the stakeholder's concept which was drawn 
from the best practice within the UK, USA, Japan and Germany by the Watkinson 
Report on the responsibilities of the British Public company (Gamble and Kelly, 2001 
p. 113). 
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Based on this report, in 1975 a corporate report was issued, but was not implemented 
due to the changes in government in 1979 when the Conservative party came to 
power. It is important to mention that the stakeholders approach is based on the neo- 
corporatism concept (this concept was discussed in chapter 2), which now exists in 
continental Europe like Germany and Austria. 
The advocates of stakeholder's concepts were mainly from the Confederation of 
British Industry and the Trades Union Congress. The stakeholder's concept is based 
on the Stakeholder's Theory. 
The issue of corporate governance became a heated issue in the eighties of the last 
century in the UK due to a series of corporate governance failures including major 
firms (Polly Pecks, Maxwells; Coloroll) and where the weaknesses of corporate 
governance were clearly a contributory factor (Charkham, 1994). 
Demirag et al (2000) argued that these financial scandals in the 1980s triggered the 
debate on making managers more accountable to shareholders. Furthermore, there 
were also some sudden failures of a number of large companies in the early nineties 
without warning fromthe auditors. This has raised a serious concern on the quality 
and reliability of audited information (Cadbury, 1992 Humphrey et al, 1993). 
In response to these concerns and for the managers to be more accountable, a 
committee was established in 1991 named "Cadbury Committee". The following 
gives more explanation on the responsibilities of this committee and other committees 
established to address the issue of corporate governance. 
3.2.1.1 The Cadbury Committee 
The Cadbury Committee was established in May 1991 by the Financial Reporting 
Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession, under the 
chairmanship of Sir Adrian Cadbury. The terms of reference of the committee were 
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to address the following issues that relate to financial reporting and accountability and 
to make recommendations to be considered as good practice by the industry. 
It is important to mention that the Cadbury code was mainly concerned with the 
discipline of the management of banks and the board of directors because the 
shareholders are widely dispersed and hence no shareholders group or majority of 
shareholders has the power to dismiss the management. 
The Committee's approach was to provide a framework for establishing good 
corporate governance and accountability. The Cadbury code is used as a benchmark 
against which companies could be assessed. Although, the implementation of the 
code was recommended, the Committee's opinion was that it was voluntary to 
establish best practice in order to allow flexibility in implementing the code and to 
encourage companies to comply with the spirit of the recommendations, rather than 
straitjacket rules and regulations (Davies et al, 1999). 
The Cadbury Committee issued the code of Best Practice, which recommends that 
boards of publicly-traded UK corporations include at least three outside directors and 
that the positions of the chairman of the board and chief executive officer not be"held 
by a single individual. Banks were encouraged to apply the Cadbury Committee and 
if the banks failed to adopt it, they had to state in the annual report the reasons for not 
adopting, i. e. what is known as "comply or explain". 
The code explicitly mentioned that legislation will be taken as a guide if companies 
failed to comply with the guidelines of the code. McConnell and Travlos (2000) 
argued that the report was given finther boost in June 1993 by the LSE (London Stock 
Exchange), which now requires every listed company to prepare a statement that 
spells out whether the firm is in compliance with the code and, if not, requires an 
explanation as to why the company is not in compliance. 
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The Cadbury Committee emphasised the setting of measures to enhance financial 
accountability by the board and the chief executive to the shareholders through 
improving information transparency, and a more independent board by the separation 
of CEO and the chairman of the board. Also the report emphasised on having non- 
executive board members. The Cadbury Report identifies corporate governance as 
the relationship of three dimensions: 
"The shareholders role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and 
to satisfy themselves that an appropriate structure is in place". 
The responsibilities of the board include setting the company's strategic aims, 
providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the 
business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The financial aspects of 
corporate governance are the ways in which boards set financial policies and oversee 
its implementation, including the use of financial controls, and the process whereby 
they report on the activities and progress of the company to the shareholders. 
The role of the auditors is to provide the shareholders with an external and objective 
check on the directors' financial statements, which forms the basis of that reporting 
system (Cadbury, 1992 paras. 2.5 - 2.7). 
The Cadbury report was aimed to improve the level of information to the shareholders 
and invites non-executive members to the company to bring more confidence to the 
financial market particularly to the investors (Demirag et al, 2000 p. 344). 
It is important to note that the excessive powers and responsibilities given to the board 
may lead to misuse of these powers resulting in 'creative accounting' practices in 
many companies with the manipulation of company earnings (Demirag, 1998). 
Therefore, the objectives of the Cadbury report are for banks and other institutions to 
establish an effective risk management and control systems (Conyon, 1997). 
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However, the critics of the Cadbury codes of practice such as (Dewing and Russell, 
2000 p. 355) argued that the government of the UK has failed to provide the legislative 
framework and hence, it provides the accountancy profession the opportunity to fill 
the legal vacuum. This is because the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and the 
accounting profession were two of the three co-sponsors of the Cadbury Committee, 
the third being the London Stock Exchange (LSE) (Freedman, 1993). 
The Cadbury Report established a debate between those who felt that the code went 
too far and those who believed that the code did not do enough by leaving it voluntary 
for the companies to implement it. According to Green (1994): 
"There is a danger in an over emphasis on monitoring; on non- 
executive directors independence from the business of the corporation; 
on control of decision making activities of companies. When coupled 
with the clearly reduced status of executives on the governing boards, 
such requirements must blunt the competitive edge and deflect the 
entrepreneurial drive which characterises participants, let alone 
success in a free market". 
To counter the claims that the code did go far, it was agreed: 
"The committees' recommendations are steps in the right direction. But, if the 
government is to address the problems, which led to the Maxwell, Polly Peck, BCCI 
and other recent scandals, then new rules in a legal framework are required. 
Shareholders, investors and creditors will be disappointed that just when the corporate 
failures of recent years cried out for bold and imaginative legal return, the body from 
which so much had been expected came up with a little tinkering and a voluntary 
code". The Cadbury Committee Draft Orders Mixed News for Shareholders 
(Financial Times, June 2,1992). 
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It can be argued that since the code was not explicitly stated in the legislation, two 
issues were not complied with by the companies such as the director's report on the 
effectiveness of internal control and that the business was a going concern. 
The Committee recommended that guidelines need to be established for the above two 
issues by the accountancy profession together with representatives of preparers of 
accounts. Two working parties were set up under the auspices of the Hundred Group 
'of Finance Directors, the ICAEW and the ICAS: the Going Concern Working Group, 
under the chairmanship of Mr. Rodney Baker-Bates and the internal Control Working 
Group (Davies et al, 2000). 
Although the original terms of reference were to apply the code on the list companies, 
now other companies including unlisted private companies, subsidiaries of domestic 
or foreign companies, public sector bodies, charities and educational institutions have 
applied the code with greater or lesser effect (Davison, 2001). 
3.2.1.2 The Greenbury Committee 
The main shortcoming of the Cadbury recommendations was on the directors' 
remunerations. The market was concerned on the unjustifiable remunerations paid to 
companies' directors, including the share options offered to them. For this purpose, a 
committee was established known as Greenbury Committee. The Committee was 
under the chairmanship of Sir Richard Greenbury, chairman of Marks and Spencer. 
The Committee was established in January 1995 at the initiative of CBI to identify the 
good practice in determining directors' remuneration and preparing a code of such 
practice for use in the UK, PLCs. 
The Greenbury Committee issued its report in July 1995, which contains code of Best 
Practice. In October 1995 and June 1996, the London Stock Exchange gave effect to 
certain of these recommendations by amending its Listing Rules (Davies, et al, 2000). 
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The main recommendations of the Code of Best Practice were as follows Short (1998 
p. 61): 
1. Remuneration's committees should consist only of non-executive 
directors with no personal financial interest other than as shareholders 
in the issues to be discussed. No potential conflicts of interest arising 
from cross-directorship and no role in the running affairs of the 
business. 
2. Remuneration committee should report directly to shareholders in the 
annual meeting. 
3. Remuneration committee's report should include the company's policy 
regarding the setting and awarding of executive remuneration. 
4. Shareholders' approval is required for the adoption of long-term 
incentive plans. 
Share options should never be issued at discount, should be phased rather than issued 
in one large block and should not be exercisable in less than three years (Short, 1998 
p. 61). 
The Greenbury Report received criticism from the accounting profession such as 
Ernst and Young which suggested that average disclosures take up six to seven pages 
in the annual report. There were accusations that the volume of information has 
become a barrier to effective communication and has supported claims that the 
Cadbury and Greenbury codes have led to increase in bureaucracy and burdens on 
companies without achieving real benefits to shareholders. 
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3.2.1.3 Combined Code Guidance 
The Combined code includes both codes of Cadbury and Greenbury. During the last 
two decades audit committees (ACs) have become a common mechanism of corporate 
governance in several countries. Bank regulators and governmental bodies in many 
countries, including the UK and USA voiced concerns about the effectiveness of ACs 
(Turley and Zaman, 2003 p. 3). 
Lee (2001) argued that researchers expressed evidence that most, if not all, audit 
committees fall short of doing their perceived duties. Sommer (1991), others like 
Vichnair et al, (1993), DeZoort, (1997), Cohen et al (1999) Guy and Zeff, (2002) 
voiced concern relating to ACs such as independence, substance, expertise and 
experience in oversight. 
Turley and Zaman (2003 p. 5) argued that AC is expected to have an impa ct on the 
appointment, removal and remuneration of auditors, the content and extent of audit 
work and auditor independence. 
COSO (1994) also claimed that AC can strengthen the internal audit function and that 
internal audit can in turn be an important resource to the AC in fulfilling its 
responsibilities. 
To streamline the role of the audit committees for banks and the listed companies, the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) formed a group headed by Sir. Robert Smith to 
prepare a report on audit committees, which should be used by UK listed companies. 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA), the body responsible for regulating banks, 
requested banks operating in UK to adopt the FRC Combined Code. 
This guidance applies in respect of accounting periods starting on or after 1", July 
2003. This guidance was designed to assist company boards in making suitable 
arrangements for audit committees, and to assist directors serving on audit committees 
in carrying out their role (Combined code guidance, 2002). 
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3.2.1.4 The Hampel Report 
The Hampel Committee on corporate govemance was established in November 1995 
based on the initiative of the Chairman of the Financial Reporting Council, Sir 
Sydney Lipworth. The establishment of this committee was the adoption of the 
recommendation of the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees that a committee should 
be established to review the implementation of the findings of the two committees. 
Banks in the UK are required to adopt the combined code. 
3.3 Market Reaction to the UK Model of Corporate Governance 
3.3.1 The Advocates of the UK System of Corporate Governance 
The approach of self-regulation adopted in the LJK allowed for the greater speed of 
response and flexibility in the face of a changing environment, and the ability to 
draw on practioner expertise which is made available at a reduced cost (Cheffins, 
1997 p. p. 378-397). This has worked for the benefit of the Cadbury Committee 
since it allows practioners to be represented in the Committee. 
Others like Baggott, (1989 p. 438) argued the codes of corporate governance in the 
UK have evolved in consistence with British beliefs of self-regulation. Also the 
political environment during the eighties and nineties which had encouraged less 
government interference and supported the trend for market self-regulation has 
effected the approached used by the Cadbury Committee. 
Because the UK system is based on large base of shareholders, it seems to have 
made the capital market more efficient compared with the German capital market. 
Also, since the main decisions are in the hand of the shareholders only, this appears 
to have made the decisions process on strategic issues became faster than the 
German model. 
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In addition, managers are always under pressure to satisfy their shareholders 
because once the shareholders are not happy with their performance they can be 
removed. 
3.3.2 Critics of the UK Model of Corporate Governance 
The corporate governance codes that have been issued such as the Cadbury, Greebury 
and Hampel reports are not explicitly stated in the legislation, which makes them 
weaker than other models like in the USA. 
As indicated by Dewing and Russell (2000, p. 356), the process of setting and 
amending the codes of UK corporate governance has been to a large extent at an ad 
hoc basis and the mechanism for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the codes 
are weak and some times does non exist. 
The UK government says it prefers an approach based on best practice, rather than 
legislation (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2002). Because of this policy, two issues were 
not complied with by the companies, for example the director's report on the 
effectiveness of internal control and that the business was a going concern. 
Young (2002), who is a businessman and cabinet minister in former UK Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher's government, argued that a part-time board of directors 
to police boardrooms was noive and government attempts to regulate non-executives 
were "dangerous nonsense". He added "non-executives directors actually become a 
shield behind which the executive's shelter and investors should hold shareholders 
directly accountable to them". 
The Department of Trade and Industry appointed Derek Higgs, an investment banker, 
to review whether non-executive have "cosy" relationships with executives because 
they sit on each others' boards (Roberts, 2002). 
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Young (2002) claimed that "the idea has come about that in some manner non- 
executive can second guess the executives. If management is not too forthcoming, 
they can never even know, until it is far too late". It can be argued that because the 
executive board of directors appoints the non-executives, the non-executives may not 
be able to do their job in a professional manner. 
In contrast, Peter Montagnon, London-based head of investment at the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI) claimed, shareholders are not expecting non-executives 
directors to second-guess the executives or know as much about business as the 
management. They are not there to do that. But they have to know enough to judge 
the validity of management decisions at least in terms of strategy, ask challenging 
questions and ensure robust board debate. 
Furthermore, self-regulation within the context of the UK resulted in a lack of 
coherence and co-ordination in the development of corporate governance policy and 
practice in the UK and can be noted in the ad hoc establishment of corporate 
governance committees as a direct response to particular public concern (Cheffins 
1997 p. p. 379 - 418). 
Lastly, as stated earlier, the UK model is more relevant to the Agency Theory, which 
gives priority to the shareholders over other stakeholders. It can be argued that such 
treatment allows the management to make decisions for the interest of shareholders, 
which at the same time may be against the interest of other stakeholders. 
To draw a similar conclusion on the case of Islamic banks. Any Islamic bank may 
take a decision such as increasing the rate of Mudarib, which works for the interest of 
the shareholders, but at the same time would not be the interest of the investment 
account-holders because this would reduce their share of profit. 
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3.4 The System of Corporate Governance in USA 
3.4.1 Development of the USA model of Corporate Governance 
Traditionally, in America, shareholders have a comparatively big say in the running of 
the enterprise they own, workers have much less influence. In contrast, in continental 
Europe workers have a bigger say in the running of the enterprise over the 
shareholders. 
The structure of the Anglo-American system (e. g. UK, USA and Australia) is based 
on appointing the board of directors "by the shareholders" to act for their interest and 
be accountable to them, electing non-executive directors to monitor the decisions 
taken by the executive board and appointing independent auditors to ensure that the 
financial results are reliable. 
It has been argued that, by committing the future managers to particular monitoring 
and accountability, the original owner-manager will be able to increase the future 
profitability of the firms and maximize the sale of equity issue (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
The Stock market crash in 1929 in the USA and the exploitation of residual claimants 
by opportunistic decision agents is reflected in the argument for the establishment of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1932, particularly with respect to 
common stock of publicly listed corporations which allows more efficient sharing of 
risk than proprietors and partnership companies and where the decision-makers are in 
the hand of the residual claimants (shareholders) (Fama and Jensen, 1983a p. 4). 
The USA system of corporate governance went through a reform in the 1970s: It 
posed a challenge to self-interested directors who regularly hold insignificant stake 
and whose interest contradicts of those of shareholders (Mertzanis, 2001 p. 89, and 
Jensen and Chew, 1995). 
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The unique feature of the USA federal system is that the law of each state regulates 
companies to operate in its jurisdiction which might be different from another law of 
another state. As a result, competition arises between different states to attract 
companies to have a presence in its jurisdiction. 
As a consequence, the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with 
regard to Corporate Govemance is shared with the respected States (Charkham, 
1994). 
For instance, rules on the disclosure of executive remuneration exist in the SEC 
disclosure requirements and do not exist in the States disclosure requirements. This 
suggests that such issues are not approved by the shareholders since it's not stipulated 
in the States law. 
A significant development took place in December, 1999, when the SEC started to 
require all large USA companies listed in The New York Stock-Exchange or in 
NASDAQ to appoint at least three outside directors, all of whom have no relationship 
to the company that may interfere with the exercise of their independence from 
management and the company (Klein, 2002 p. 435). However, some (e. g. Daily & 
Dalton, 1992, and Rechner & Dalton, 1989) argue that the composition of the board 
has no impact on the firm performance. 
Berle and Means (1932) claim that corporate governance intends to allow disperse 
shareholders to exert corporate governance by directly voting on crucial issues, such 
as mergers, liquidation, and fundamental changes in business strategy and electing 
boar&s members. 
Furthermore, banks whose shares are listed, are required to adopt the rules of the 
SEC. It is worth mentioning that the UK and the USA models are similar because 
both systems are giving the interest of the shareholders preference over the interest of 
other parties of the enterprise. 
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3.4.2 The Advocates of the USA Model of Corporate Governance 
In the USA, the ownership structure of corporations is widely dispersed, hence the 
authorities decided to re-address the issue of principal-agent problem. As a result, the 
USA authorities have strengthened the role of the shareholders "including the right to 
remove the management" and disclosure laws (Beim and Calomiris, 2001 p. p. 198 - 
199). 
On the other hand, the Anglo-American model can be applied virtually by every 
country because the right of shareholders is, the same between one country and 
another. In this respect the approach taken by the International Accounting Standards 
Board is based on the Anglo-American approach of corporate governance which 
primarily addressed the needs of the shareholders, hence, this model lends itself as an 
international model. 
Following the failures of large corporations such as Enron and WorldCom in 2001 
and 2002, the issue of the independence of the audit committee was largely debated in 
the USA. In order to restore the confidence on the role of the audit committee, the 
Sarbanes-Oxlay Act, which came into effect on 30th, July, 2002, required all members 
of audit committee to be external directors. 
Furthermore, the new act required every audit committee to appoint a financial expert 
within its members and if the company decides not to appoint, it should disclose the 
reason for not appointing such an expert. The Sarbanes-Oxlay Act states that audit 
conunittee is the sole body within the company responsible for appointing, 
compensating, and overseeing the company's external auditors (Bies, 2003). 
3.4.3 The Criticism of the USA Model of Corporate Governance 
It has been argued that one of the limitations of the Anglo-American model is that the 
voice of the individual shareholder is limited. The ability to sell share in the stock 
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market gives the shareholder a low-cost opportunity exit (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
One of the characteristics of the USA financial system is that the shares of American 
large corporations are diffiisely owned and they dominate the USA business. 
Manager's agenda differs from shareholders; hence, the authorities in the States are 
trying to tide the interest of the shareholders with those of the managers (Row, 2003). 
As the USA economy grows, business units are becoming larger, and the right of the 
shareholder is diminishing. This is because ownership became more dispersed and 
few shareholders have the power to influence the choice of directors or chief 
executive officers (Row, 2003). 
Row (2003) claimed that the Chief executives in the USA system play the key role in 
managing the business units not the board to the extent that the appointed board 
members are within the "slate" proposed by the CEO. 
The audit committee of each listed public company (including banks with listed 
shares) on a securities market or NASDAQ would be responsible for the appointment, 
compensation, and oversight of the work of a registered public accounting firm 
related to issuing audit reports. 
Each member of such an audit committee must be a member of the board of directors 
and shall otherwise be independent. In addition, the audit committee member cannot 
accept any consulting, advisory, or compensatory fee for the public company, other 
than fees for serving as a board of committee member. The audit committee must 
establish procedures for processing complaints. All of the processing should be 
confidential, anonymous submissions by employees regarding accounting, internal 
control, and auditing matters. 
Another corporate governance weakness existing in the USA system as indicated by 
Row (2003) is the pressure on the CEOs from the investment community to meet 
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short term expectations, which encouraged companies to practice accounting 
treatments to obscure potential adverse results. External auditors on several cases 
have sanctioned such practices in order not to lose their clients, for example the Enron 
and WorldCom scandals. 
In the USA, boards especially dominated by outside directors, sometimes remove top 
managers after poor performance, Weisbach (1988) Mace (1971) and Jensen (1993) 
argue, as a general rule, corporate boards in the United States are captured by the 
management. There is limited empirical support that the preponderance of out-side 
directors is positively associated with profitability (Ezzaamel & Watson, 1993) or 
return on equity (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). 
Jensen (1989,1993) argued that the USA corporate governance system is deeply 
flawed and that a major move from the current corporate form to much more highly 
leveraged organizations, similar to LBOs, is in order. 
As mentioned before, in the USA many large corporations allow the same person to 
be the chairman and the CEO of the company. Under such system, the chairman will 
have greater responsibilities and influence compared to other systems (where a 
separation exist between the chairman and the CEO), for example the UK's combined 
code of June, 1998 which states that a clear division of responsibilities at the head of 
the company will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual 
has unfettered powers of decision. In the USA, the independent directors will be 
appointed by the chairman. 
Concentrated Shareholders Structure: 
One the main differences between the European models (e. g. Germany, Belgium, 
and France) and the Ango-American model is that the European block holdings are 
much higher than the Anglo-American model. Hence, the relationship between 
large controlling shareholders and weak minority shareholders is as important to 
analyze as between the dispersed shareholders and the managers, (Oogh, U, and De 
40 
Chapter 3 The Main Models of Corporate Governance 
Lange, 2002 p. 439). Due to the limited information disclosure, the ownership 
structure in Continental European countries is not as transparent as in Anglo- 
American countries. Regulations such as anti-trust laws and the "arm's length 
rules" between parent and daughter companies have limited the complexity of the 
ownership structure in Anglo-American countries (Van Hulle, 1997). 
Pyramidal structures (control firms through a chain of companies) and mutual 
shareholders are more common in countries with poor shareholder protection 
(Oogh, U, and De Lange, 2002 p. 439). Families have control over firms in excess of 
their cash flows rights, particularly through pyramids, and typically manage the 
firms they control. Pyramidal ownership appears to be an important mechanism 
used by controlling shareholders to separate their cash flow ownership from their 
control rights. 
Through pyramids, controlling rights acquire power disproportionate to their cash 
flow rights (Wolfenzon, 1998; LaPorta et al, 1998). In countries with good legal 
protection of the minority shareholders, widely held companies are more common 
(La porta et al, 1998, Becht et al, 2000). 
3.5 The Importance of Corporate Governance for Banks 
Corporate governance for banks is to make them operate for the interest of their 
shareholders, depositors and for the financial sector at large and it is also one of the 
measures to help regulators in supervising banks (Ciancanelli and Gonzalez, 2000 
p. 3). 
Corporate govemance for banks involves the manner in which the individual banks 
are governed by their board of directors and senior management (Basel, 1999). 
Effective corporate governance is an essential element in the safe and sound 
functioning of a bank. 
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Also the European Commission revealed the existence of some forty different 
corporate governance codes across the EU for banks (Davies, 2002). 
It is important to mention that moral hazard in banks is more severe due to the 
existence of deposit insurance schemes to protect the interest of small depositors 
(Caprio and Levine, 2002 p. 24). Dionne et al (2003 p. 4) claimed that the structure of 
a bank's balance sheets, with their high leverage and their variations in liquidity for 
assets and liabilities, seems to support the argument that bank directors should assume 
fiduciary obligations to fixed claimants as well as to equity claimants. 
Due to such risk, Dionne et al. (2003 p. 4) also argued that the bank's creditors should 
be able to sue directors for violations of their fiduciary responsibility for prudence and 
loyalty. 
The regulation of banks is vital for the safety of the financial sector. A failure of a 
bank might have contagious effect on other banks and on the financial sector at large. 
Bank's reputation and confidence is critically more important than non-financial 
institutions. Any rumors on a bank might affect the financial sector as a whole. 
Market discipline() and good corporate governance play an important role in 
protecting the individual banks and the financial sector in general. As put in a recent 
IMF Study: "An open and competitive banking market exerts its own form of 
discipline against weak banks while encouraging well-managed banks", (Lindgren, et 
al, 1996). 
(2) Market discipline: refers to the environmental features which, in response to the disclosure of material 
information, elicit prompt adjustments in either prices or quantities of financial positions of Islamic 
banks, and thereby provide incentives for Islamic banks to limit excessive risk-Wdng and pursue 
good governance. Market discipline, in this sense, requires a set of mechanisms through which 
markets can penalise excessive risk-taking or inadequate transparency (IFSB, 2006c). 
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Llewellyn (1999 p. 9) argued that the weak banks in terms of disclosure and 
transparency and poor accountancy data may face risk charged on their inter-bank 
borrowings. In addition, weak internal control in banks; weak surveillance by (mainly 
non-executive) directors, and ineffective internal audit is an indication that the bank 
has unsound corporate governance (Llewellyn, 1999 p. 9). 
The structure of banks and lines of responsibilities among various posts is a 
determining factor whether the bank has sound corporate governance or not, 
particularly if the bank is part of larger group. In the absence of good governance 
connected lending and weak risk analysis of borrowers may be noted. 
In well developed financial regimes, the discipline imposed by the market forces 
makes it difficult for banks not to establish good corporate governance, including 
frequent and adequate disclosures to the market. 
Caprio and Levine (2002 p. 10) argued that because banks are more less transparent 
than non financial entities, this intensifies the agency problem. This is due to greater 
information asymmetries between insiders and outside investors; it is more difficult 
for equity and debt holders to monitor managers and incentive contracts; easier for 
managers and large investors to exploit the benefits of control for their private benefit. 
There are other authors who advocated such views, e. g. Furfine (2001), who argued, 
that information asymmetries exists in all sectors and is worse in banks. 
The existence of information asymmetries lead to Agency problems because the 
shareholders will have little information to assess the performance of the 
management. The result of information asymmetries will establish unsound corporate 
governance since the shareholders will have little information to monitor the actions 
of the management. 
Caprio and Levine (2002 p. 2) state that under information asymmetries, it makes it 
very difficult for outsiders to monitor and evaluate managers. It also makes it 
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difficult for diffuse equity and debt holders to write and enforce effective incentive 
contracts, to use their voting rights as a vehicle for influencing firm decisions, or to 
constrain managerial discretion through debt covenants. 
In countries where the domination of large sectors of the banks is by few families, this 
makes insider abuses more likely most often at the expense of outside equity 
investors, depositors, and ultimately taxpayers (Levine, 2003 p. 8). 
Levine (2003 p. 5) also claimed there are particularly large information asymmetries in 
banks between managers and small shareholders, because managers are controlling 
the level of information to be published and small shareholders relied on others (free- 
rider) to monitor the behavior of the managers. 
On the other hand, Levine (2003 p. 7) indicated that greater information asymmetries 
between insiders and outsiders in banking make it very difficult for diffuse equity and 
debt holders to monitor bank managers. 
Furthermore, the intervention by the IMF, Bank for International Settlement (BIS) 
and World Bank to ask countries to strengthen their supervision over banks, has put 
pressure on all countries to implement the best regulatory standards. One of the 
important issues that these international organisations are emphasizing on is the issue 
of corporate governance. 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
The UK model of corporate governance is characterized as a system that gives 
priority to shareholders over other stakeholders through making the management 
accountable to the shareholders. 
This model has been criticized by researchers, businessmen and other interested 
parties. It has been argued that since the government did not enacted the FRC 
Combined Code into law it has lacked the power to enforce compliance with the 
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Code. (This was in fact a deliberate choice of the LJK government, which preferred to 
rely on a voluntary code with self-enforcement on a "comply or explain" basis). 
The appointment of non-executive directors to ensure that the board works for the 
interest of the shareholders can be questioned since the non-executive director will be 
appointed by the executive board which may create some conflict of interest. 
On the other hand, some researchers and practioners supported the UK model of 
corporate governance as a model of dispersed shareholders which has impacted 
positively on the capital market and made one of the most efficient capital markets 
along with USA. 
To restore the market confidence which had been negatively affected by the failures 
of large corporations and banks, there was a strong debate among professionals and 
academics to establish effective corporate governance. In 1991, The Cadbury 
Committee issued the code of Best Practice. The Cadbury Committee focused on 
enhancing financial reporting and making the management more accountable to the 
shareholders. 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA), the body responsible for regulating banks 
and other financial institutions requested banks operating in UK to adopt the FRC 
Combined Code (see page 32). 
All these codes intend to strengthen the role of the board by enabling them to monitor 
the management more effectively, enhancing transparency, and strengthening the 
internal control and risk management through the establishment of an audit committee 
and a remuneration committee. 
The USA model of corporate governance went through two main changes, one in 
1932 when the SEC was established which was intended to restore confidence in the 
capital market after the 1929 stock market crash. The second major reform was in 
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2002 when the Sarbanes-Oxlay act came into effect which was a result of failures of 
large corporations like Enron and WorldCom in 200 1. 
The Sarbanes-Oxlay act required every audit committee to appoint a financial expert 
Within its members. The new act also stated that the audit committee is the sole body 
within the company which is responsible for appointing, compensating and 
overseeing the external company's external auditors. 
The USA federal states sometimes create contradictions between the responsibility of 
the State and the duties of the SEC. This has resulted in reducing the role of the SEC 
in enforcing its laws, including those requirements relating to corporate governance. 
One of the main drawbacks in the USA system is the diversity of the shareholders 
base which had resulted in little control on the management by the shareholders. 
Banks are more opaque than non financial entities. This tends to intensify the agency 
problem and thus requires an effective corporate governance. This is due to greater 
information asymmetries between insiders and outside investors. 
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Islamic Banking Practices 
Islamic banks mobilize a large proportion of their funds in the form, not of interest 
bearing deposits, but of profit-sharing and loss-bearing investment accounts held by 
Investment Account Holders (LAJD. These accounts, from the point of view of 
Shari'ah jurisprudence, have equity-like rather than liability-like characteristics. 
IAH funds represent the main source of funding for a majority of the Islamic banks. 
Investment accounts, which are in most cases based on a version of the profit-sharing 
and Ioss-bearing Mudaraba contract under which the funds are managed on behalf of 
their holders. 
Due to contractual relationship between the Islamic bank and the IAH, the Islamic 
banks as manager (Mudarib) are entitled to a percentage of the IAH profits. Usually 
Islamic banks stipulate in their contracts with IAH the maximum Mudarib rate. 
While an Islamic bank is entitled to receive its Mudarib share of profits only when the 
IAH funds generate profits, in contrast, fund managers receive typically their 
management fee based on the net assets value (NAV) and regardless of whether the 
funds generate profits or not. 
L4. H funds share several features of subordinated debt, including, most importantly, 
the subordination of their claims to those of creditors. Also, unlike conventional 
depositors, neither holders of subordinated debt nor IAH are in a position to initiate a 
bank run, and stand to lose part or all of their capital if their investments yield 
negative returns (Archer and Karim, 2006). 
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Types of IAH: 
Unrestricted L4H (Mudaraba Contract): Unrestricted IAH refers to funds 
received by the Mudarib (the bank) from the Rab al Maal (investor) on the basis 
that the Mudarib will have the right to use and invest those funds without 
restrictions. 
This includes the Mudarib's right to commingle those invested funds with its own 
investment for proportionate participation in profits and losses after the Mudarib 
receives its share of profit as Mudarib (Mudaraba Standard, AAOIFI, 1996). 
It is worth noting that IAH represent 60 per cent or more of the funding side of the 
bank's balance sheet, which is the case with many Islamic banks (Archer and Karim, 
2006 p. 140). 
The nature of Unrestricted Investment Accounts (UIA) permits the bank to 
commingle its own funds with the bank's assets, unlike conventional banks where a 
separation exists between the bank's assets (Chinese Wall) from those funds managed 
under fiduciary basis; such separation includes appointing dedicated staff responsible 
for fiduciary accounts to avoid any conflict of interest. 
Al-Baluchi (2006 p. 4) claimed that fiduciary risk is related to the nature of the 
Mudaraba contract, which places liability for losses on the Mudarib in case of wrong- 
doing, negligence or breach of contract on the part of the management of the 
Mudaraba. 
Due to the nature of unrestricted investment accounts which allows the bank to 
commingle its own funds with LAR fimds, adequate transparency is absolutely 
essential to enable the IAH to assess the performance of the management. This will 
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
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Standard & Poor's in their latest commentary paper in 2006 on the rating of Islamic 
banks pointed out that for unrestricted investment accounts, neither the returns nor the 
principal is guaranteed. 
Even if an Islamic bank makes a loss that impairs the principal value of the unrestricted 
investment accounts, S&P (Standard & Poors) would not recognise a "soft default", 
because no contractual obligation would be breached. Only in the case of management 
misconduct or negligence would the bank be liable to LAE for all losses incurred (S&P, 
Oct. 2006). 
As claimed by S&P, holders of unrestricted Profit Sharing Investment Account (PSIA) 
should refer to the ratings of the Islamic bank offering the PSIA as the best indicator of 
the PSIA's overall creditworthiness as measured by a given probability of default. Such 
comments by S&P have made new interesting and relevant interpretation of the 
assessment of Islamic banks which will help in providing the market with a fair 
assessment of Islamic banks. 
Other credit rating agencies are so far silent on this issue which may be interpreted as 
treating a loss than impairs the equity of IAH as default. This runs contrary to the 
treatment of IAH in the IFSB Capital Adequacy Standard which calls for the deduction of 
the total risk weighed assets fmanced by LAH from the denominator to the capital 
adequacy ratio, which is in line with the S&P rating methodology. 
Restricted IAH (Mudaraba Contract): Restricted IAH refers to funds received 
by the Mudarib (the bank) from the Rab al Maal (account holders) on the basis 
that the Mudarib should follow the Rab al Maal's instructions on matters such 
as the type of investment, the level of risk and the commingling of its own 
investment with the Mudarib funds (Mudaraba standard, AAOIFL 1996). 
Archer and Karim (2006 p. 134) argues that the status of IAH raises lack of clarity 
regarding the status of these investment accounts in practice. 
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Unlike conventional banks where dedicated staff is appointed for managing fiduciary 
accounts, Islamic banks have no dedicated staff responsible for managing the 
restricted investment accounts from those responsible for managing the bank's assets. 
This creates conflict of interest and hence the risk that the interest of restricted IAH 
may not be adequately protected. 
4.1 Current Accounts 
Current accounts in Islamic banks are demand deposits, that is, debt claims on the 
bank which can be withdrawn at any time, and are not entitled to any remuneration; 
they are "capital certain" since repayment is a contractual right protected by the bank 
having adequate equity capital. The bank commingles the funds of current accounts 
with its own funds. 
4.2 Fiduciary Risk() 
A fiduciary relationship exists when the shareholders (principal) appoints someone 
(agent/manager) to manage their enterprise on their behalf. A disciplined corporate 
governance mechanism ensures that the manager works for the interests of the 
shareholders (owners) by making management accountable to the shareholders. 
Establishing an effective system of accountability requires, among other matters, an 
effective risk management system, appointment of audit committees, and 
transparency in order to enable shareholders to monitor the managers effectively. 
(3) Fiduciary Risk: This is related to the nature of the Mudaraba contract, which places liability for 
losses on the Mudarib (manager) in case of malfeasance, negligence or breach of contract on the 
part of the management of the Mudaraba. 
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Archer and Karim (2006) argued that to fulfill its fiduciary duty the bank as 
(Mudarib) is expected to maximize profit for and act in the best interests of IAH. 
This will be examined in more details in chapters 7,8,9, and 10. 
The management of the Islamic bank owes a fiduciary duty to two categories of 
equity holders, shareholders and IAH, whose interests may not necessarily be 
congruent (Archer and Karim, 2006 p. 13 6). 
IAH expects the management as part of its fiduciary duties to manage their funds 
prudently and pay them an attractive rate of return while compensating the 
management with an acceptable Mudarib rate for their services. However, the 
shareholders expect the management to pay them an attractive dividend yield and a 
good value for their share. 
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A bank's failure may lead to detrimental impact on the financial sector as whole 
(Caprio et al, 2003). This makes transparency all the more important in banks as it 
enables the shareholders to monitor management more effectively and accordingly 
prevent systemic risk. 
In Islamic banks, prior to the establishment of AAOIFI, the lack of adequate 
disclosure by Islamic banks was very apparent. 
(4) Transparency of an UFS refer s to an environment where material and reliable information about the 
IIFS is made available in a timely and accessible manner to the market at large and to all 
stakeholders. Such transparency can reduce asymmetric information and uncertainty in financial 
markets, refers to the environmental features, which, in response to the disclosure of material 
information, elicit prompt adjustments in either prices or quantities of financial positions in the 
IIFS, and thereby provide incentives for IIFS to limit excessive risk-taking and pursue good 
governance. Market discipline, in this sense, requires a set of mechanisms through which markets 
can penalise excessive risk-taking or inadequate transparency (IFSB, 2006c). 
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This may have been due to a lack of appreciation of the financial reporting 
requirements which Islamic banks should comply in order to provide adequate 
disclosure to L4. H in their capacity as equity investors, not depositors. Prior to 
implementation of AAOIFI's Standards Islamic banks were hardly required to 
disclose any information relating to the investments of LAR's funds. 
Also Islamic banks were also divided as regards the accounting treatment of IAH on 
their balance sheet. Some banks reported IAH funds on the balance sheet under 
liabilities, while other treated them as part of equity. Yet a third group of banks 
treated all IAH funds as off-balance sheet items. Karim (2001) argues that these 
differences were due to the approaches adopted by various countries to regulate 
Islamic banking. 
As the issue of transparency is very critical, AAOIFI was established in 1991 to 
improve the transparency of Islamic financial institutions by setting accounting 
standards that would allow shareholders and IAH to have access to information that 
helps them in their decision-making. For example, Accounting Standard No. 5 
provides the basis on which profits are distributed between the Shareholders and IAH 
(AAOIFI, 2002 p. 224). 
Enhancing transparency in Islamic banks should improve market discipline. The 
Basle Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS's) Revised Capital Adequacy 
Framework (BCBS 2005, commonly known as Basel 11) has taken the view that 
market discipline is increasingly important in a world where banking activities are 
becoming more and more complex. 
This is reflected in Pillar 3 of Basel II, which encourages greater bank disclosure to 
strengthen market discipline and accordingly establish good governance. 
As IAH have no direct monitoring role over the management of an Islamic bank, 
adequate transparency may be the only mechanism that can be used to enable them to 
assess the performance of the management. Therefore, should the LAR receive a 
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lower than expected IAH return, IAH can sanction management by withdrawing their 
funds. 
Furthermore, IAH requires more information than depositors of conventional banks 
since, like the shareholders, IAH bear the risk of loss of their investments. 
In spite of the AAOIFI efforts in developing transparency and disclosure, there is 
demand for developing new standards or for updating the existing standards. For 
example, AAOIFI Standards do not require the disclosure of the actual Mudarib 
percentage rate charged to the IAH provided the rate does not exceed the maximum 
rate stated in the Mudaraba contract. 
Furthermore, the existing AAOIFI Accounting Standards do not require disclosure of 
the actual returns generated on IAH funds. This means IAH will not be able to assess 
the performance of the management with regard to the management of their funds. 
4.4 Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks 
The debate in the corporate governance literature has mainly concentrated on whether 
corporate governance should focus exclusively on protecting the interests of 
shareholders, or whether such a focus should be broadened to protect the interest of 
other stakeholders (Many and O'Hara, 2003). 
The essence of the agency problem is the separation of ownership (shareholders) and 
control (management) (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). To address such problem good 
governance is a mechanism to encourage management to work for the interest of the 
shareholders. 
Such mechanism of corporate governance is to make the manager accountable to the 
shareholders. Establishing effective corporate governance includes establishing an 
effective risk management system, an effective audit committee, visionary board of 
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directors "representing the interest of shareholders and IAH", adequacy of 
information "to shareholders and IAH", among other matters. 
Greuning and Iqbal (2007 p. 29) stated that IAH are like quasi-equity holders but 
without participation in the governance of the Islamic bank. As a result, IAH do not 
have any direct recourse to the bank to protect their rights. 
In spite of the potential risk of the IAH losing their funds, IAHs have no governance 
rights. 
Therefore, they rely on the board of directors/shareholders to represent their interest, 
but actual practice reflects otherwise. For example, there are a number of Islamic 
banks, which have attempted to pay shareholders a constant high rate of dividends for 
a long period, while IAH in those banks were receiving minimum returns. This is due 
to PDF high Mudarib rate and Islamic financial leverage effeCt(5). This will be 
discussed in more details in chapter 11. 
This apparently was due to certain expenses were charged to IAH. Such practices 
tend to please the shareholders. This will be discussed in more details when we 
analyze the case studies in chapter 11. 
However, in order to protect the interests of the Unrestricted LAR (the funds of 
Unrestricted investment accounts are commingled with the shareholders funds), some 
(5) Islamic financial leverage: Extent to which an Islamic bank uses investment accounts financing to 
fund a portfolio of assets in order to benefit from the Mudarib share of profit. 11is enables the 
lsl*nic bank to increase its shareholders' return on equity for no additional financial risk. This is 
subject to the possibility of DCR (Archer and Karim 2006). DCR arises when the Islamic bank is 
under pressure to give up part or all of its Mudarib share of profits in order to enhance the returns to 
the IAH. This pressure my come from the market or from the supervisor. 
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countries (e. g. Qatar and Malaysia) the banking supervisor takes the view that Islamic 
banks should not allow unrestricted IAH to suffer a loss of their capital or a major fall 
in their returns. 
Such decision by the bank supervisors is a signal to the management of the Islamic 
banks to take equally, the interests, of the Unrestricted LkH and shareholders. 
This decision would also give investors the confidence to place their funds with the 
Islamic banks. 
Archer and Karim (2006 p. 140) argued that in order to mitigate the effects of this 
practice, which could not be sustained in the longer term if the shareholders had 
consistently to forgo the bank's Mudarib share, that the management of many Islamic 
banks introduced the PER() (Profit Equalization Reserve). 
Similar considerations apply to the IRRV) (Investment Risk Reserve); the IRR may 
give rise to moral hazard problems similar to those arising from deposit insurance 
schemes, since the existence of IRR in Islamic banks is likely to encourage 
management to engage in excessive risk-taking. 
(6) PER is an amount set aside from the income of both LkH and shareholders before the allocation of 
the Bank' share as Mudarib to smooth the profit of IAH to match the returns of instruments in the 
market, thereby encouraging IAH to retain the funds with the Bank to mange them on their behalf. 
The PER may also be used to increase owners' equity; AAOIFI, Financial Accounting Standard No. 
11, Provisions and Reserves Manama, Bahrain, 1999). The PER serves to mitigate DCR. 
IRR is an amount set aside from the income of IAH, but not the shareholders, after the allocation of 
the Bank's share as a Mudarib to absorb losses attributed to investments financed by IAH before the 
losses affect the equity of IAH. Shareholders cannot contribute to this reserve because this is 
considered as indirectly compensating IAH for losses, which is prohibited by the Mudaraba 
contract. 
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While the declared objective of the PER was to reduce volatility of LAH returns, it 
provided management with a mechanism to tap this pool of funds to relieve 
shareholders of the burden of smoothing the returns of IAH or to mitigate problems of 
asset-liability management 
Since the relationship between the IAH and the Islamic bank is based on Mudaraba, 
the bank as manager (Mudarib) is not permitted by Shariah to fix in advance the 
amount of the return to be paid to LAR. The amount of the return will be based on the 
results of the investment, which are shared between the IAH and the bank as Mudarib, 
with the bank's percentage share being stated in the Mudaraba contract (in practice, 
this percentage is normally a maximum). 
This allows the Islamic banks to change the IAH return from year to another. 
However, in order for the Islamic bank to be competitive in the market, sometime the 
shareholder will give up part of their Mudarib (commission) share of profits to beef 
up the IAH return. 
This is because losses can be covered, at least in part, by this reserve, which is 
financed only from the funds of IAH and not those of shareholders, and this is likely 
to increase the management's risk appetite to a higher level than that of the IAH, 
especially as the IRR is appropriated from profits after the calculation of the Mudarib 
share which is unaffected, while in the case of a loss, Mudarib share is zero 
irrespective of the size of the loss. 
Even if a loss arose due to misconduct and negligence it could wrongly be absorbed 
by the IRR, although, according to the Mudaraba contract it should be borne by the 
shareholders. It would indeed be difficult for IAH to be aware of such occurrences 
because of the absence of either adequate disclosure or adequate governance 
structures to prevent such practices. 
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4.5 Appointment, Duties and Responsibilities of the Shariah Supervisory Board 
(SSB) 
The main purpose for establishing Islamic banks is to allow Muslims to conduct their 
financial transactions in accordance with Shariah precepts. In order to give 
credibility and to satisfy the ethical expectations of their customers, the majority of 
Islamic banks have developed a control process in the form of in-house religious 
advisers, commonly called the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). The membership 
of the SSB is drawn exclusively from very knowledgeable Shariah Scholars 
(Gambling et al, 1993). 
The SSB is a part time board. At the end of financial year, they submit a report to the 
shareholders' annual assembly on the bank's compliance with Shariah. This matter 
will be discussed in more details in chapter 7,8,9, and 10. 
The members of the SSB are appointed by the banles shareholders or in some cases by 
the board of directors. They have the right to attend the annual general meeting of the 
bank, and perform all or some of the following duties (Karim, 1990): 
1. Design and approve the banles contracts for its basic activities and issue religious 
rulings in response to requests by the staff. 
2. Advise the external auditors and the management of the bank on the accounting 
treatments, which require departure from generally accepted accounting 
principles in order to comply with Shariah precepts. 
3. Ensure that the bank's practices conform to the spirit as well as the letter of Islamic 
teaching. 
4. Prepare a religious (compliance] report as part of the annual report, in which it 
attests whether the banles operations are in conformity with the Shariah. 
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The functions of a SSB, which are usually spelt out in the articles of association of the 
bank, lie in two main areas. These are ex ante compliance (e. g., the checking of 
contracts in advance of their use), and ex post compliance. The ex ante is usually 
conducted by an Internal Shariah Review (ISR) comprising of Shariah staff which 
are appointed by the management or in some cases by the SSB. 
Usually members of the SSB are not employees of the bank. While, the ISR is a full 
time staff of the bank. However, the SSB has a right of access to any source of 
information and, at the end of the financial year; it issues a special report that is 
published with the external auditor's report. 
Karim (1990b) claims that in some banks, the SSB's role is mandatory and in other 
banks, the SSB's role is advisory in nature. 
The transparency created by the central Shari'ah board' rulings can at times impact on 
governance related matters. These rulings create benchmark of acceptable practices, 
which can reduce differences between a bank's management and its SSB and 
encourage meaningful dialogue about the acceptability of new products and services 
(McKinsey, 2007 p. 111). 
In the absence of a single authority on how to interpret and apply Islamic law, 
individual banks appoint recognized Islamic scholars as members of the SBB, to rule 
on whether new products or services are compliant, as well as to audit a bank's day- 
to-day operations. 
The existence of a religious authority within banks also creates clear governance 
challenges, particularly when the opinions of its management and board, with their 
focus on financial results, diverge from those of the SSB. 
However, in certain countries (such as the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia) it is a 
legal requirement for Islamic banks to establish an SSB. The Malaysian Islamic 
Banking Act (1983) states that "the Central Bank shall not recommend the grant of a 
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license, and the Minister shall not grant a license, unless the Central Bank or the 
Minister, as the case may be, is satisfied that there is, in the articles of association of 
the bank concerned, provision for the establishment of a Shariah Supervisory Board 
to advise the bank on the operations of its banking business in order to ensure that 
they do not involve any element which is not approved by the Religion of Islam". 
In Bahrain, the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) appoints an internal part-time 
Shari'ah Supervisory Board and its role is to give advice to the CBB on matters 
relating to banking or other business issues. 
The fiduciary responsibility of Islamic banks towards their customers includes a 
primary undertaking by the Islamic banks to comply with Islamic Shariah rules and 
principles at all times (IFSB, 2006b). 
The appointment of SSB and ISR is aimed at acting as a watchdog on the bank's 
management to ensure that the bank operates in accordance with Shariah. 
The IFSB Corporate Standard (2006b) recommends that Islamic banks form a three- 
member Governance Committee, which shall include an independent non-executive 
director to chair the Governance Committee. A Shariah scholar who is an SSB 
member for the purpose of leading the Governance Committee on Shariah related 
governance issues and also to coordinate and link the complementary roles and 
functions of the Governance Committee and the SSB. 
One of the objectives of the IFSB Corporate Governance Standard is to address the 
fiduciary responsibility to make sure that the Islamic bank adheres to Islamic rules 
and principles laid down by the SSB. 
AAOIFI Governance Standards complement the role played by the IFSB to ensure 
that the Islamic banks perform its fiduciary responsibly towards its stakeholders on 
the bank's compliance with Shariah. 
59 
Chapter 4 Islamic Banking Practices 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
Corporate governance is a mechanism to ensure that management work for the 
interests of the shareholders (owners) by making them accountable to the 
shareholders. It encourages transparency and accountability to enable IAII and other 
stakeholders to assess the performance of the management and to enable them make 
more informed investment decisions. 
In an Islamic bank, the IAH expect more information than depositors of conventional 
banks because, unlike a deposit holder, the LAH are exposed to the risk of losing their 
investments. Further, the IAH share a similar characteristic with small and dispersed 
shareholders as both these groups have limited influence on management. 
As an IAH has no direct monitoring role over the management of an Islamic bank, 
adequate transparency may be the only mechanism that can be used to enable them to 
assess the performance of the management. Therefore, should the IAH receive a 
lower then expected IAH return, IAH can sanction management by withdrawing their 
funds. 
The nature of Unrestricted Investment Accounts (UIA) permits the bank to 
commingle its own funds with the bank's assets. Unlike conventional banks where a 
separation exists between the bank's assets (Chinese Wall) from those funds managed 
under fiduciary basis, such separation includes appointing dedicated staff responsible 
for fiduciary accounts to avoid any conflict of interest. 
In spite of the potential risk of the UH losing their funds, IAHs have no governance 
rights. 
Therefore, they rely on the board of directors/shareholders to represent their interest, 
but the true reflects otherwise. For example, there are few Islamic banks, which have 
attempted to pay shareholders a constant high rate of dividends for a long period, 
while IAH in those banks were receiving minimum returns. 
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However, in order to protect the interest of the Unrestricted IAH (the funds of 
Unrestricted investment accounts are commingled with the shareholders funds), in 
some countries (e. g. Qatar and Malaysia) the banking supervisor takes the view that 
Islamic banks should not allow unrestricted IAH to suffer a loss of their capital or a 
, major 
fall in their returns. 
The IFSB Corporate Governance Standard is to address the fiduciary responsibility is 
to ensure that Islamic banks adhcre to Islamic rules and principles laid down by the 
SSB. 
AAOIFI Governance Standards complement those issued by the IFSB. While the 
IFSB addresses the Sharl'ah governance by recommending the establishment of an 
effective governance system within the bank, the AAOIFI Governance Standards 
tackle the Shariah governance by promoting transparency and accountability of 
management. 
The functions of a SSB, which are usually spelt out in the articles of association of the 
bank, lie in two main areas. These are ex ante compliance (e. g., the checking of 
contracts in advance of their use), and ex post compliance. The ex ante is usually 
conducted by an Internal Shariah Review (ISR) comprising of Shariah staff which 
are appointed by the management or in some cases by the SSB. 
The transparency created by the central Sharilah board rulings can at times impact on 
governance related matters. These rulings create benchmark of acceptable practices, 
which can reduce differences between a bank's management and its SSB and 
encourage meaningful dialogue about the acceptability of new products and services. 
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Chapter 5 
Research Issues 
5.1 Introduction 
Based on a view of pertinent literature and the prevalent industry practice, it can be 
inferred that the existence of profit-sharing and loss-bearing investment accounts in 
Islamic banking and the lack of clarity regarding the status of these accounts, raise 
important questions of corporate governance, transparency, market discipline and the 
role of the regulators. 
The following sections set out the theoretical basis development of this thesis, i. e. the 
issues concerning corporate governance in Islamic banks particularly from a banking 
supervisor's point of view. 
5.2 The Accountability of the Board of Directors and Management 
As discussed in chapter 2 above, Agency Theory is concerned with the relationships 
between various stakeholders in the corporation. In the first instance, it is concerned 
with the principal-agent relationship (that arises owing to the separation of ownership 
and control) between the shareholders as principals and the management as agent. But 
it also considers principal-principal relationships between two sets of principals where 
there may be conflicts of interests. For example, creditors such as bondholders 
constitute a class of principal different from shareholders. With particular reference 
to Islamic banks, while there are obviously no bondholders, there is not merely a 
potential principal-agent problem with regard to the relationship between the IAH as 
principals and the management as agents, but also a potential principal-principal 
problem with regard to the relationship between the IAH and the shareholders as two 
sets of principals whose interests may not coincide. However, the Agency Theory 
literature does not consider principals such as IAH who are a form of stakeholder 
specific to Islamic banks. 
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Managements of banks in the USA and UK, and indeed elsewhere, typically adopt the 
view that maximisation of shareholders' wealth is the main duty of management. 
Such a view ignores, however, the Islamic bank's duty as Mudarib to pay equal 
attention to the interests of its IAH. 
Agency Theory considers certain mechanisms that serve to mitigate the principal- 
agent problem. As mentioned in chapter 2, these include bonding and monitoring. 
Bonding consists of binding undertakings by the management to avoid certain types 
of action that may be contrary to the interests of principals. One common form of 
bonding which is used to protect the rights of bondholders consists of debt covenants 
that restrict the right to pay dividends to shareholders and to raise further borrowings 
unless the rights of the new lenders are subordinated to those of the bondholders. 
Monitoring involves providing principals with the means to exercise scrutiny of the 
actions of management, such as the provision of periodic financial statements, 
external audit and annual general meetings. Shareholders typically have the right to 
approve the appointment of members of the board of directors and to vote directors 
off the board. Moreover, if bondholders do not receive payments of interest and 
principal by the due dates, they can typically acquire governance rights such as the 
right to appoint an administrator to manage the corporation in their interests. 
Islamic banks are built around the profit sharing concept which is different from the 
conventional banks. The IAH share the profits earned from the investment of their 
funds with the Islamic bank as fund manager (i. e. Mudarib) and are exposed to losses 
on such investments, unlike depositors in conventional banks whose funds are 
remunerated by means of a contractually agreed rate of interest with the principal 
amount being guaranteed. Hence IAHs are crucially affected by their bank's 
investment performance. In spite of this, under the Mudaraba contract IAH have no 
right to intervene in the Islamic bank's investments and policies, which are the sole 
prerogative of the Mudarib. A clear separation must occur between IAH and their 
invested capital. However, unlike the situation with shareholders, this separation of 
capital ownership from management under Mudaraba as currently applied does not 
provide any rights of governance or oversight to IAH in exchange for their funds. 
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The lack of governance rights of IAH means that they cannot exercise monitoring 
over management; even if they have access to periodic financial reports, they have no 
say in the appointment or removal of members of the board of directors and their only 
recourse if they are dissatisfied is to withdraw their investment (perhaps at a loss). 
In such a situation, it can be suggested that the IAHs may place reliance on the 
shareholders to monitor the management of the Islamic bank on their behalf 
"vicarious monitoring" by shareholders of behalf of IAH (see Archer and Karim 
2006). The same authors (Archer and Karim, 2006) pointed out that the management 
of an Islamic bank has a fiduciary duty both to the shareholders and also to the IAH. 
Moreover, there is a similarity between LAR and dispersed shareholders as both have 
little influence on the management. Yet since the interests of shareholders and IAH 
do not necessarily coincide, there is a potential principal-principal problem that may 
undermine the "vicarious monitoring" as described above. 
With regard to the principal-principal problem between shareholders and IAII, it is 
certainly in the shareholders' interest to attract and retain the funds of IAH, as the 
bank's Mudarib share of the profits earned from investing these funds is a major 
source of income for the shareholders (Al-Deehani et al, 1999). Thus, depriving IAII 
of attractive returns in order to offer significantly more attractive returns to 
shareholders might seem to be a poor policy for management to follow. In principle, 
therefore, the hypothesis that vicarious monitoring is effective has some plausibility. 
As indicated in chapter 4, however, it was noted that some Islamic banks were paying 
consistently high returns to shareholders compared to very minimal returns to IAH. 
Such a difference in the payment of returns between the shareholders and IAH not 
merely implies that management gives preference to the interests of the shareholders 
over the IAH, but also casts great doubt on the "vicarious monitoring" hypothesis. In 
fact, there would seem to be a double agency problem affecting the interests of IAH: 
both a principal-agent problem as between the IAH and the management, and a 
principal-principal problem as between shareholders and IAH. Moreover, no bonding 
or monitoring mechanisms are available to the IAH to mitigate these agency 
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problems. They have the right to withdraw their funds if they are dissatisfied with the 
management of their funds, but do not have the right to receive the information on the 
basis of which they can make a well-founded decision on such a matter (an instance 
of the problem of asymmetric information). 
This situation results a failure of the managements' fiduciary duty toward the IAII and 
constitutes weak governance which will be discussed further in this thesis. 
5.3 Transparency and Disclosure 
The benefits of adequate information are the reduction of information asymmetry 
between the management and stakeholders which facilitates monitoring of 
management by the stakeholders and, in principle, the promotion of effective market 
discipline. 
This coincides with the Basel Committees' new strategy. Pillar 3 of Basel II 
encourages greater disclosure by banks to strengthen market discipline and 
accordingly to promote good governance. This part of the new policy of the Basel 
Committee aims to establish what is called a friendly approach of supervision through 
reliance on fuller disclosures, better market discipline and good governance. 
The Basel Committee believes that fuller disclosures and good governance makes the 
board of directors and management more accountable towards their shareholders and 
other stakeholders. 
In this new policy, financial intermediaries play a significant role in assessing the 
reports published by banks in terms of transparency with the aim that the market will 
have access to greater information which will be reflected in the bank's share price 
and its borrowing costs. 
The question that arises in the context of this thesis is how effective market discipline 
is likely to be in the case of Islamic banks. With regard to financial reporting, Islamic 
banks are subject to various accounting standards. Some regulators require Islamic 
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banks under their supervision to adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), while others promote Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions adopts (AAOIFI) Standards. Such differences make it difficult 
to compare information between Islamic banks applying different accounting 
standards. 
Although AAOIFI-based disclosures provide greater information than IFRS-based 
disclosures, there is still a lack of adequate information published by Islamic banks. 
This is part of what is called a weak information environment. This suggests that 
without adequate disclosures, development of effective market discipline and good 
governance will be hampered, to the determent of shareholders. The existence of a 
weak information environment will contribute to weak governance and ineffective 
market discipline. This issue will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
In a weak information environment, the board of directors and management may 
decide on strategic issues that may affect the interests of other stakeholders without 
their knowledge (i. e. an inadequate provision of monitoring facilities). For example, 
Islamic banks in the Arabian Gulf pays very attractive salaries to their executives 
since neither the accounting standards nor the regulators require them to disclose such 
information. Currently there is a debate within the industry as to whether Islamic 
banks should be required to disclose certain information about the salaries of their 
executives. Islamic banks are expected to resist to such a move because it may put 
pressure on the board of directors to provide adequate explanations to the 
shareholders and IAHs of practices outside the norm of conventional banking. 
While a weak information environment is detrimental to the interests of shareholders, 
it is equally detrimental to those of IAH. Among other things, IAH may be 
misinformed about the actual returns on their investments. This may result from the 
use of creative accounting techniques, such as profit equalisation reserves and 
investment risk reserves, which is standard practice in Islamic banks in most countries 
where they operate (see chapter 4). 
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However, for market discipline to be effective, market actors such as shareholders and 
IAH not only need to be adequately informed, but they also need to be sufficiently 
knowledgeable and active to make use of the information. In the case of shareholders, 
such action may take the form of selling their shares, but they may also remove 
members of the board of directors. By contrast, IAH may withdraw their funds but 
they have no say in the composition of the board of directors. Moreover, while sales 
of shares are visible as they take place in public stock markets, and this visibility 
contributes to market discipline, withdrawals of funds by IAH are not similarly visible. 
5.4 The Role of SSB 
All Islamic banks must appoint a SSB to monitor the performance of the management 
on Shariah matters and report to the shareholders on the bank's compliance with 
Shari'ah. However the length and contents of the Shariah reports differ from one 
bank to anther. The lack of standardisation makes it difficult to make comparisons 
between reports and thus various banks' compliance. A negative or inadequate report 
on a bank's compliance with Shariah might, in principle, lead to run on the bank as 
disappointed IAH and current account holders withdraw their funds. Without 
standardisation, it would be difficult to come to accurate conclusions when analysing 
an Islamic bank's compliance. 
It is worth noting that the relationship between the SSB and the Islamic bank is 
similar to the relationship between the external auditors and the Islamic banks, as both 
are outside the bank's organisation and both acts as independent reporters on the 
operations of the bank. 
The roles and responsibilities of SSB will vary across Islamic banks and jurisdictions. 
A clear understanding of the role and influence that SSB has on the business of 
Islamic banks is a matter for careful consideration by a regulator. 
The AAOIFI has provided some guidance on the composition and role of the SSB of 
Islamic banks, which is a welcome move to bring consistency in this area, but 
in the 
absence of mandatory implementation of such standards across the industry the roles 
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and responsibilities of the SSB will continue to vary. Moreover, the SSB members 
are not professional bankers and therefore, rely on the explanations of transactions 
provided to them by the management in arriving at their Shariah opinions (fatwas). 
This may allow the management to influence the SSB's decisions so as to produce the 
Shari'ah opinions that they want. 
Despite its importance, most of the supervisors of the Islamic banks do not interfere 
with the bank's compliance with Shadah because as supervisors they believe it is 
outside their remit. 
Islamic banks typically appoint an ISR to help the SSB in their task; the role of the 
ISR is similar to the role played by the internal auditors. 
Unless the bank's by-laws specify explicitly the role of the SSB, their role will 
depend upon what the board of directors decides regarding their responsibilities. 
Most of the supervisors think that their role should focus on protecting IAH funds. A 
failure of the role of the SSB is an example of weak governance. This is a corporate 
governance issue which is examined in a subsequent section. 
5.5 The Role of the Supervisors of Islamic Banks 
The supervisors of Islamic banks have different approaches to supervising Islamic 
banks. The majority of supervisors apply to Islamic banks the same regulations that 
were designed for conventional banks. Other countries such as the Kingdom of 
Bahrain have developed a specific set of regulations for Islamic banks; these 
regulations are based on AAOIFI Standards and Basel Committee Standards. 
The researcher being a former supervisor of Islamic banks for over 10 years 
discovered that the majority of supervisors lack the understanding of the types of 
Shari'ah compliance risks associated with the Islamic banks and their relationship 
with fiduciary risk. Failure to comply with the Sharilah is a breach of the Mudarib's 
fiduciary duties to the LkH. The fiduciary risk in Islamic banks should go hand in 
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hand with protecting the IAHs funds because any misconduct by the bank could 
damage its reputation dearly and result in the inability to mobilise further funds. 
More seriously, it could result in the transformation of the IAH funds into liabilities 
which might well make the bank insolvent. 
As indicated previously, in spite of their importance as a major source of funding for 
Islamic banks, IAHs do not have the rights either of shareholders or of creditors, the 
latter having a variety of control rights including the right to appoint an administrator 
or receiver in case of default or violation of debt covenants. 
This situation requires the supervisors to take into account the characteristics of the 
Islamic investment accounts and to come up with regulations that protect the interests 
of the LAR while at the same time safeguarding the interests of the shareholders. 
It is worth noting here that any direct rights given to IAHs to monitor their funds may 
represent a violation to the concept of Mudaraba which is based on giving the rights 
of managing the IAH funds to the banks in their capacity as Mudarib (Manager). 
It might be argued that supervisors would do better to focus on improving the Islamic 
banks' financial reports so as to enable the IAH to assess the performance of their 
funds. IFSB and AAOIFI play a very instrumental role in issuing standards with the 
aim of improving the bank's disclosures and allowing the market to react to such 
information. This will encourage information intermediaries to use the information 
provided by the Islamic banks which will help to establish market discipline. Where 
the information given by the Islamic banks is insufficient, this will lead to weak 
governance. Shareholders and IAHs will be unable to assess the Islamic bank's 
performance. This will also impede information intermediaries in their role of using 
their expertise to assess the bank's performance for the benefit of investors and other 
interested parties. 
Following this line of thought, it may be suggested that the supervisors of Islamic 
banks could play a more important role in establishing good governance by adopting 
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and enforcing standards that enhance the bank's disclosures and establish good 
govemance. 
Based on the above, the following are the research questions on corporate governance 
in Islamic banks that this research will examine: 
1. Does the existence of shareholder concentration in an Islamic bank affect the 
way in which attention is paid to the interests of IAH? In other words, does 
shareholder concentration affect the principal-principal relationship between 
the shareholders and the LkH, and the vicarious monitoring by shareholders on 
behalf of IAH that may be part of that relationship? 
2. Does the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) provide stakeholders with 
adequate assurance that Islamic banks are in compliance with Shariah 
jurisprudence in their operations? 
3. Is there are lack of adequate implementation of AAOIFI Accounting Standards 
that restricts the ability of IAH to assess the performance of Islamic banks? 
4. How important is the role of banks supervisors in enhancing transparency, 
good governance and effective market discipline? 
To address the above research questions, the following research propositions are 
established in order to test the findings of the research to the existing theory or in this 
study to examine if the theory which was developed for conventional banks can be 
applied in the case of Islamic banks. Therefore this research will focus on testing 
propositions that are implications of the existing theory of corporate governance, 
rather than developing a new one: 
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The principal-principal relationship between shareholders and IAH and the 
possible effects of shareholder concentration 
Unlike the shareholders in an Islamic bank, the LkH do not have the right to appoint and 
monitor the performance of the board of directors and executive management. They also 
do not have a say in the appointment of the SSB members or the external auditors. 
Archer & Karim (2006) suggest that there may be "vicarious monitoring" by shareholders 
in the interests of IAH, but its effectiveness is primarily dependent on there not being any 
significant conflicts of interest between the shareholders and the LAE. Such conflicts of 
interest are arguably more likely to occur where there is a concentration of shareholders. 
In such a situation, the shareholders may pursue their own interests (via their control the 
board of directors) which may differ from those of the minority shareholders and the TAH. 
Hence, we fonnulate Research Proposition No. I as follows: There is a correlation 
between the extent of shareholder concentration and the ratio of the shareholder return on 
equity to the IAH return on equity - the higher the concentration of shareholders, the 
higher the ratio of the shareholders return on equity to the LAH return on equity. 
2. Compliance with Shariah Rules and Principles 
The role of SSB has typically been defined in terms of ex ante compliance of contracts 
with Shariah, but not ex post compliance of transactions with the fatwas issued by the 
SSB (which requires an audit process to verify compliance). This highlights the need for 
internal Sharilah review as proposed by the AAOIFI Governance Standard No. 2. 
However, AAOIFI Auditing Standard No. 2 requires the external auditors to report on 
Shari'ah compliance. One way of measuring the effectiveness of internal Shariah review 
is by the external auditors when they perform their audit to report on the bank's 
compliance with Shariah rules and principles. On the other hand, given that they do not 
perform their ex post audit, the SSBs will tend to depend on the findings of internal 
Sharl'ah review to issue their report to the shareholders. 
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Hence, we formulate Research Proposition No. 2 as follows: The findings of the ISR will 
be reflected in the wording of the SSB's report that is included in the Islamic bank's 
annual report. 
3. The Information Environment and the Role of Industry Supervisors 
There is substantial empirical support for the proposition that small investors (of whom 
LAH are a category) do not pay much (if any) attention to financial reporting information 
of companies in which they invest. Rather, they rely on information intermediaries to 
study such information. Hence, in the absence of adequate information intermediaries 
(e. g. financial analysts publishing report, or rating agencies) covering Islamic banks, the 
issue arises of the role of banking industry supervisors in protecting the interests of 
investors, especially small investors. 
4. The Role of the Bank Supervisors in Improving the Information In the Financial 
Reports 
The weak information environment in which ITS operate tends to have implications for 
this issue. Arguably, there is a 'chicken and egg' situation in which information 
intermediaries are rare because there has been a lack of good quality information, while 
AAOIFI Standards should have improved this situation (Al-Baluchi, 2006). Hence, there 
is a need for a 'bootstrapping' of the information environment by supervisory authorities, 
Le. by enforcing AAOIFI and IFSB Standards that promote the provision of better 
financial reporting and governance. But to what extent do supervisors recognize this. 
The banking industry supervisors and supervisors will play an important role in 
protecting minority shareholders as well as the IAH. Among other things, banking 
supervisors recognize the need to improve financial reporting of Islamic banks, even if 
there is currently only a very limited amount of information intermediation. 
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
In the corporate governance of Islamic banks, there are various issues concerning the 
existence or effectiveness of the mechanisms such as bonding and monitoring that 
serve to protect the interests of investors, with particular reference to the IMI. Three 
such issues have been identified above. 
The next chapter will discuss the research methodology that will examine the above 
issues them. A further set of issues that arise concerns the implications of the answers 
to the above questions for the regulation and supervision of Islamic banks. These will 
be considered in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Research Design and Methods 
6.1 Introduction 
In carrying out research, the researcher may first identify a theoretical issue which is 
expressed in terms of a set of research hypotheses and then design an empirical study to 
show whether the hypotheses are consistent with empirical evidence. In this way, the 
theory relating to the issue either receives empirical support or is shown to require 
modification. 
Alternatively, the researcher may identify a problem or issue from practical point of view 
and then characterize the issue in theoretical terms using and possibly adapting existing 
theory prior to proceeding in a manner similar to that above, except that research 
hypotheses may be replaced by research propositions leading to questions to which 
answers are sought. 
Finally, the researcher, having identified a problem or issue from a practical point of 
view, may, instead of characterizing it in theoretical terms, develop theoretical 
propositions inductively on the basis of the research findings, and then test whether these 
propositions are supported by lurther research -a process known as the Grounded 
Theory approach. 
This study uses the second approach, by first examining the problems of corporate 
governance in Islamic banks and then looking to existing theory to try to get a theoretical 
understanding of the problem. However, the existing theory is not entirely applicable 
because it was developed for different types of institutions and different types of 
environment. Hence some adaptation of the existing theory was called for. 
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It is to be noted that CG in Islamic banks is a relatively new topic and therefore the 
theories in this area are relatively few and are not well developed. Accordingly, this 
research will attempt to test corporate governance theories developed for conventional 
banks on Islamic banks. 
Such research has the characteristics of exploratory research, which is defined as research 
when there are very few or no earlier studies to which we can refer for information about 
the issue or problem. The aim of this type of study is to look for patterns, ideas or 
hypotheses, rather than testing or confirming a hypothesis (Hussey and Hussey, 1997 
P. 10). 
It is worth noting that each research strategy has peculiar advantages and disadvantages, 
depending on three conditions which are characteristics of the chosen field of study and 
the research objectives: (a) the type of research questions; (b) the control an investigator 
has over actual behavioural events; and (c) the focus on contemporary as opposed to 
historical phenomena (Yin, 2004 p. 1). 
6.2 Research Objectives 
Following the issues highlighted in the previous chapter, research objectives are 
developed which are as follows: 
a) To study the impact of the degree of shareholder concentration for protecting the 
interests of the IAH. 
To assess the role of SSB in providing assurance via the report they produce as to the 
bank's compliance with Sharl'ah. 
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C) Given the lack of adequate implementation of applicable financial reporting standards 
(specifically, AAOIFI Financial Accounting Standards), to study the impact of this on 
the ability of IAH to assess the performance of Islamic banks. 
d) To assess the role of the banking supervisors in enhancing transparency in Islamic 
banking, thereby protecting, among others, IAH interests. 
6.3 Research Questions 
The development of research questions is probably the most important step in conducting 
research since it will have an impact on the research methodology that to be used. As 
mentioned in chapter 5, the following are the research questions: 
1. Does the existence of shareholder concentration affect the way in which attention 
is paid to the interests of IAH? 
This research question in the study will investigate the extent to which the 
research findings support the proposition drawn from conventional corporate 
governance theory (see chapter 2), (see chapter 2), that shareholder concentration 
works to the disadvantage of smaller investors, including the LAR. On the other 
hand, literature on corporate governance of Islamic banks (e. g. Archer and Karim, 
2006 p. 138) suggests that the shareholders of the Islamic banks have a vested 
interest in looking after the interests of IAH. This incentive is motivated by the 
operation of the Mudaraba contract which is used to mobilize the funds of LAH, 
whereby a major component of the shareholders' earnings is their (typically very 
large0)) share in the profits generated by the bank for its IAH, whereas the latter 
The reader is referred to the percentage shares noted in the four case studies that appear in subsequent 
chapters. 
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bear all the risk of loss. The IAH may thus be compared to the proverbial "goose 
that lays the golden eggs" for the shareholders (See Al-Deehani et al, 1999). 
If we categorize shareholders into concentrated and minority, it would be mainly 
the concentrated shareholders who would have the power, through their control of 
the board of directors, to look after the interests of IAH. The role of the IAH in 
the bank's capital structure differs from that of minority shareholders who do not 
play this role of the "goose that lays the golden eggs" via the operation of the 
Mudarib share. 
Another difference between minority shareholders and IAH is that minority 
shareholders normally (i. e. in the absence of related party transactions for the 
benefit of dominant shareholders) have the same payoffs from the bank's 
operations as majority shareholders, while IAH are exposed to losses on 
investments of their funds to which the shareholders (via the bank as Mudarib) 
are not exposed. A further important difference is that, in principle, minority 
shareholders have governance rights, including property rights, rights to control 
(although they may have difficulty in exercising them) and rights to information 
while benefiting like the concentrated shareholders from sharing in the profits 
generated for IAH, however, the latter have no such governance rights, even in 
principle. 
2. Does the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) provide stakeholders with adequate 
assurance that Islamic banks are in compliance with Shariah jurisprudence in 
their operations? 
One of the unique features of Islamic banks is the role of the SSB to make sure 
that the bank's transactions are in compliance with Shariah. The role and 
authorities of the SSB differ from one bank to another. Also the mode of 
appointment of the SSB members differs from one bank to another. The existence 
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of an effective SSB is a governance tool to act as watchdog on the bank's 
transactions from a Shariah perspective. Thus, the existence of an ineffective 
SSB would be expected to reflect negatively on the bank's reputation and to lead 
to withdrawals of IAH funds. 
3. Is there are lack of adequate implementation of AAOIFI Accounting Standards 
that restricts the ability of IAH to assess the performance of Islamic banks? 
To establish an effective governance regime, Islamic banks arguably need to 
provide investors including IAH with good quality information to enable them to 
make well-founded economic decisions about their investments in the banks. 
However, if the Islamic banks that are required to implement AAOIFI Accounting 
Standards fail to implement fully AAOIFI Standards in a satisfactory manner. 
What impact will this have on the effectiveness of corporate governance? 
4. How important is the role of bank's supervisors in enhancing transparency, good 
governance and effective market discipline? 
The roles of supervisors in regulating Islamic banks differ from bank to another. 
For example, countries like Sudan and Malaysia promulgated Islamic Banking 
Acts as early as 1983 that includes specific regulations for Islamic banks. Bahrain 
has developed specific regulations for Islamic banks. Some countries like 
Bahrain, Qatar and Sudan have adopted AAOIFI Standards, other countries like 
Kuwait adopts IFRS Standards. Such differences make it difficult to compare 
Islamic banks operating in different jurisdictions. Developing effective market 
discipline requires an adequate level of disclosures to enable the financial 
intermediaries to assess the performance of Islamic banks. 
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6.4 Research MethodoIogy 
Research Design and Methods 
Research methodology is concerned with the reasoning behind the choice of research 
method and research design. This reasoning reflects the characteristics of the chosen 
field of study, and is informed by a literature search and review. 
The degree to which a research study in social science requires theoretical motivation is a 
matter of debate. In the case of the Grounded Theory approach, the initial theoretical 
motivation is minimal, as theory is developed inductively during the research. However, 
the absence of a firm initial theoretical motivation makes it difficult to frame the research 
issues or questions. In any case, use of theoretical concepts remains one of the most 
important strategies for completing research successfully (Yin, 2004 xv). 
The Steps used in Conducting Research Methodology: 
The literature review is a written summary of the findings from a literature search. It 
is an important part of any research activity and should provide the background to and 
justification for a research project (Hussey and Hussey, 1997 p. 87). 
1. The literature review focused on corporate governance generally as well as on 
Islamic banks in particular. A review of the literature on corporate governance 
was carried out with particular emphasis on variants of one of the two main 
models of corporate governance, namely the USA, and UK variants of the neo- 
liberal model. These models and their variants were explained in more detail in 
chapter 3. 
2. Chapter 4 highlighted governance issues in Islamic banks with emphasis on 
fiduciary responsibility, market discipline and disclosure. In chapter 5 research 
issues, questions and propositions were then developed on the governance of 
Islamic banks. It needs to be emphasised that the literature review on corporate 
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governance focused predominantly on conventional corporations, i. e. non-Islamic 
banks and other non-Islamic entities. This raised the issue of the extent to which 
the research propositions and questions largely derived from this literature review 
would be applicable to Islamic banks. 
3. To examine the applicability of the research propositions and questions, a pilot 
study was conducted to have a better insight of the governance issues in Islamic 
banks and refine the interview questions and the questionnaire used for the survey 
where appropriate. In this chapter, we analyze the findings of the pilot study. 
4. Then a survey within a set of case studies was carried out to examine in depth 
some of the research questions. These were then analyzed to ascertain the extent 
to which they support propositions behind the research questions. The research 
attempted to highlight the implications of its findings on the corporate governance 
literature. 
6.4.1 Research Methods 
As indicated above, the research methodology leads to a choice of research methods. Yin 
(1994 p. 3) states that there are several research methods/strategies for doing social 
science research, which include for example, surveys, case studies, experiments, cross 
sectional and longitudinal studies, histories and analysis or archival information. All 
these methods have positive and negative attributes. 
To address the research propositions and questions in exploratory research, an 
appropriate method to use is based on the case study approach. This approach is 
supported by a number of authors including Hussey and Hussey (1997 p. p. 66) who argue 
that case studies are often used in areas where there are few theories or a deficient body 
Of knowledge or to gain insights and familiarity with the subject area for more rigorous 
investigation. 
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However, Yin (1994) emphasises the role of theory in case-based research, with 
particular reference to 'generalisation to theory'. Yin (2003 p. 10) further states that case 
studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to 
populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like an experiment, does not 
represent a "sample" and in doing a case study, the goal will be to expand and generalize 
theories (analytic generalisation) rather than to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalisation). 
In other words, since case studies do not employ statistical sampling, they cannot be used 
as a basis for empirical generalizations. However, they can be used to test theoretical 
propositions, if they are designed to produce empirical evidence for or against such 
propositions ("generalisation to theory"). In particular, a counterexample to a theoretical 
proposition indicates a likely need to modify the theory from which it is derived. In 
formal logic, a single counterexample to a proposition that states a generalisation is 
considered to refute the proposition; however, in empirical research the result is more 
likely to be a suggested modification of the theory from which the proposition is derived. 
6.4.2 Research Design 
Case study research may use either single or multiple cases, and in the latter each case 
may be treated separately as a single unit of analysis (unitary cases) or as a set of sub- 
units of analysis handled cross-sectionally within an "embedded" case design. The form 
of design that will be employed in this study is an embedded case design, using several 
case studies so as to reduce the limitations of case study research on single phenomena 
which provide little basis for scientific generalization (Yin, 1994 p. 10). The use of an 
embedded case study design helps to understand the phenomena in more depth, to make 
comparisons, which may make it possible to generalize the findings to theory and to 
modify or extend the theory. 
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The use of several subunits of analysis allows the researcher to establish the differences 
and analyze them in more detail. This is important in order to highlight the different 
practices within Islamic banks that have impact on the issue of corporate governance in 
Islamic banks. 
Although a case-based research approach is sometimes presented as an alternative to 
survey-based research, in fact surveys using interviews and/or questionnaires may be 
carried out as part of the data acquisition process in case-based research. Yin (1994 p. 5 1) 
stated that to facilitate generalization to theoretical propositions, a survey could be used 
within a case study (structured questionnaire-based survey within case study). Such 
surveys do not use statistical sampling techniques or aim to be the basis for statistically- 
based empirical generalisations. Their function in an embedded case study design is to 
form part of the data collected for certain sub-units of analysis. Such an approach is 
ta ken in this study, for the sub-units of analysis constituted by the IAH. The survey will 
be carried out by using a questionnaire that was sent to 350 IAII (see Appendix 1.9). 
This research will focus on testing propositions that are implications of the existing 
theory of corporate governance, rather than developing a new one. However, the existing 
theory which was intended for application to conventional institutions in a well- 
developed market setting may not fit the four Islamic banks in emerging markets which 
are the main units of analysis of this study. 
So we may need to suggest modifications to the theory based on the findings of the 
research, for example as regards the effects of shareholder concentration. 
One of the key aspects of the case study approach with which the researcher must be 
concerned is the reliability and validity of evidence. Ryan et al (1992 p. 123) argued that 
the validity of each piece of evidence should be assessed by comparing it with other 
kinds of evidence on the same issue. Other subjects might be interviewed, records 
checked or observations made. The researcher has chosen to use the case study approach 
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because, as Yin (1994 p. 13) pointed out, a case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary matter within its real-life context. The researcher believes 
that because the case study is conducted mainly through face to face interviews, the case 
study approach is more appropriate for this research study given its exploratory aspect. 
There are different methods of collecting data in which selected participants are asked 
questions in order to find out what they do, think or feel. Interviews make it easy to 
compare answers (Hussey and Hussey, 1997 p. 156), and are thus appropriate in an 
embedded case study design. 
However, to achieve a greater degree of generalisability, a survey can be used within a 
case study, such as a structured questionnaire-base survey within a case study (Yin, 1994 
p. 5 1). 
In brief, this research adopted the following research design. These steps were also stated 
by Yin (2003 p. 45) for conducting a case study: 
I. Articulate the objectives and questions of the study. 
2. Link objectives and questions to the basis unit of the study (e. g. single case, 
multiple cases or survey). 
Identify the critical evidence (e. g. interview) that will support the major 
propositions. 
4. Stipulate the relevant techniques for analyzing the evidence. 
Every type of empirical research has an implicit, if not explicit, research design. In the 
most elementary sense, the design is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data 
to the study's initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions (Yin, 2003 
p. 20). 
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6.5 Research Pilot-Study 
As mentioned earlier, this research will examine the governance practices in Islamic 
banks and attempt to identify pertinent problems or issues rather than to develop a new 
theory. However, areas where the existing theory does not appear to fit, or to provide 
explanations of, the phenomena observed, will be noted. 
Yin (2003 p. 79) stated that a pilot case study will help the researcher to refine his/her 
data collection plans as to both the content of the data and the procedures to be followed. 
In this regard it is important to note that a pilot test is not pre-test. 
The pilot case study can be so important that more resources may be devoted to this 
phase of the research than to the collection of data from any of the actual cases. For this 
reason, several subtopics are worth further discussion: the selection of pilot cases, the 
nature of the inquiry for the pilot cases, and the nature of the reports from the pilot cases 
(Yin, 2003 p. 79). 
6.5.1 The Following Steps were Adopted in Conducting the Pilot Study 
The pilot study was conducted by using a mix of open-ended() and close-ended"') 
questions through face-to-face interviews that were held with 18 persons, including CEOs 
of two Islamic banks in one of the GCC countries (see the sample of the questions used in 
the interviews with the management of Islamic banks Appendix 1.1). 
(9) Open ended questions: where each respondent can give a personal response or opinion in his or 
her own 
words. 
(10) Close ended questions: where the respondent's answer is selected from a number of predetermined 
altematives. 
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Out of the 18 persons interviewed including 3 shareholders of Islamic banks (see 
Appendix 1.2) one internal Shariah reviewer (see Appendix 1.3), three managers 
representing auditing firms (see Appendix 1.4), two senior Islamic banking supervisors 
from two different jurisdiction (see Appendix 1.5) and two SS13 (Shariah Supervisory 
Board) members from two Islamic banks (see Appendix 1.6) and five IAH (see Appendix 
1.7). 
For one of these banks, its ownership structure shows that it is owned by Islamic financial 
institutions and small shareholders, while in the other bank the majority shares are held 
by one family and their relatives (concentrated shareholders), and the remaining shares 
are held by small shareholders. 
6.5.2 The Findings of the Pilot Study 
The findings of the pilot study indicated, among other things, that the questions used for 
the interviews with the JAH needed to be simplified so that they could be understood by 
the LAE. Accordingly an amended interview questions (see Appendix 1.8) was 
developed. 
It was also observed from the pilot study that IAH have very little background on the 
Islamic bank's characteristics, including the bank's contractual arrangements with the 
IAH, and the potential risk of their investments. 
However, the pilot study indicated that some of the bank's management suggested that 
AAOIFI needs to improve their disclosure requirements especially on restricted 
investment accounts, for example with reference to the disclosure standards required for 
mutual funds (IFSB, 2006c). 
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Most of the LAH that were interviewed indicated that they placed their funds with Islamic 
banks primarily for religious reasons. Other reasons considered were the expected 
returns paid to IAH and the quality of service provided to them. 
It was also noted that generally the LAH and shareholders do not read the SSB's report on 
the bank's compliance with Shadah. 
The interviews held with two members of the SSB indicated some differences with 
regard to their responsibilities. One stated that the SSB's role is purely to make sure that 
all the bank's operations are line with Shafilah. The other scholar indicated that the SSB 
has two main duties. One is to check on the bank's compliance with Shariah and the 
other is to protect the interests of the IAH. 
Also interviews were held with two external auditors from different auditing fu-ms that 
audit Islamic banks, in order to understand their role výith regard to the SSB report. It 
was noted from the interviews that each audit firm conducts its audit somewhat 
differently with regard to the bank's compliance with Shariah. One auditor mentioned 
that they always review anyfatwas issued by the bank before they start their normal audit 
to be able to check whether the bank implements theta. The other auditor stated they do 
not simply review thefatwas but also sometimes they discuss them with the SSB. Also 
interviews held with two internal Shariah reviewers (ISR) of two banks indicated 
differences in the role of the ISP, 
The pilot study gave the researcher a better understanding of the governance issues 
relating to Islamic banks and helped in amending the interview questions that would be 
used in conducting the case studies. 
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6.6 Research Case Study 
Research Design and Methods 
To address the above research questions, the researched used a survey within case 
studies. For this reason, four banks located in three jurisdictions in the Arabian Gulf 
were selected for the case study. To preserve the confidentiality of the four banks, each 
bank is given a fictitious name. 
The Reasons for choosing an Islamic Bank operating in Bahrain are as follows: 
I. Bahrain hosts more than 27 full fledged Islamic banks. 
2. It is the first jurisdiction that issued specific regulations for Islamic banks. 
3.71be Central Bank in Bahrain, as in the other four jurisdictions, requires Islamic 
banks to adopt the AAOIFI Accounting and Governance Standards, including those 
Standards that deal with the roles, duties, appointment, and removal of the SSB 
members. 
4. Only Bahrain has adopted the AAOIFI capital adequacy framework. 
The Reasons for choosing an Islamic Bank operating in Qatar are as follows: 
Central Bank of Qatar has not developed special regulations for Islamic banks, apart from 
the following: 
I- Islamic banks in Qatar are required by the Central Bank to implement the AAOIFI 
Accounting Standards. 
2. The regulations indicated that LAE should bear no losses on investments made with 
their funds, except as decided by the regulators. 
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The Reasons for choosing an Islamic Bank operating in Kuwait are as follows: 
Prior to 2003, Islamic banks in Kuwait were outside the direct supervision of the 
Central Bank. 
2. In 2003, the Central Bank began to regulate Islamic banks. 
3. Islamic banks are not required to adopt the AAOIFI Accounting Standards; instead, 
they are required to adopt International Financial Reporting Standards. 
The features of each of the four banks selected for the case study can be summarised 
as follows: 
a) Ahmed Bank (this b2nk Is located In Kuwait): 
I. The goverrimcnt owns 43% of the bank's capital and the remainder is widely 
dispersed (no single party holds more than 5%). 
2. It uses the partial commingling approaches such that some assets are jointly 
financed by shareholders and IAH. 
The appointment of SSB members is the responsibility of the General 
Assembly whereas the chairman is appointed by the board of directors. 
4. The bank applies MRS Standards and not AAOIFl Standards- 
5. The bank has paid a modest rate of return to its LkH (far below the dividend 
rate paid to shareholders but better- than the interest rate on conventional 
deposits). 
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b) Mohammed Bank (this bank Is located In Bahrain): 
A single shareholder owns 40% and the remaining capital is distributed 
among small shareholders. 
2. The bank has changed its profit allocation policy from commingling of assets 
to separating the assets that are financed by shareholders from those of the 
LAR 
3. The appointment of the SSB members is the responsibility of the general 
assembly based on the recommendation of the board of directors. 
4. The bank applies AAOIFI Standards. 
5. The bank has paid a very modest rate of return to its LAH (far below the 
dividend rate paid to shareholders and even below the interest rate on 
conventional deposits). 
C) Khalifa Bank (this bank is located In Bahrain): 
1. The bank is a subsidiary of a large fmancial grouP- 
2. The appointment of the SSB members is the responsibility of the general 
assembly based on the recommendation of the board of directors. 
3. Ile bank applies AAOIFI Standards. 
4. The rates of return to the UH during the period studied are almost equivalent 
to the dividend yield rates for the shareholders and higher than the prevailing 
interest rates. 
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d) Sara Bank (this bank is located In Qatar): 
Research Design and Methods 
1. One family holds the majority of the shares of the bank 
2. The SSB members (including the chairman of the SHEC) are appointed by the 
general assembly of the bank and the SHEC (other than the chairman) 
members are appointed by the SSB. 
The bank uses the commingling approach, i. e. UH funds are commingled 
with shareholders' and current account holders' funds. 
The bank applies AAOIFI Standards. 
5. The bank paid a very high dividend yield rate, the highest among the four 
banks in the sample, and paid LkH rates of return that were more than the 
interest rates on conventional deposits but far below the dividend yield rate. 
6.6.1 The Following Steps were Adopted in Conducting a Survey within the 
Embedded Case Study 
The four research questions mentioned below are those set out in Section 6.3 above. 
a) Interviews Held: 
Research Question No. 1: 
III order to understand the impact of the degree of shareholders concentration on the 
financial outcome for the IAIL with particular reference to the profit distribution formula 
between the shareholders and Ulf, fact-to-face interviews wereheld with CEOs or their 
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deputies' in the four banks. Financial controllers and the internal auditors attended the 
meeting with the CEO or his deputy. 
The interviews focused on the role of the management in protecting the interests of the 
IAH (see Appendix 1.1). It is worth noting that the same questions were used to 
interview the management in conducting the pilot study and case studies. 
Preparing the questions in such a form is intended to enable the researcher to evaluate the 
responses more easily and at the same time to allow the interviewee to expand in his/her 
response. All interviews were recorded to enable the researcher to analyze the responses 
in more depth. 
Also, a survey was conducted of the IAH (the survey questionnaire see Appendix 1.9). A 
total number of 350 IAH were selected from the four banks on a random sample basis 
and 164 responded, representing 47%. The survey was important in helping to 
understand the IAH level of satisfaction with regard to their financial returns. The survey 
was conducted by mail and used close-ended questions. 
The researcher conducted interviews with a mix of open-ended and close-ended 
questions. 
Research Question No. 2: 
With regard to research question No. 2, the researcher conducted face-to-face interviews 
with Internal Shariah Reviewers (ISR) (see Appendixl. 3), the SSB of the four banks 
(see Appendix 1.6), and with the external auditors (see Appendixl. 4). This was 
important in order to analyze the role of the SSB members and ISR with regard to 
Shari'ah compliance. The meeting with the external auditors was in order to understand 
the role played by them in auditing the Shariah compliance. It is worth noting that the 
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same questions were used to interview the ISR, SSB and external auditors in conducting 
the pilot study and case studies. 
The researcher conducted interviews with a mix of open-ended and close-ended 
questions. 
Research Question No. 3: 
Face-to-face meetings were held with bank supervisors of the four banks in order to 
understand the role of the banks' supervisors (see Appendix 1.10) in enhancing 
transparency and encouraging the activity of information intermediaries. Also, 
interviews were held with rating agencies (see Appendix 1.11) that rated Islamic banks, 
to gain an understanding of the methodology they use in rating Islamic banks. 
The researcher conducted interviews with a mix of open-ended and close-ended 
questions. 
Research Question No. 4: 
These research questions address the issue of transparency from the prospective of bank 
supervisors and rating agencies (see Appendix 1.10 and 1.11). For this reason, interviews 
were held with the supervisors of all the four banks in order to determine to what extent 
the supervisors understand the problem and how they would address it. 
Furthermore, specific questions were sent to two rating agencies that rate Islamic banks. 
The questions relate to issue of Sharl'ah, and the responsibility of the management and 
the board of directors towards the IAH. 
The researcher conducted interviews with a mix of open-ended and close-ended 
questions. 
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Secondary data: 
Research Design and Methods 
The research also involved analyzing the financial statements of the four banks for a four- 
year period (2002-2005), as well as reviewing the articles and memorandum of 
association (by-laws) of the four banks. 
This was important in order to review the banks' extent of disclosures and their policy in 
respect of profit distribution. The researcher also reviewed the SSB reports regarding the 
bank's compliance with Shariah from 2002 - 2005. 
As part of the research, a review was carried out of the banks by-laws, to determiner the 
responsibility of the SSB members and whether their role is advisory or whether the 
management is obliged to comply with the SSBs opinions. 
6.7 Concluding Remarks 
In summary. with regard to research design and methods: 
The case study method was used as an exploratory strategy in view of the 
underdeveloped state of relevant theory. 
2. A pilot study was carried out in order to test and refine the research propositions 
and questions. 
3. An embedded case study design was used in order to facilitate generalization to 
theory and theory development. 
4. As the main units of analysis, 4 banks were selected in 3 different countries and 
with differing ownership structures. 
93 
Chapter 6 Research Design and Methods 
5. A survey approach with questionnaire was used within the case study and 
secondary data such as annual reports were also used. 
It was decided to use an embedded case study design with sub-units of analysis in order 
to make cross-sectional comparisons and to analyze the differences in more detail 
(please see Figure 6.1 below). 
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Figure 6.1 Embedded Case Study Design 
Main units of analysis 
Research Design and Methods 
Ahmed BK II Mohammed BK III Khalifa BK II Sara BK 
Subunits of analysia 
(for each of main units) 
Management II BOD II SSB II ISR 
Other relevant parties 
consulted 
Banking Rating External IAH 
Supervisors Agencies Auditors 
II 
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Chapter 7 
The Case Study of Ahmed Bank 
7.1 Introduction 
Ahmed Bank (henceforth also referred to as the "Bank") is a public shareholding 
company incorporated in one of the GGC states established on 23 March, 19xx. Its 
core business activities include the providing banking services, the purchase and sale of 
property, leasing and other trading activities. All of the bank's activities are strictly in 
accordance with Islamic Principles("). The financial statements of the bank were 
Prepared in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
The bank is not required to adopt AAOIFI accounting, Shariah and auditing standards. 
7be bank is run by a general manager who has a team of eight assistant general 
managers reporting to him. Prior to 2003, Islamic banks were outside the direct 
supervision of the central bank. In 2003, law No. 32 of 1968, (pertaining to currency, 
the central bank and the organization of the banking business), was amended by 
incorporating a new section which was to allow the central bank to regulate Islamic 
banks. The new section requires that the founder of an Islamic bank should hold, at all 
times, 51% of the capital, leaving the residual for public subscription. In case the 
founders are a non-bank entity, they shall hold, at all times, a minimum of 10%, and 
not exceed 20% of the bank's capital. 
(")Audited Accounts ending 31st December 2005. 
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able 7.1: Snap-shot on the financial highlights in millions 
Ahmed Bank 
2005 mn 
() I'l I-F'CLL IIIv 
2002 
230 
- 
2003 
249 
2004 
28 7 54() 
otal I nN estment A/c Holder - 
1-9-7 -7-j - 2300 --- -2563 3181) 
Curren tA cco unts 13 64 122 71 
Ratio of Total Share Capital to IAH 1: 8.5 1: 9.2 1: 8.9 1: 5.9 
Ratio of Total Share Capital to 
Current Accounts 
1: 0.06 1: 0.3 1: 0.4 1: 0.1 
Net Income 56 60 77 129 
Total Assets 2554 3000 3458 4691 
Return on Average Equity % 24 24 27 24 
Return on Average Assets % 2.1 2 2.2 2.8 
Capital Intelligent (2005) commented that the bank has a good asset quality as 57% of 
the bank's assets are invested in short-term commodities which are highly liquid and 
carry low risk. This explains why returns in assets are generally low. Also deposits 
with banks make up a further 17.1 %. As indicated in table I above, the bank enjoys a 
strong return on equity. What is striking in this bank is that although there was a 
significant increase in IAH returns during the four years, the return on equity remained 
constant, except for 2005 when it went down. 
This would lead to believe that this bank is adopting very conservative investment 
policies 
7.2 Omvnership Structure 
The government owns 43% of the bank's capital and tile remaining is widely dispersed 
(no single party held more than 5 %). In 2003 tile bank came under the supervision of' 
the Central Bank. Prior to 2003 the Ministry of Commerce and Finance had been its 
formal regulatory authorities. 
There are 9 board members in the batik, of which there are two reprcsentat ves oftlic 
govemnient. The batik's by-laws firnit the ownership of one individual/cntity (other 
than the government) ofnot exceeding 10% to ensure that the bank's shares arc widely 
dispersed. 
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To avoid conflict of interest, the board members are restricted from serving as members 
of the board of directors of competitor banks. Moreover, they are restricted in 
engaging in business with competitors of the bank (Article 18,1977). 
7.3 Types of Investment Account-Holders 
The bank's accounts maintain different types of investment accounts holders as 
cxplained below: 
Current Account: These accounts bear no risk of loss and give no return as 
the bank guarantees to pay the outstanding balance on demand. These 
accounts are considered as Qard (free loan) to the bank. 
Deposits for unlimited period and saving accounts: As Ahmed Bank 
indicated in the audited accounts, unlimited accounts are initially for the 
duration of one year, and is automatically renewable thereafter, for the same 
period, unless notified to the contrary, in writing by the depositors (L4dl). 
Investment saving is for an unlimited period. 
In all cases the IAH share of profits are determined by the board of directors based on 
the results of the financial year. The bank, however, states in the contract only the 
maximum Mudarib rate. 
Ile bank's audited accounts state that 60% to 90% of the deposits are available for 
investment by the bank. The remaining is set-aside for liquidity and is guaranteed by 
the bank (e. g. the amounts sct-aside for liquidity is funded by IAII). Any returns 
generated from the amounts set-aside for liquidity are for the shareholders. All 
investment deposits, except the current account, are based on Mudaraba contract. 
As reported by the bank's management, the bank is liable to pay back 100% of the 
Saving accounts on demand by the account-holder. The bank's contract does not make 
any reference to the type of contract it is, the liability of the bank or the profit sharing 
Percentage of the Mudarib. 
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It is important to note that (article 96,2004) of the Central Bank law requires that 
Islamic banks shall be under obligation to fully pay sight deposits i. e. current accounts 
to their depositors upon request, while such deposits shall not incur any losses. 
The Level of dividends paid to Investment account-holders and Shareholders from 
2002 to 2005: 
Table 7.2: Snap-shot on the proflt distributed to shareholders and Investment 
account-holders for 4 years 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
a) Percentage of returns distributed to Investment Account-holders 
for 4 years (bank's financial statements) 
4.5 4.500 4.800 6.807',.,. -, 
b)The annual interest rate for 4 years (Reuters) 
2.84% 1 2.2% 1 2.38% 1 )'ý, -,: ': 3.77% 
c) Dividends yield distributed to shareholders for 4 years (bank's 
financial statementS)(12) 
47% 1 50% 50% 
The bank's audited accounts do not disclose the methods that the bank uses in order to 
determine the profits allocated to shareholders and the IAH. As mentioned in page I of 
the case study, the bank applies the MRS standards, and these standards do not require 
the bank to disclose information relating to the methods used in allocating and 
distributing the profits between the shareholders and IAH. 
The management justifies the higher dividend yield paid out to shareholders, as 
compensation for their exposure to fluctuations in the price of their shares. This is not 
the case with the IAH, as their deposits are not subject to such fluctuations. 
(12)Banles Financial Statements 
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The Formula of distributing profits between the shareholders and IAH: 
The following are financed by both the shareholders and IAH: 
Investment in International Commodities 
Plus: Murabaha financing 
Plus Murabaha with banks 
Plus: Consumer Finance 
Total: Assets financed by 
Shareholders and IAH 
Total: Income allocated to IAH proportionate 
to their investments in the above 
Less: Provision for non performing Murabaha 
Specific provisions 
Less: Direct expenses relating to IAH investments 
e. g. feasibility study 
Less: Mudarib Share (decided by the board of directors) 
Total: Profits allocated to IAH 
(Source: obtained from the bank's records) 
The bank's methods of profit distribution between the shareholders and IAII is based 
on the sharing of profits generated from Murabaha transactions with other banks (inter- 
bank transactions), including investments in international commodities, consumer 
finance and Murabaha financine"). 
(13)Murabaha Financing is defined by Fuqaha (Jurists) as the sale of goods at cost plus an agreed profit 
mark up. 
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All other assets are financed solely by the shareholders and profits are exclusively an 
entitlement of them including investments in real-estate, capital investment in other 
institutions, bank fees, and returns on current accounts. 
The bank may, at its discretion, give additional profit to the IAH from its share as 
Afudarib, under the new method of profit distribution. 
owever, in the case of AAOIFI Standards, Islamic banks are required (under 
accounting standard No. 5 regarding the Disclosures of basis for profit allocation 
between owner's equity and investment acc*ount-holders) to disclose in the notes on 
significant accounting policies, the basis that are applied by the Islamic bank for the 
allocation of prof 14) its between owners equity and unrestricted investment accounts( . 
7.4 The Role and Composition of the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
The bank's Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) may consist of no less than 3 members 
and they shall be appointed by the general assembly, whereas the board of directors 
appoints the chairman of the SSB("). 
The SSB claimed that it is responsible for monitor the bank's transactions and 
operations, to determine whether the bank's has complied with Shariah. Based on the 
research conducted, the SSB conducts e-xpost monitoring and ISR conducts the ex ante 
Shari'ah audit which who then report to the SSB. The memorandum and articles of 
association permit the SSB to check all contracts, agreements, policies and transactions 
held between the bank and a third partyM. In practice the role of the SSB is limited in 
conducting ex post monitoring of Shariah compliance, while, the ex ante is carried out 
by the ISR which we are going to examine its role latter in this case. 
(14) No profit equalization (PER) reserve is created. 
(15) Article 64 a, 1977 and amended in 2004. 
(16) Article, 64,1977 and amended in 2004. 
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In case there is a dispute among the members of the SSB regarding a particular opinion, 
the bank"s management can consult the Al-Fatwas Board in Awqaf and the Islamic 
Affairs Ministry, whose ruling is mandatory(17) 
According to Article 50 of the bank's Articles of Association states the following: 
"The SSB will be responsible for monitoring the conformity of the 
activities conducted by the management to ensure that they are in line 
with Islamic guidelines as approved by the Shariah Supervisory 
Board". 
The bank's memorandum and articles of association state that the SSB can carry out the 
following activities("): 
Submitting annual report to the general assembly stating whether 
transactions were conducted in accordance with the Islamic law. 
Conducting Shariah courses for the bank's staff so that they can abide by 
the Islamic principles while performing their duties. Besides, the SSB shall 
have the right to suggest organizing seminars and conventions pertaining to 
the Islamic economy. 
m Other duties as assigned to the SSB by the board of directors. 
(17)Article, 64. b, 1977. 
(")Articles, 64. b, 1977 and amended in 2004. 
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Analysis of the SSB's report: 
Ahmed Bank 
As in the case of all Islamic banks, the SSBs report forms a part of the bank's annual 
report. The report of Ahmed Bank states the following: 
"By following up the performance of Ahmed Bank during the year ended 31st, 
December, 2005, we certify confidently that all activities were practiced in compliance 
with Islamic Shariah and no violations have occurred, to the best of our knowledge". 
The report falls short of the AAOIFI Governance Standard No. I (AAOIFI, 1999), 
which requires the SSB to state the following opinion: 
The Islamic bank's contracts and related documentation are in compliance 
with the Islamic Shariah rules and principles. 
The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Islamic bank 
during the year ended xxxx that we have reviewed are in compliance with 
the Islamic Shariah rules principles. 
The allocation of profit and charging of losses relating to investment 
accounts conform to the basis that had been approved by the SSB in 
accordance with Islamic Shariah rules and principles. 
Where appropriate, the opinion paragraph shall also include the following: 
All earnings that have been realized from sources or by means prohibited by 
Islamic Shariah rules and principles have been disposed of to charitable 
causes; and 
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0 The calculation of Zakd`) is in compliance with Islamic Sharl'ah rules and 
principles. 
The bank's report makes no reference to the methodology used in arriving upon such 
an opinion and to whom the report is addressed. Moreover, the report makes no 
reference to the Internal Shariah Reviewers (ISR). However, the bank indicated that 
the above opinion is in accordance with the central bank requirements that require all 
Islamic banks to adhere to the above opinion. 
7.5 Report on the Interviews Conducted 
7.5.1 Report on the Interview held with the Management of Ahmed Bank 
Ilie management indicated that the relationship between the shareholders and the 
IAH is a form of partnership where the IAH delegate to the bank (owned by the 
shareholders) the responsibility to invest IAH funds on the IAHs'behalf. 
The bank's management also indicated that the bank's strategy is to work for the 
benefit of the shareholders and the UH, regardless of the ownership structure. 
The bank's policy is one that has a long-term view, based on providing the IMI with 
an exceptional service, and paying an attractive rate of returns to the shareholders and 
IAR The management stated that it is accountable to the board of directors, as the 
latter acts as custodian for all stakeholders. Such views were shared by one rating 
agency who stated that the role of the board of directors of Islamic banks is to play a 
monitoring role in assessing the performance of the management on behalf of the 
IAH as well as the shareholders. 
(19) Zakat means "blessing, purification, increase and cultivation of good deeds: in Shari'a. it is an 
obligation in respect of funds paid for a specified type of purpose and for specifies categories. It 
is an individual duty if the criteria for making it obligatory are sa6sfied. It is also one of the 
pillars of Islarn. 
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Another rating agency asserted that both the board of directors and rating agencies 
should play a role in assessing the management of the bank on behalf of the IAH as 
well the shareholders. 
The supervisors of Ahmed Bank argued that protecting the interest of the IAH is a 
means of establishing sound corporate governance (issued in May 3,2004) to make 
sure that Islamic banks apply a regulatory system that protects the interest of all 
stakeholders. The supervisors also indicated that their supervisory role is limited to 
the bank's financial statutes and they have no supervisory role over the SSBs since 
this is difficult role to conduct. 
The supervisors of Ahmed Bank believe that enhancing transparency and market 
discipline are of high importance in better assessing the bank's performance, and will 
encourage rating agencies to play a significant role in protecting the interests of all 
stakeholders. In this respect the supervisors of Ahmed Bank supported the role of the 
IFSB and AAOIFI to enhance transparency and establish market discipline. As stated 
earlier, Islamic banks are required to adopt IFRS or other relevant and accepted 
accounting standards. 
The management of the bank rejected the issue of allowing IAII to be represented in 
the bank's organs of governance as an impractical and unrealistic solution. It is 
worth noting that in Ahmed Bank many IAII attend the annual (general meeting) of 
the bank and participate in the discussions therein. The supervisors also rejected the 
idea of allowing the IAH to be represented in the bank's organs of governance since 
the boards of director's responsibilities already include the protection the interest of 
all stakeholders. 
7.5.2 Report on the Interview held with Sharilah Supervisory Board Members 
(SSB) 
The main duties of the SSB as reported to the researcher include the following: 
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Answering to questions by the management, approving new products, 
approving new contracts and issuingfatwas. 
0 Reviewing and auditing the bank's compliance with Shariah in all its 
activities. 
The Shadah Board of Ahmed Bank is accountable to the board of directors, and their 
report is presented to the board of directors. The appointment of SSB members is the 
responsibility of the general assembly based on the recommendation of the board of 
directors. This is in line with AAOIFI Governance Standard No. I on Shariah 
Supervisory Board, (AAOIFI, 1999) Appointment, Composition and Report. 
It is worth noting that AAOIFI Governance Standard No. I on Shariah Supervisory 
Board: Appointment, Composition and Report, states that the SSB's report should be 
appropriately addressed as required by the circumstances of the engagement and local 
laws and regulations. 
However, the remuneration of the SSB members is decided by the board of directors 
based on recommendation of the management. 
The bank's by-laws and procedural manuals allow the Shariah Supervisory Board to 
review and audit various operations of the bank from a Shariah perspective. And, as 
appropriate, financial auditing, and reviewing the annual financial statements. 
[The SSB's main responsibility in Ahmed Bank is to carry out Shariah reviews of 
banles contracts to ensure compliance with Shariah]. As indicated earlier the SSB of 
Ahmed Bank also conducts an ex ante Shariah review and the ex post review is 
carried out by the ISR who report to the SSB. 
The SSB claim that the reason for this review is to reach at a reasonable assurance 
that the activities of the bank are according to the expectation of shareholders and 
other stakeholders. 
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The relationship between SSB and the external auditors is limited to discussing the 
financial reports when the SSB asks for some clarifications on the financial 
statements. The external auditors conduct no testing on the ISR procedures to 
determine the effectiveness of the system. 
It is worth noting that the auditors opinion in the bank's financial statements falls 
short of what is required in AAOIFI Auditing Standard No. 4, since it makes no 
reference in the opinion in the bank's compliance with SSBfatwas and rulings. 
The SSB members meet once every week and with all the internal Shariah units 
present in the meeting. In this meeting they discuss any Sharl'ah issues presented to 
them and give the relevant opinion. 
7.5.3 Report on the interviews held with the Internal Shariah Review (ISR) 
The ISR is an integral part of the organs of governance of the bank and operates 
under the policies established by the bank. The staff salaries and other benefits is 
decided by the SSB. 
The ISR is the 'right hand' of the Shariah Supervisory Board. Since the SSB 
members are not full-time employees, the SSB carries out its tasks in accordance with 
the information given by the ISR. The ISR looks into the day-to-day transactions of 
the bank and reverts to the SSB for major Sharl'ah issues that need collective 
discussion. 
The staff members of ISR are nominated by the management and approved by the 
SSB. However, there are no written policies and procedures for the ISR. 
The SSB relies on various reports of the ISR since these reports play a vital role in 
assisting the SSB to accomplish its goals and objectives to come to a reasonable 
conclusion or a set of recommendations, with respect to the bank's compliance with 
Shari'ah principles. 
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A noteworthy feature of Ahmed Bank's ISR is that it is a separate unit, headed by a 
senior Shariah scholar and 5 Shariah staff working under him. Its role is to carry 
out a regular audit on the bank's and its related entities' compliance with Shariah 
and reports its findings to the SSB. 
7.5A Report on the Rating Agency 
One rating agency emphasized the importance of financial reports, as they play an 
important role in monitoring the performance of the management. They are also 
instrumental in ensuring that the management does not give preference to one party 
over the other. However, the same rating agency believed that AAOIFI and IFSB 
Standards needs the support of the supervisors to make them more effective. 
One rating agency claim the board of directors of Islamic banks is to play a 
monitoring role in assessing the performance of the management on behalf of the 
IAH as well the shareholders. 
Another rating agency argued that board of directors and rating agencies should play a 
role in assessing the management of the Islamic bank on behalf of the IAII. 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
The government holds 43% of the bank's capital of Ahmed Bank and remaining is 
widely dispersed. Ahmed Bank used to be outside the supervision of the central bank 
until 2003 when the law was amended to allow the central bank to regulate Islamic 
banks. The bank's applies the IFRS on its financial reports. 
As the case study indicates the rate of return paid to IAH are very low compared to the 
dividend yield distributed to shareholders. The management claim the high dividend 
Yield distributed to shareholders is compensation for their risk of fluctuations in the 
Price of their shares. 
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The management of Ahmed Bank rejected the idea of allowing LAH to be represented 
in the bank's organs of governance as an impractical and unrealistic. 
The bank's applies the method of profit allocation between the shareholders and IAII 
which is based on following factors: 
I. Profits generated from Murabaha with other banks, investments in 
international commodities, consumer finance and Murabaha financing are 
allocated between shareholders and LAE; 
2. All profit generated from other assets including investments in other Islamic 
banks are solely paid to shareholders; 
I Mudarib commission and profits generated from funds of current accounts are 
paid to shareholders; 
4. Returns generated from investing amounts set-aside (60% to 90% of the IAII 
funds) for liquidity are entitlement if shareholders. 
The SSD of Ahmed Bank is accountable to the board of directors, and their report is 
presented to the board of directors. The SSB members are appointed by the general 
assembly of the bank, whereas the board of directors appoints the chairman of the SSB. 
The SSB carries out a review of any transaction after implementation, either through 
its members or through the ISR members. The supervisor of Ahmed Bank does not 
require Islamic banks to adopt AAOIFI Governance Standards. 
The SSB does not rely on the work of external auditors on the bank's compliance with 
Shari'ah since all external auditors lack the expertise on Shafi'ah matters. 
The bank's by-laws allow the SSB to check all contracts, agreements between the bank 
and third party. However, the bank's Sharilah report makes no reference to the role 
Played by the ISP, this is because the central bank developed a specific opinion 
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wording and requires the Islamic bank to adhere to it. The SSB relies on the on the 
ISR report to assist it in forming an opinion on the bank's compliance with Shariah. 
The management of Ahmed Bank argued that it is accountable to the board of directors 
and not to the IAH. 
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Chapter 8 
The Case Study of Mohammed Bank 
8.1 Introduction 
Mohammed Bank (the "Bank") was established in 19xx (audited accounts ending 31", 
December, 2005). With its core activities focusing on the provision of standard 
banking services, including the sale and purchase of properties and leasing finance. All 
projects are Shariah compliant, i. e. strictly in accordance with Islamic principles. 
The bank is required by the Central Bank to implement accounting Shariah and 
auditing standards issued by the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). 
The bank maintains a strong quality of investments and a low ratio of non-performing 
financing, with good overall coverage. This is largely attributed to the bank's 
conservative policy towards investing its funds. The bank's prudence is reflected by 
the fact that approximately 65% of its financing activities were in the form of low-risk 
Afurabaha with other banks, in international commodities (Quasi Bank placements 
guaranteed by the counterparty banks)"'). 
7be following research studies the bank's performance, and benchmarks the same to 
other case studies, for the period 2002-2005, as illustrated in table 8.1. In the interest 
of discretion regarding the bank's identity, the table will not reveal the currency that 
denotes the figures used. 
C20) Capital Intelligent, 2005. 
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Table 8.1: Snap-shot of the financial highlights in millions (The bank's financial 
statements, 2005) 
i- mn 
I (0ý11 !, 1! C Capital 
2002 
38 
2003 
40 
2004 
1ý -1 
2005 
72 
Total Investment A/c Holders 147 160 168 198 
Current Accounts 13 29 30 47 
_Ratio of 
Total Share Capital to IAH 1: 3.8 1: 4 1: 3.16 1: 2.75 
Ratio of Total Equity to Current Accounts 1: 0.3 1: 0.7 1 1: 0.6 1: 0.7 
Net Income 2.1 2.5 3.7 7.4 
Total Assets 210 231 255 321 
Return on Average Equity % - ' 5.4 6.2 7.9 12 % -t umon Averagle Assets % 1.0 1.1 1.5 2.5 
8.2 Ownership Structure 
The bank's ownership is spread among financial institutions an(] individual 
shareholders. Prior to 2003, no single shareholder held more than 5% of the capital. 
The management revealed that in 2003, a single institution bought around 40%) ofthe 
bank's capita ](21). (This information is not stated in the bank's published statemcnt of 
accounts) 
II ighl ighted below are the batik's strengths and weaknesses. 
8.2.1 The bank's strengths 
m Strong capitalisation and liquidity 
0 Solid asset quality 
0 The Central Bank acts as a lender of last resort 
8.2.2'1'lie bank's weaknesses 
m Small franchise 
mI figh concentration in low yielding commodity Murabaha impacts 
profitability 
m Increasing competition in a small over-banked market. 
Q 1) Capital Intelligent, 2005. 
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The Capital Intelligent report highlights that the bank aims to increase the return to its 
shareholders by moving away from low yielding short-term investments, towards high 
yielding assets thereby the increasing leverage of its balance sheet. The above table 
8.1, indicates that in 2005 ROA increased to 2.5% compared to 1.5% in 2004. This 
attributed to the increase in net income in 2005 compared to 2004 (see table 8.1). Prior 
to 2003 the bank was headed by a management team that followed a conservative 
investment policy. In 2003 however, a new management took over. 
It is worth mentioning that the new management was appointed before the sale of the 
40% of the capital to the new shareholder. 
In the same year the new management changed the bank's profit allocation from 
'Commingling' of assets to separating those assets that are financed by shareholders 
from those of the IAH. As a result, long-term investments, such as investing in the 
share capital of other banks and real estate investments are finariced by shareholders 
only and any return generated on these investments are paid entirely to the 
shareholders. 
83 Types of Investment Account-Holders 
The bank's accounts maintain different types of investment accounts holders as 
follows: 
m Current Accounts: These accounts bear no risk of loss and give no return, as 
the bank guarantees to pay the outstanding balance on demand. These 
accounts are considered as Qard (free loan) to the bank. The financial 
statements disclose no information on the nature of these accounts. (This 
information is obtained from the CEO of the bank). 
Un-restricted Investment Accounts with limited period of one month, three 
months, and six months. 
Un-restricted Investment Certificate Accounts for the duration of three years. 
n Un-restricted Private Investment Accounts. 
113 
Chapter 8 Moliammed Bank 
The bank's contracts with the IAH state clearly that the IAH authorlses the bank to 
invest his/her funds on his/her behalf The contracts clearly state that the bank is not 
responsible In case of any loss, other than that due to negligence or misconduct on part 
of the bank. 
The bank's contract states that as Mudarib, it would charge tip to 05', "() of tile profits 
attributable to the IAH. It can also set-aside tip to 65% of the IAII funds For 
maintaining its liquidity. The irony is that the batik's contract does not clearly reveal 
that it can invest the amounts set-aside for the purpose of maintaining liquidity and that 
shareholders are entitled for such returns. In addition, tile batik's contract makes no 
reflerence to the amount set-aside for liquidity which is established Ironi deducting the 
JAI I funds. 
Presented below are financial statements of the batik, pertaining to the distribUtIOn 01' 
profits. 
Table 8.2 : Snap-shot on the prorit distributed to shareholders and invest nien I 
account holders for 4 vears: 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
.0 Annual Returns, distributed 1() 111%esIllIcIll %ccolilit-11olders for 4 %cars 
1.2 0', ) 0 1.48 i0 0 
b) Annual Returns distributed b y of Mohammed Bmik") 
2.16% T I. 31% 2.1 O'YO 14.0% 
c) Annual interest levels for the p eriod 2002-2005" ") 
2.206'! /0 TI. 23(VO I 
I Nvidends Yield distributed to shareholders for 4 years" 
10%) 00 TI OF%//Y(07= 
== 
,%1 
27% 
(22) Bank's Financial Statements 2003 and 2005. 
(23 The Information Obtained from the Bank. 
(24 Reuters. 
M) The Bank's Financial Statements. 
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The bank's formula for the distribution of profits to the IAH (the 'commingling' 
approach between the shareholders and IAH is used): 
Prior to 2003, the bank used to apply the commingling method; i. e. commingling 
shareholders funds with those of the IAH. At the end of financial year, the bank used 
to share the profits between the shareholders and IAH proportionate to their 
investments. The expenses will be deducted from total revenues. Presented below are 
both the old and new methods for calculating the distribution of the bank's profits. 
8.3.1 The Old Method 
" Net profit after deducting all expenses .......... 
" Deducting the shareholders share in the profit .......... 
Gross Share of Holders of unrestricted investment accounts .......... 
Deduct-Bank's Mudarib income .......... 
M Net Share of holders of unrestricted investment accounts 
in the profit .......... 
8.3.2 The New Method (26) 
" The average balance of IAH ............... 
" Deduct the cash reserve with the Central Bank ............... 
N The amount invested for the IAH ............... 
Profits achieved for IAH ............... 
Deduct profit equalisation reserve (IAH share) ............... 
Distributable profits ............... 
Deduct banks share as Mudarib (up to 65%) ............... 
Deduct investment risk reserve ............... 
Net profits entitle for distribution to IAH ............... 
(20 As per the Ban)es Records. 
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As stated above, in 2003 the bank has changed its method of distribution of profits 
between the shareholders and IAH by moving from the commingling approach to the 
separation approach. The new method is applied in 2004, this has resulted in a 
doubling of the dividends yield distributed to shareholders. The irony is that while the 
dividends yield for 2005 reached 27%, the IAH received only 2.76% in the same year 
for generally the same risk as both the shareholders and IAH are exposed to the same 
risk of losing their investments. 
Taking into consideration the potential risk on IAH funds, we expect the IAH rate of 
return is higher than the annual interest rate, in fact the IAH of Mohanuned Bank 
receives rate of return lower than the annual interest rate and much lower than the rate 
paid by the competitor bank. 
In this respect, the bank has paid 1.63% as an average rate of return to IAH from 2002 
till 2005 lower than the average rate of interest during the same period which was 
2.282%. On the other hand, the bank paid an average dividend yield of 17.25% during 
the same period. 
Under the new method of profit distribution, investments in real-estate, capital 
investment in other institutions, bank fees, and returns on current accounts will be the 
entitlement of the shareholders. This will be in addition to the profits generated from 
investing the amounts deducted from the IAH funds for liquidity purposes. The IAII 
will also be entitled to the returns generated from other forms of financing including 
Afurabaha financing, leasing, Musharaka etc. The PER is allocated for the IAH only. 
We can see from table 8.2 that prior to 2003 (the year when there was a change in 
n1anagement) the bank use to distribute a constant 10% dividend to shareholders. The 
bank did not indicate in its financial statements, as per AAOIFI requirements of 
accounting standards No. 5 on Provisions and Reserves, to disclose in the notes to the 
financial statements, the basis it has applied to determine the profit equalisation reserve 
and the investment risk reserve("). 
"Para 25, AAOIFI, 1999. 
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In addition, the bank did not made any reference to the note to the accounts as required 
in AAOIFI Standard No. 6 to the percentage of funds of unrestricted investment 
accounts holders which the bank had agreed with them to invest in order to produce 
returns on to them (para 15). 
Furthermore, in spite of the requirements as stated in AAOIFI Standard on Disclosure of 
Bases for Profit Allocation between owners' and IAH, the bank failed to state in their 
accounting policies the bases applied by them in the allocation of profits between owners' 
equity and unrestricted investment accounts holders (para 2, Oct. 1996). 
Furthermore, although this is required by AAOIFI Standard No. I on General Presentation 
and Disclosure in the Financial Statements of Islamic banks and Financial Institutions, 
Mohammed Bank did not make disclosures of the method used to allocate investment 
profits (losses) between unrestricted investment account holders or their equivalent and the 
bank as a Mudarib, or as an investment manager whether or not participating in the 
investments with its own funds (AAOIFI, 1993). 
8.4 Report on the Interviews Conducted 
Following are the findings of interviews conducted with the bank's management, its 
regulators and rating agencies. 
8.4.1 Report on the Interviews held with the Bank's Management 
'I'lie management of Mohammed Bank claimed that it is accountable to the board of 
directors. It also confirms its commitment to provide the shareholders and IAII with 
attractive returns of profits. As indicated in table 8.2, the average rate of returns paid 
to LkH from 2002 to 2005 was much lower than the dividend yield paid to 
shareholders. The management presented several justifications to explain the 
apparent discrepancy. 
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One reason was that shareholders are long-term investors, while, IAH in 
most cases, place their funds for a maximum of one year. As a result, the 
returns to shareholders will be higher than the returns paid to IAH. 
The management reported that IAH are not subject to fluctuations in the 
market value of their deposits, unlike the shareholders, whose share price 
is subject to changes based on the movements of the shares in the stock 
market. This means that the IAH are not subject to the risk of price 
fluctuations as compared to the shareholders. 
E The management of Mohammed Bank claimed that since the bank's 
establishment, the bank maintains a policy of not giving (higher returns)? 
to shareholders over IAH or visa versa. The researcher, however, believes 
this does not hold true if we take into consideration the level of returns 
paid to shareholders as compared with those of IAH. 
The management of Mohammed Bank are in favour of some form of representation for 
the IAH in the bank's organs of governance. This is important to bring more discipline 
to the market. 
The management believe that SSBs should be given greater role specifically to ensure 
that the IAH interest is adequately protected. Presently, the role of the SSB is fairly 
limited, for example, the SSB provide afatwa only to those issues that are presented to 
them. The management can avoid presenting certain Shariah matters to SSB, in order 
to avoid the regulation thereon. 
The bank indicated that there is no regulation by any authority, including the external 
auditors and regulators, to ensure the bank's compliance with the conditions stated in 
the agreement between the bank and IAH. For example, if the agreement states that the 
bank will invest 70 % of the IAH funds, this is not checked for compliance by anyone 
including the auditors, the regulators, and the ISR (ISR role will be discussed latter in 
this case study). 
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The management argued that in order to bring more discipline to this market, the SSBs 
should consist of Shariah scholars and professional auditors. 
The management suggested that bank supervisors, rating agencies and other 
information intermediaries should take the issue of corporate governance more 
seriously, particularly with respect to the rights of LAR 
8.4.2 Report on the Interviews heId with the Rating Agencies 
T'hese rating agencies shared the views of the bank's management on the level of 
transparency. They further claim that the level of information disclosed in the Islamic 
bank's financial statements is less than satisfactory. 
One rating agency proposed that the board of directors are responsible for assessing the 
management on behalf of the IAH as well the shareholders. While another rating 
agency reported to the researcher, that in addition to the board of directors, rating 
agencies should play a role in assessing the management on behalf of the IAH. 
Another rating agency claimed that the role played by IFSB and AAOIFI is very 
important in assisting rating agencies in assessing Islamic banks, provided that such 
role is supported by the bank supervisors. 
8.4.3 Report on the Interviews held with the Bank Supervisors 
The supervisors of Mohammed Bank believe that developing a regulation for corporate 
governance that takes into consideration the special status of the LAE, similar to the one 
developed by IFSB, will enhance market discipline and protect the interest of the IAH. 
The supervisors are also in favour of a public awareness effort, targeting the clients of 
Islamic banks, particularly IAH, to encourage them to take more pro-active role in their 
relation with their banks. So far the IAH are unsophisticated and passive investors, and 
rely on others like the SSB and bank supervisors to protect their interests. 
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The supervisors of Mohammed Bank indicated that their supervisory role is limited to 
the banks financial status and they have no directly supervisory role over the SSBs 
since this is difficult role to conduct. 
However, in case the bank fails to comply with Shariah it is the responsibility of the 
SSB to declare it in the SSBs report. 
The supervisors of Mohammed Bank argued that the bank's board of directors and the 
supervisors are responsible for protecting the interest of the LkH. 
The bank's supervisors believe that IFSB should play an instrumental role in 
developing specific regulations to protect the interests of the IAH. It is worth noting 
that IFSB has developed guidelines for corporate governance for Islamic banks (IFSB, 
2006b). The main purpose of these guidelines is to protect the interests of the 
stakeholders other than shareholders and make the bank's activities more compatible 
with Shariah precepts. 
Furthermore, supervisors of Mohammed Bank argued that enhancing transparency will 
constitute developing a market discipline. 
8A. 4 Report on the Interview held with the Internal Sharilah Review (ISR) 
The ISR claimed that it is accountable to the SSB. Its role and responsibilities are 
delegated by the SSB, and it is independent from the management. By reviewing the 
bank's by-laws, there is no reference made pertaining to the establishment of the ISFL 
The ISR in Mohammed Bank is independent from the management and is accountable 
exclusively to the SSB. However, the ISR is an integral part of the organs of 
governance of the bank and operates under the policies established by the IFI. The 
salaries and other benefits is decided by the management based on the recommendation 
of the SSB. 
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The ISR's main function is to carry out an ex post Shariah audit, i. e. reviewing the 
bank's transactions to ascertain whether the bank obtained the SSB instructions before 
implementing them. Such an audit also includes checking the bank's contracts to see 
whether if they have been implemented in accordance with the instructions of the SSB. 
However, there is no written policies and procedures for the ISP, 
It is worth noting that AAOIFI Auditing Standard No. 4 requires the auditor to attest in 
its audit opinion as to the bank's compliance with Shariah. However, the auditor's 
make no such reference in its report. The external auditors conduct no testing on the 
ISR procedures to determine the effectiveness of the system. 
It is also worth noting that AAOIFI Standards Auditor's Report Standard (AAOIFI, 
1998) requires the external auditor to include in the auditor's opinion the following 
statement: 
"The report should include a statement that the financial statements and the financial 
institution undertaking to operate in accordance with Islamic Shariah Rules Principles 
are the responsibility of the financial institution management and a statement that the 
responsibility of the auditor is to express an opinion on the financial statements". The 
]Bank's Auditors' opinion is in line with the AAOIFI Standard. 
The ISR claimed that it also conducts a Shariah audit with respect to the bank's policy 
of profits allocation between the shareholders and IAH. As indicated above with the 
high percentage of dividend yield paid to shareholders compare to IAH rate of returns, 
this will question whether he ISR has the right to report on such discrepancy to the 
SSB- The ISR Shad'ah audit includes the bank's compliance with the instructions of 
the SSB. 
8.4.5 Report on the Interview held with the Shadah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
The SSB's activities include reviewing the bank's transactions, new contracts and 
Products, and other activities to make sure that they are in accordance with the Shariah 
rules and principles. It can be noted that such activities are e-x ante Shariah audit. The 
121 
Chapter 8 Mohammed Bank 
ISR carry out an ex post Shariah audit on behalf of the SSB. The SSB's obligations 
include, responding to the queries of the bank's clients. Furthermore, the by-laws 
under Article 4 refer to the establishment of the SSB to act as advisor to the board of 
directors on Shariah matters. 
The SSB remuneration is decide by the board of directors based on the 
recommendation of the management. 
The report of the ISRs audit is submitted to the SSB with a copy to the management. 
Ile SSB discusses the report with the ISR and advice the management based on the 
findings of the report. 
The SSB pointed out that presently the bank has internal Shariah procedures to assist 
the ISR in carrying out their tasks. 
The SSB's report of Mohammed Bank states that: 
"The SSB monitored the operations and transactions and contracts related to 
transactions carried out by the bank throughout the year ended xxxx. to express opinion 
on the bank's commitment to the provisions and principles of Islamic Shariah in its 
activities and investments in accordance to the guidelines and decisions issued by the 
SSB. The SSB believes that ensuring the conformity of the bank's activities and 
investments with provision of Islamic Shariah is the sole responsibility of the bank's 
management, while the SSB is only responsible for expressing an independent opinion 
and preparing a report thereabout". 
The SSB monitoring functions included the checking of documents and procedures to 
scrutinize operation carried out by the bank, either directly or through the (ISR). The 
SSB plans with the Shariah Internal Audit Department (SIAD) to carry out its 
Monitoring functions. This is executed through the acquisition of all information and 
clarifications that are deemed necessary to confirm that the bank did not violate the 
Principles and provisions of Islamic Shariah. The Shariah Internal Audit Department 
carries out its functions of auditing the bank's transactions and submitting a report to 
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the SSB, which indicated the bank's conunitment and confonnity to the SSB's 
opinions. 
I'lie SSB, obtained data and clarifications that it deemed necessary to confirm that the 
bank did not violate the principles and provisions of Islamic Shariah- The SSB then 
held several meetings throughout the year ended 31, December xxxx and replied to 
enquiries, in addition to approving a number of new products presented by the 
management. The Shariah Board then discussed with the bank's officials all 
transactions and applications carried out by the management throughout the year 
ending 31, December xxxx, and reviewed the bank's record of conformity with the 
provisions and principles of Islamic Shariah, as well as the resolutions and guidelines 
set out by the SSB. 
The SSB believes that: 
N Contracts, operations, and transactions conducted by the bank 
throughout the year, ending 31, December xxxx were made in 
accordance to the standard contracts pre-approved by the SSB. 
NA distribution of profits and losses on investment accounts was in line 
with the basis approved by SSB in accordance with principles pre- 
approved by the SSB. 
m No gains resulted from sources or by means prohibited by the provisions 
and principles of Islamic Shariah. 
E Zakat was calculated according to the provisions and principles of 
Islamic Shariah. The bank distributed Zakat on statutory reserve, 
general reserve, and retained earnings. The shareholders declared their 
proportion of Zakat on their shares as stated in the financial report. 
n The bank was committed to the Shariah standards issued by AAOIFI. 
The report exceeded their disclosure, beyond what is required under AAOIFI- The 
AAOIFI Sharl'ah Supervisory Board No. I requires the Islamic banks to state that: 
a The Islamic bank contracts and related documentation are in compliance 
with the Islamic Shariah rules and principles. 
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The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Islamic bank 
during the year ended xxxx that we have reviewed are in compliance 
with the IsImnic Shariah rules principles. 
m The allocation of profit and charging of losses relating to investment 
accounts conform to the basis that had been approved by the SSB in 
accordance with Islamic Shariah rules and principles. 
(Where appropriate, the opinion paragraph shall also include the following matters): 
All earnings that have been realized from sources or by means 
prohibited by Islamic Shariah rules and principles have been disposed 
of to charitable causes; and 
w The calculation of Zakat is in compliance with Islamic Shariah rules 
and principles. 
The SSB claimed that in order to make sure that ISR staffs are qualified and capable of 
doing the job; the SSB interviews the staff candidate to work in the ISR and makes 
recommendation on their appointment to the management. 
T'he SSB members indicated that since the appointment of new management in 2003, 
the SSB was much more powerful than it used to be during the time that the bank was 
under the previous management. For example, under the more empowered SSB, all 
transactions, new products must be presented to the Shariah Board for its 
endorsements and opinion. 
The appointment of SSB members is the responsibility of the General Assembly based 
on the recommendation of the Board of Directors. 
The SSB's main responsibility is to carry out Shariah reviews of ban)es contracts (e-x 
ante) to ensure compliance with Shariah. 
Article 4 of the bank's by-laws states that the bank is obliged to implement the Sharl'ah 
rules and principles in all its activities, with the assistance of the Shariah Supervisory 
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Board, if it so requires. The SSB confirmed that it is also their role to examine the 
bank's profit allocation policy between the shareholders and IAH. It is within this role 
that it has to make sure that the policy is fair to UH. This will be analysed in detail in 
the analysis section. 
The SSB's that is mainly of issuing fatwas and responding to the queries of the 
management and the public. It seems that the SSB does not diligently review the 
bank's contracts with the IAH. This is validated by the fact that the contracts explicitly 
do not mention important information with respect to will receive returns will be 
generated from invested the amounts set aside for liquidity and that such amounts are 
guaranteed by the bank. These views are shared by the rating agency who claims that 
they are not fully satisfied with the role played by SSBs in making sure that Islamic 
banks operate in accordance with Shariah principles. 
8.4.6 Report on the written responses received from the External Auditors 
The auditors are required by the bank supervisors to make sure that Mohammed Bank 
operates in compliance with Shariah (regulations, 2001). In this respect it's important 
to understand the role of the auditors to attain to such opinion. 
The auditors claimed that ASIR 4 (Accounting Standard for Islamic Financial 
Institutions) "testing for compliance with Shariah rules and principles by external 
auditors" requires auditors to test the bank's compliance with Islamic Shariah rules 
and principles, including the examination of all newfatwas and rulings that affect the 
bank. 
As part of their audit programme, the auditors meet with the ISR and study their 
reports. They also meet with the SSB to discuss the bank's compliance with Shariah 
rules and principles. However, the external auditors do not themselves carry out any 
detailed checks of the bank's Shari6h compliance 
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8.5 Concluding Remarks 
The bank's ownership is divided among financial institutions and small shareholders. 
Till 2003, no shareholder held more than 10% of bank's capital. In 2003, a single 
institution acquired 40% of the bank's capital. In the same year, new management is 
appointed. Till 2003, the bank used to pay a 10% dividend to shareholders. 
Also, in 2003 the bank has changed its method of distribution of profits between the 
shareholders and LkH by moving from the commingling method to separation method. 
The changed had resulted in doubling the dividends year. The IAH rate of return is 
lower than the interest rate and the rate paid by competitor bank. 
The SSB's Shariah review is limited in conducting ax ante Shariah audit and relies on 
the ISR to conduct the ex post Shariah audit. The role and responsibilities of the ISR 
responsibilities are delegated by the SSB, and that it is independent from the 
Management. The bank adopted AAOIFI Sharilah Standards, including the 
appointment of the SSB members, Shariah review, Shariah internal review. 
With regard to the relations between the ISR and external auditors, the external auditors 
can have excess to the reports of the ISR to assist the auditors on the bank's compliance 
with Shail'ah. The SSB's report state that the ISR carries out its functions of auditing 
the bank's transactions and submitting a report to the SSB. 
However, protecting the IAH is the prime responsibility of the IAH themselves; this 
requires LAH to be pro-active role in their relation with the bank. So far, IAII rely on 
others like the SSB and the supervisors to protect their interest. This is because IAH 
are passive and unsophisticated investors and in the absence of market discipline. 
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Chapter 9 
The Case Study of Khalifa Bank 
9.1 Introduction 
Khalifa Bank 
Khalifa Bank was established in lqxx to conduct banking activities in accordance 
with Shail'ah principles. 
The bank is required to adopt accounting, Shariah and auditing standards issued by 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). 
9.1.1 Asset Quality 
The bank has a good banking franchise. The principal activities include Murabaha 
financing (cost plus profit margin), Musharaka 6oint venture), and Leasing and Ijara 
(lease financing). On the liability side of the balance sheet, investment (customer) 
accounts are managed on the basis of Mudaraba. Current accounts are treated as qard 
(free loan) to the bank and it is a liability. 
It is worth noting that around 58% of the asset-side financing was in the form of low- 
risk Murabaha financing. Generally, Murabaha represent a major financing of 
Islamic banks especially International commodities Murabaha (Financial statements, 
2005). 
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'Fable 9.1: Snap-shot of the linancial highlights in millions (The bank's financial 
statemen s, 2005) 
I mn 
FoLd Sharc Capital 
2002 
61 
2003 
60 
2004 
01 
2005 
o. ) 
_ I Otal hivestnicnt A/c lJoldcrs _ 256 -___ 34S 392 4 78' 
Current Accounts 13 21 29 37 
Ratio of Total Share Capital to IAH 1: 5 1: 6.75 1: 6 1: 7.7 
Ratio of Total Share Capital to Current 
Accounts 1: 0.2 1: 0.3 1: 0.5 1: 0., 0 
Net Income 3.2 1.1 0.3 2.7 
Total Assets 305 405 454 511 
Total Share Capital 61 60 63 62 
- Rcturn on Average Equity % 5.2 1.8 0.4 4.4 
Rctum on Average Assets % 1.0 1 0.27 0.06 1 0.5 
9.2 Ownership Structure 
The bank is a subsidiary of a large financial gi-oup that holds 78.3', ' ý' of tlIc hank's 
capital. The remaining is owned by other Islamic financial institutions (Capital 
Intelligence, 2005). The banking arm of the grOUp exists in various countrics 
including Jordan, Turkey, Tunisia and Algeria. 
There are seven board members, five of which represent the financial group 
(dominant shareholder). This suggests that tile financial group controls majority 
ownership (and decision making) ofthe bank, thereby classifying the hank as having a 
controlling majority (concentrated sharcholdcr). 
The profitability picture improved in 2005 but remains dim, as Rcturn oil Asscis 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) is much lower in coniparlson to tile otlicr tIlrec 
banks. 
9.3 Types of Account-floldel's 
There are three main types of account holders in the bank which are (Icscribcd its 
f'()Ilows 
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9.3.1 Current Accounts 
These accounts bear no risk of loss and earn no return, as the bank guarantees to pay 
the outstanding balance on demand. These accounts are considered as Qard (free 
loan) from the account holder to the bank. 
93.2 Un-Restricted Investment Accounts (General Mudaraba Agreement) 
There are different types of unrestricted investment accounts based on General 
Mudaraba Agreements, with maturity tenors of 3,6,12 or 24 months. 
The contract for all three types of accounts is a standard one; the standard contract 
makes no reference to the Mudarib rate, as, clause (6) of the agreement with respect 
to the IAH share of the profit and the bank's share as Mudarib has been left blank. As 
reported by a senior official of the bank, the two parties will agree on the bank's share 
as Mudarib which will be filled in when signing the contract. Also the contract makes 
no reference to the level of discretion given to the Mudarib, with respect to the 
investments which it makes, which is in accordance with the concepts of financial 
accounting for Islamic banks and financial institutions issued by AAOIFI (Oct. 1993): 
"Unrestricted Investment Accounts refer to funds received by the 
Islamic bank from individuals and others on the basis that the 
Islamic bank will have the right to use and invest those funds 
without restrictions including the Islamic banks right to commingle 
those invested funds with its own investments in exchange for 
proportionate participation in profits and losses after the Islamic 
bank receives its share of profit as a Mudarib (para. 24)". 
9.3.3 Restricted Investment Account (Specillc Mudaraba) 
The contract of the restricted investment accounts is very similar to the contract of the 
unrestricted investment accounts (General Mudaraba). However, the restricted 
contract makes no reference to the level of discretion given to the Mudarib. Such a 
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difference is instrumental in differentiating restricted investment accounts from 
unrestricted investment accounts, in accordance with the concepts of financial 
accounting for Islamic banks and financial institutions issued by AAOIFI (Oct. 1993): 
"Restricted Investment Accounts are not assets of the Islamic bank 
and should not be reflected on the bank's statement of financial 
position since the bank does not have the right to use or to dispose of 
those investment except within the conditions of the contract 
between the Islamic bank and holders of restricted investment 
accounts (para. 18)". 
However, the bank failed to comply fully with AAOIFI Standards. In this respect, the 
bank did not made any reference to the note to the accounts as required in AAOIFI 
Standard No. 6 to the percentage of funds of unrestricted investment accounts holders 
which the bank had agreed with them to invest in order to produce returns on to them 
(para. 15). 
Furthermore, in spite of the requirements as stated in AAOIFI Standard on Disclosure of 
Bases for Profit Allocation between owners' and IAH, the bank failed to state in their 
accounting policies the bases applied by them in the allocation of profits between owners' 
equity and unrestricted investment account-holders (para. 2, Oct. 1996). 
Furthermore, although this is required by AAOIFI Standard No. I on General 
Presentation and Disclosure in the Financial Statements of Islamic banks and Financial 
Institutions, Mohammed Bank did not make disclosures of the method used to allocate 
investment profits (losses) between unrestricted investment account-holders or their 
equivalent and the bank as a Mudarib, or as an investment manager whether or not 
participating in the investments with its own funds (AAOIFI, 1993). 
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'Fable 9.2: Snap-shot on the distribution of yield dividend on IAH 2002 - 2005 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
a) Returns Distributed to Investment Account-holders for 4 ), Cars 
(financial statements, 2003 - 2005) 
5.48 % 2.74 'Yo 1 2.63% 4.35 % 
b)Annual Interest rates for the same period (source of information is 
Reuters) 
2.1 % 1.3 % 2.3.9 'NO 
C) Dividends distributed to shareholders for 4 years (bank's financial 
statements 2003 - 2005) 
5%I-I- 5% 
The bank's profit distribution formula to IAH 
I lie bank policy is to separate investment pools (SCIN11"1001, "IC1,11)(1) 1111,111ccd I)y 161. 
the IAIJ from those of shareholders. Retunis on the 1161lowing items will he paid to 
shareholders (bank's financial statements, 2005): 
0 Investments in real-estate (long-term) 
0 Capital investment in other institutions 
IN Bank fees 
" Returns on assets financed by current accounts 
" Profits allocated to shareholders 
Returns on the following iterns will be paid to IAII (bank's records): 
" Intemational Commodities 
" Deposits with other Islamic Banks 
" Alurabaha financing 
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0 Musharaka financing 
N Investment short-term 
N Securities short-term 
" Total: the above assets financed by IAH 
" Less: direct expenses related to the pool and 
specific provisions related to the IAH pool 
" Less Mudarib share (it ranges from 30% to 40% 
based on a decision from the Board of Directors) 
" Less profit equalisation reserve, at a percentage 
to be specified by the Board of Directors 
" LAR entitlement to returns 
(Source: obtained from the bank's records) 
The method of distribution of profits to shareholders and IAH is similar to the method 
used by Mohammed Bank, except that its Khalifa Bank a share of profits on assets set 
aside for liquidity management is paid to IAH, while in the case of Mohammed Bank 
such profits will be paid just to the shareholders. 
9.4 Report on the Interview held with the Management of Khalifa Bank 
The management of Khalifa Bank claimed that it is accountable to the shareholders 
and IAH. This means providing the shareholders and the IAH with attractive rates of 
returns. 
Claiming that the bank is accountable to both the shareholders and IAII is difficult to 
comprehend since the management is appointed by the board of directors and the 
board of directors are accountable to the shareholders who appointed them to 
represent their interest. 
One rating agency argued that the board of directors should play a role in assessing 
the performance of the management on behalf of the LAR So far the supervisors of 
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Islamic banks have not developed legislation or specific regulations to address the 
interests of the IAH. 
On the other hand, the bank's management indicated that their policy is different from 
other Islamic banks in respect to the level of returns distributed to shareholders and 
IAH. 
Its worth noting that Mohammed Bank and Khalifa Bank are regulated by the same 
central bank and audited by the same auditors, therefore the views of their auditors 
and supervisors are the same and as stated in the case study of Mohammed Bank. 
9.5 Report on the Written Response from the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
The SSB's main responsibility is to carry out Shariah reviews of banles contracts to 
ensure compliance with Shariah. 
Article 58 (1984) of the bank's by-laws state, that the board of directors should 
appoint one or more Shariah scholars with experience with financial services. 
Article 60 (1984) state that the board of directors or the management can obtain the 
SSB's views on Shariah matters. The SSB consists of three board members. 
The SSB submits its report to the board of directors. AAOIFI's Governance Standard 
No. 1 on Shariah Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report, states 
that the SSB's report shall be appropriately addressed as required by the 
circumstances of the engagement and local laws and regulations. 
The SSB conducts mainly an ex post review which includes the approving of new 
contracts and/or products and endorsing new banking services (e. g. debit card 
services). The ex ante review is carried through the Internal Shariah Review (ISR) 
on behalf of the SSB. The role of the ISR is to make sure that the bank has 
implemented the SSB instructions. 
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The supervisors of Khalifa Bank indicated that their supervisory role is limited to the 
bank's financial statues and they have no directly supervisory role over the SSB. 
If the bank fails to comply with SSB instructions, usually the SSB will discuss it with 
the management, and if it is not convinced by the management response, it will 
qualify the report. This indicated in the SSB's report when it has decided to put 
qualification in the report for several consecutive years. 
It is important to mention, that ISR is an integral part of the organs of governance of 
the bank and operates under the policies established by the bank. The staff and 
benefits of the ISR are decided by the management. However, there is no written 
policies and procedures for the ISR. 
It is also worth noting that the SSB remuneration is decided by the board of directors 
based on the recommendation of the management. 
It is worth noting that AAOIFI Auditing Standard No. 4 requires the auditor to form 
an opinion on the auditor SSB's on the bank's compliance with Shariah. The 
auditor's opinion makes no such reference in the opinion, which makes it short of 
what is required in AAOIFI Standard No. 4. The external auditors conduct no testing 
on the ISR procedures to determine the effectiveness of the system. 
The bank is required to adhere to AAOIFI Governance Standards (central bank 
regulations, 21 November 2001) which include the following standards: 
1. Shariah Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report 
2. Shariah Review 
3. Internal Shariah Review 
4. Audit and Governance Committee for Islamic Financial Institutions 
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The SSB's report to the shareholders of the bank contains the following opinion: 
"We have reviewed the principles applied in contracts related to transactions and 
practices which were launched by the bank during the year ended 31/12/xxxx. We 
have conducted the monitoring which is required to express our opinion whether the 
bank is compatible with the rules and principles of Islamic Shariah and alsofatwas 
(religious opinions), decisions and guidelines which were issued by our board. 
The appointment of SSB members is the responsibility of the General Assembly 
based on the recommendation of the board of directors. 
The responsibility of ensuring that the bank works in accordance with the rulings and 
principles of Islamic Shariah lies with its management. Our responsibility is limited 
in expressing an independent opinion on the basis of our review of the bank's 
operations and in preparing our report to you. 
Our review included checking documents and procedures followed by the bank on the 
basis of testing each type of operations. We have planned and implemented our 
review in order to obtain all information and explanation deemed necessary by us in 
order to obtain reasonable evidences that the bank did not violate the rulings and 
principles of Islamic Shariah. 
In our opinion: 
The contracts, operations and transactions carried out by the bank ending 31 st, 
December, xxxx, which we have examined were all compliance with the rules and 
principles of the Islamic Shariah. 
2. As to the bank branches in .......... it appears to us that a number of 
investments 
interred with some of the banks were not Shariah compatible in their underlying 
operations, and therefore, we decided that the management has to cease these 
investments to which we have presented alternative Shariah compatible ones. 
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The management has set aside a sum of PR212,235/- out of the earnings 
generated from the said operations to expend it in charitable purposes to be 
decided by us. However, since part of these earnings has been received by the 
owners of the investment accounts as part of distributions made to them, the SSB 
has asked the management to notify the investors of the percentage of such 
earnings to the total amounts distributed to them and advise them to spend this 
percentage in charitable purposes. 
3. The distribution of profits and losses on the investment accounts is compatible 
with the standards adopted by us according to the rules and principles of the 
Islamic Shariah. 
4. The Management has to expend the amount which is earned from sources or 
through means prohibited under the rules and principles of the Islamic Shariah in 
charitable ways". 
The qualification of the SSB's report as indicated above shows the SSB enjoys 
independence from the management and board of directors, as such a qualification 
could negatively impact the bank's reputation. It is worth noting, however, that the 
same qualification continues to appear in the SSB's report for four consecutive years 
from 2002 to 2005. 
The external auditors fails to state in its report as to whether the financial statements 
give a true and fair view in accordance with Islamic Shariah Rules and Principles. 
The market did not react to such qualifications. On the contrary, total deposits 
increased from 197 mn in 2002 to 374 mn in 2005. 
This indicates how the market fails to react in the absence of effective and efficient 
market discipline. 
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9.6 Concluding Remarks 
Khalifa Bank is a subsidiary of a large financial group that holds 78.3% of the bank's 
capital. The remaining is owned by other Islamic financial institutions. There are 
seven board members, five of which represent the financial group. 
The method of distribution of profits to shareholders and IAH is similar to the method 
used by Mohammed Bank, except that Khalifa Bank distributes profits on assets set 
aside for liquidity management to both the shareholders and IAH, while in the case of 
Mohammed Banks such profits will be paid just to the shareholders. 
Although the majority of the capital is held by one institution, the bank continued to 
pay returns to LAE even in years where no dividends were distributed to shareholders. 
The SSB conducts mainly an ex post review which includes the approving of new 
contracts and/or products and endorsing new banking services (e. g. debit card 
services). 
The ex ante review is carried through the Internal Shariah Review on behalf of the 
SSB. The SSB's report makes no reference to the role play by the ISR. 
With regard to the relations between the ISR and external auditors, the external 
auditors can have access to the reports of the ISR to assist the auditors on the bank's 
compliance with Shariah. 
However, the bank's policy is to provide the shareholders and the IAH with attractive 
rates of returns. One rating agency argued that the board of directors should play a 
role in assessing the performance of the management on behalf of the LAH- 
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Chapter 10 
The Case Study of Sara Bank 
10.1 Introduction 
Sara Bank 
Sara Bank (henceforth also referred to as the "Bank") was established in May 19xx, 
which made it the second Islamic bank in the country. Along with the provision of 
standard banking activities, its main activities include, maintaining different kinds of 
deposits, opening and confirming letters of credit, issuing securities and letters of 
guarantee, dealing in foreign currencies and financing foreign trade, and issuing credit 
cards, travellers' cheques, and other financial instruments (Article 1, Article of 
Association, 1990). 
The bank is required by the Central Bank to implement AAOIFI accounting standards 
issued by the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI). The bank is not required to adopt AAOIFI Shariah and auditing 
standards. The board of directors are obliged to seek the assistance of a religious 
supervisory committee for religious counsel in matters related to the various banking 
activities (Article 49, Article of Association, 1990). The appointment of the SSB 
members is the responsibility of the Board of Directors. 
10.1.1 Asset Quality 
The bank registered a significant growth in its activities in 2005. While financing 
ur growth has remained robust, on the back of higher local demand, expos e to housing 
finance and consumer finance sectors has increased by 20% and 32% respectively. 
It is important to note that this research uses the period from 2002 to 2005 as an 
indicator as well as a benchmark period for comparison with other case studies. 
Furthermore, in order to disguise the bank's identity the table will not mention 
the 
currency that the figures represent. 
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'I'llble 10-1: Snap-shot of the financial highlights in minions ('rhe hank, s tinanciai 
ýtillelllent%, 2002 - 2005) 
mn 
1 ()IA 'Share Callital 
2002 2003 
28( )- 
2004 
--- -- 
441) 
2005 
-- 
S8 -1 EWA Investinct-it A/c I folders 2695 _____ 34w) 4359 S070 
Current Accounts 482 891 997 1762 
_Ratio of 
Total Share Capital to IAH 1: 11.7 1: 12.3 1: 9.7 1: 5.7 
Ratio of Total Share Capital to Current 
Accounts 1: 0.4 1: 3.2 1: 2.2 1: 1.9 
Net Income 50 64 88 465 
Total Assets 3039 3906 4962 6335 
Return on Average Equity % 22 / 23) / 26 59 
Return on Average Assets % 
[ýý 
1 6 1.7 7.3 
As indicated by table 10.1 above, the bank's net income increased by 428% In 2005. 
The major increase came from the gain on sale of cquitics, as the local stock market 
"'itnessed its best year (financial statements, 2005). The market index advanced from 
6,493 to 11,053.2005 was an outstanding performance for all banks operating in the 
same country. 
10.2 Ownership Structure 
A significant share of the bank's capital is owned by one family, which is rcprcscntcd 
hy tour out of the eight board members"" 
The perccritage of shares held by the family is disclosed ilcithcr ill tile auditcd 
accounts nor in the Capital Intelligence Report. However, determined Cron' their 
representation ill the board, it call be suggested that tile family holds majority control 
and tile bank can be considered to have concentrated shareholding (with the Iamily 
owning 50% or higher). 
Capital Intelligence, June, 2005. 
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10.3 Types of Investment Account-Holders 
Sara Bank 
Ilie accounts maintain different types of investment account holders as follows: 
10.3.1 Current Accounts 
These accounts bear no risk of loss and give no return to holders, as the bank 
guarantees to pay the outstanding balance on demand. These accounts are considered 
as Qard (free loan) to the bank. 
10-3.2 Saving Accounts 
The contract states clearly that this is a Mudaraba contract between the IAH and the 
bank. The bank also states that it guarantees the principal in case the bank has acted 
with proven negligence or misconduct. 
1033 Time Deposit 
The contract states clearly that this is a Mudaraba contract between the LkH and the 
bank. The bank also states that it guarantees the principal if the bank has acted with 
proven negligence or misconduct. 
However, all bank contracts with IAH that do not indicate the bank's share of profits 
as Mudarib. This share is decided by the board of directors at the end of the financial 
year, based on the maturity profile of the deposit base. Maximum Mudarib for 2005 
is 39.4%. For time deposit lower Mudarib rate will be charged. 
In spite of the requirements as stated in AAOIFI Standard on Disclosure of Bases for 
Profit Allocation between owners' and IAH, the bank failed to state in their accounting 
policies the bases applied by them in the allocation of profits between owners' equity and 
unrestricted investment account-holders (para 2, Oct. 1996). 
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Table 10.2: Snap-shot on Interest rates paid from 2002 - 2005 and on the 
dividends distributed to shareholders for 4 years 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
1.4 8 ')/,, 1 3.27 ',, () 1 3.7 5 6.5 1 
111terest rates f'or the same period (Reuters) 
1 1.0% 1 2.1 (Yo 3.89% 
Dividends distributed to shareholders for 4 years (batik's 1-111,111cial 
statements 2003 - 2005) 1 ý 7 
35 ýO/. 35% 40% 100% 
The bank's prof-it distribution formula (The bank uses the conliningling 
approach between its shareholders and IAII): 
0 Net realised profit entitled for shareholders and IAI I firom after 
deducting all expenses 
mI )educting the shareholders share in the profit ............... 
0 S', hare of holders of unrestricted investment account-lioldcrs in 
tile profit 
Deduct-profit equallsation reserve ............... 
m Deduct-Bank's Aludarib fees ............... 
0 Share of holders ofunrestricted investment accounts in the prolit ............... 
(Source: obtained from the bank's records) 
The hank's share as Mutlarib as indicated in the bank's financial statements are 
as loliols, s: 
Table 10.3: The bank's share as Wittlarih for 2003 2005 
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The bank uses the commingling approach, which means investing the funds of the 
shareholders with those of the IAH. All revenue generated is shared between the 
shareholders and IAH proportionately. This approach differs from the one used by 
Mohammed Bank, where some of the assets are financed by the shareholders and 
others by the IAH. This also differs from the approach used by Khalifa Bank, where 
some of the expenses are borne by the IAH and others by the shareholders. In the 
case of Sara Bank all expenses will be shared between the shareholders and IAIL 
The supervisors require all Islamic banks to abide by the above formula which is 
required to be disclosed in the bank's financial statements. The supervisor of Sara 
Bank is the only Central Bank of the three Central Banks (as indicated in the 
methodology chapter, the research is conducting case studies of four banks operating 
in three countries) that requires such information to be disclosed in the bank's 
financial statements (29) . 
Islamic banks are required by the supervisor to state the method of profit allocation 
and the maximum Mudarib ratio in the contract, where the Mudarib ratio should be 
declared at the beginning of each year along with the modifications in the contract(IO). 
The Islamic banks are permitted to forego part of their share of profits (the Mudarib 
fee) in order to increase the rate of return for the IAH, after obtaining the approval 
from the general assembly, followed by a disclosure of the same in the bank's 
financial statements(31). Banks are not allowed to allocate or announce the profit 
allocation to the LAR unless they have obtained the approval of the Central Bank and 
before meeting the rest of the criteria that govern this allocation("). 
(29) Instruction to banks, 2005 p. 225. 
(30) Instruction to banks, 2005 p. 226. 
(31) Instruction to banks, 2005 p. 226. 
(32) Instruction to banks, 2006 p. 225. 
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The regulations also indicate that the LAE shall bear no losses, except what is decided 
by the supervisors. The supervisor is the entity that dictates that the Islamic bank as 
Mudarib will bear the responsibility of such losses in line with the rules of the Islamic 
law("). As per the Shadah law the Mudarib e. g. the Islamic bank is responsible for 
the IAH losses only in case of negligence or mis-conduct. 
The Central Bank governing Sara Bank, is quite progressive in regulating Islamic 
banks, by not only enhancing transparency and disclosure rules, but also addressing 
other very important issues which affect the returns distributed to the IAH and the 
shareholders. 
10.4 Report on the Interviews Conducted with the Management 
The management of Sara Bank claimed that they have a fiduciary responsibility but 
no accountability as UH have no governance rights. 
The bank's management asserted that the bank's stability and confidence in the 
niarket depends to large extent on the service it provides to the IAH. Following from 
this, the management stated that it was against providing the IAH any representation 
in the bank's committees, since it is in the interest of the board of directors and 
Management to protect the interest of the IAH. In the event that the LAH decided to 
withdraw their funds, it will put the board of directors and management under severe 
pressure which may result in losing their positions. Hence, the management indicated 
that regardless of the bank's ownership structure, it is in the interest of the board of 
directors and management to protect the interest of the IAH. 
The researcher shares the view that it is in the interest of the board of directors and 
Management to protect the interest of the TAH. For this reason, the board of directors 
and management may decide to give up part of the Mudarib share of profit for the 
benefit of the IAH. 
03) Instruction to banks, 2005 p. 226. 
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One rating agency maintained that it is the responsibility of the board of directors to 
monitor the performance of the management on behalf of the IAH. While another 
rating agency claimed that it is the responsibility of the board of directors and rating 
agencies to assess the performance of the management on behalf of the IAH. 
The supervisors of Sara Bank argued that in order to achieve financial stability, bank 
supervisors have an obligation to develop a robust supervisory framework in order to 
Protect the interest of the IAH, as any losses incurred by LAR will negatively impact 
on the bank's reputation and the overall confidence in the banking system. 
In this regard, the bank's supervisors believe that the IFSB should work closely with 
the supervisors in helping to develop supervisory standards for Islamic banks which 
give confidence to the IAH and other stakeholders with respect to the management of 
Islamic banks. The supervisors of Sara Bank also believe that financial intermediaries 
such as rating agencies also play an important role in protecting the interest of the 
IAH through their assessment of the bank's financial strength. This is achieved when 
there is adequate level of disclosure. This calls for AAOIFI and other accounting 
standards setting bodies to develop accounting standards that help financial 
intermediaries to effectively assess Islamic banks. 
The supervisors of Sara Bank indicated that their supervisory role is limited to the 
bank's financial statues and they have no supervisory role over the SSBs. 
However, in case the bank fails to comply with Shariah it is the responsibility of the 
SSB to declare it the SSBs report. 
Two rating agencies that rate Islamic banks claim that the level of information 
disclosed in the financial reports of Islamic banks is less than satisfactory. This Will 
certainly not help in developing market discipline and allowing the IAII to take the 
appropriate decisions on their investments. 
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10.5 Report on the Written Response 
Sara Bank 
10.5.1 Report on the written response from the Internal Sharilah Review (ISR) 
The role of ISR is to review and audit all banking activities to make sure that they are 
compatible with Shariah. The ISR conduct ex ante and ex post reviews. The ex ante 
reviews include the examination of documents or contracts before their 
implementation, in order to make sure that they are in compliance with Shariah 
Principles. The ex post reviews are conducted on contracts after implementation to 
make sure that contracts were implemented in accordance with the instruction of the 
Shari'ah Executive Committee (SHEC). 
The ISR audit also includes conducting a Shadah audit on the rate of Mudarib fee 
charged by the bank. The audit assesses if the fees charged are in line with the 
percentage agreed upon by the SSB. The ISR also responds to the staff 
queries/questions on Shariah matters relating to their units or responsibilities. 
The Head of the ISR meets very often with the Head of the Internal Audit to discuss 
with him the ISR report since this will assist the internal Audit Unit (IAU) to conduct 
their audits. The Head of the IAU also discusses its report with chairman of the SEC. 
The ISR is conducted through a separate unit within the bank. The Shariah 
Executive Committee (SEC) consists of three Shariah members, while the chairman 
of the SEC, who is a full-time staff member of the bank, is accountable to the SEC 
and to the board of directors. 
The members of the SEC are different from those of the Shariah Supervisory Board 
(SSB) except that the chairman of the SEC is also a member of the SSB- The SSB 
members (including the chairman of the SEC) are appointed by general assembly of 
the bank and the SEC (other the chairman) members are appointed by the SSB. 
Members of the SEC meets more frequently than the SSB, the duties of the SEC 
include the issuance offatwas/instructions which need urgent decisions. The SSB has 
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delegated the SEC to make certain decisions on their behalf This is because most of 
the SEC members have had experience and exposure in such matters while serving as 
SSB members in number of Islamic banks. 
The ISR prepare a quarterly report which is sent to the chairman of the SEC, as he is 
responsible for the ISR. Copies of the report are also sent to the managing director 
and general manager of the bank. The SEC discusses the report with the 
management, provide comments and give instructions to the management regarding 
the relevant transactions, and also provide alternatives where necessary. 
It is worth noting that AAOIFI Auditing Standard No. 4 requires the auditor to form 
an opinion on the [auditor opinion on] the bank's compliance with Shariah. The 
auditor's opinion includes no such opinion which makes it short of what is required in 
AAOIFI Standard No. 4. The extemal auditors conduct no testing on the ISR 
procedures to determine the effectiveness of the system. 
10.5.2 Report on the Interview held with the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
The SSB's main responsibility is to carry out Shariah reviews of bank's contracts to 
ensure compliance with Shariah. However, SSB has delegated some of its duties to 
the SEC. 
Article 49 of the bank's by-laws states that the board of directors can seek the 
assistance of a religious supervisory board for consultation on Shariah matters. The 
article does not make it mandatory on the board of directors and management to 
irnplement the instructions (fatwas) of the SSB. 
The SSB consists of four members. The SSB report states the following (and it does 
not state to whom the report is addressed): 
"T'he SSB for xxxx has monitored the bank's activities and 
transactions and their adherence to Islamic Shariah. The SSB 
has reviewed contracts, agreements, and documents presented 
146 
Chapter 10 
to it and implemented changes where appropriate to assure 
compliance with the Islamic Shariah principles. The SSB 
answered questions presented by the bank's management and 
assisted in finding solutions for implementation difficulties. 
Tle SSB, through its executive member, has directly 
supervised operational execution to ensure compliance. 
It is the SSB opinion that issues presented for its review are 
generally in compliance with Shariah guidelines. Further, the 
SSB has reviewed the bank's financial reports for the year 
xxxx and confirms no deviation from the rulings of Islamic 
Shari'ah. 
The SSB affirm it is the bank management responsibility to 
apply the Shad'ah guidelines. The SSB responsibility is to 
give 'fatwa" (religious opinion) and monitor transactions 
through the religious review department within the bank". 
Sara Bank 
Although the report makes reference to the role played by the chairman of the SEC 
who is also a member of the SSB, it has passed over the role of the SEC and ISFL The 
SSB's role is to discuss the annual report of the bank and issuefatwas or directions to 
the management on all issues relating to the bank's affairs when the SEC members are 
not in agreement among themselves or in cases where the Shadah matters are 
complicated and need the input of the SSB. 
10.6 Concluding Remarks 
The bank's capital is significantly held by one family. There are 8 board members, 4 
members represent the family holding the major stake of the capital. However, 
determined from their representation in the board, it can be suggested that the family 
holds majority control. 
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The bank Paid very high dividend yield as indicated above, compared with moderate 
Mte Of returns paid to IAH. 
The bank uses the commingling method. All revenue generated is shared between the 
shareholders and IAH proportionately. This is required by the bank's supervisors. 
Islamic banks are required by the supervisors to state the method of profit allocation 
and the maximum Mudarib ratio in the contract, where the Mudarib ratio should be 
declared at the beginning of each year along with the modifications in the contract. 
However, the actual Muda? ib rate is decided at the end of the financial year. 
Regarding the bank's compliance with Shariah. The SSBs role is to discuss the 
annual report of the bank and issuefatwas or directions to the management when the 
SEC members are not in agreement among themselves or in cases where the Shariah 
Matters are complicated and need the input of the SSB. 
The role of ISR is to review and audit all banking activities to make sure that they are 
compatible with Shari'ah. The ISR conduct ex ante and expost reviews. The ex ante 
reviews include the examination of documents or contracts before their 
implementation, in order to make sure that they are in compliance with Shariah 
principles. 
The ex post reviews are conducted on contracts after implementation to make sure 
that contracts were implemented in accordance with the instructions of the SEC. 
The SSB's report makes reference to the role played by the chairman of the SEC who 
is also a member of the SSB, but it has ignored the role of the SEC and IM 
However, the bank indicated that regardless of the bank's ownership structure, it is in 
the interest of the board of directors and management to protect the interests of the 
IAH. 
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One rating agency argued that it is the responsibility of the board of directors to 
monitor the performance of the management on behalf of the IAH. Another rating 
agency claimed that it is the responsibility of the board of directors and rating 
agencies to assess the performance of the management on behalf of the IAII. 
Ilie supervisors of Sara Bank also claim that information intermediaries such as rating 
agencies also play an important role in protecting the interests of the IAII through 
their assessments of the bank's financial strength. This is achieved when there is an 
adequate level of disclosure. This calls for AAOIFI and other accounting standards 
setting bodies to develop accounting standards that help information intermediaries to 
effectively assess Islamic banks. 
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Chapter 11 
Analysis and Comparison of the Case Studies 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyze the four case studies in relation to the following research 
Proposition and questions identified in chapter 5: 
The principal-principal relationship between shareholders and IAH and the possible 
effects of shareholder concentration 
Unlike the shareholders in an Islamic bank, the IAH do not have the right to appoint and monitor 
the performance of the board of directors and executive management. They also do not have a 
say in the appointment of the SSB members or the external auditors. Archer & Karim (2006) 
suggest that there may be 'vicarious monitoring' by shareholders in the interests of IAII, but its 
effectiveness is primarily dependent on there not being any significant conflicts of interest 
between the shareholders and the LAH Such conflicts of interest are arguably more likely to 
occur where there is a concentration of shareholders. In such a situation, the shareholders may 
Pursue their own interests (via their control the board of directors) which may differ from those 
of the minority shareholders and the IAH. 
Hence, we formulate Research Proposition No. I as follows: There is a correlation between the 
extent of shareholder concentration and the ratio of the shareholder return on equity to the IAH 
return on equity - the higher the concentration of shareholders, the higher the ratio of the 
shareholders return on equity to the LAH return on equity. 
2. Compliance with Sharilah Rules and Principles 
The role of SSB has typically been defined in terms of ex ante compliance of contracts with 
Shari'ah, but not ex post compliance of transactions with the fatwas issued by the SSB (which 
requires an audit process to verify compliance). This highlights the need for internal Shariah 
review as proposed by the AAOIFI Governance Standard No. 2. However, AAOIFI Auditing 
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Standard No. 2 requires the external auditors to report on Sharl'ah compliance. One way of 
measuring the effectiveness of internal Shariah review is by the external auditors when they 
perform their audit to report on the bank's compliance with Shariah rules and principles. On the 
other hand, given that they do not perform their ex post audit, the SSBs will tend to depend on 
the findings of internal Shariah review to issue their report to the shareholders. 
Hence, we formulate Research Proposition No. 2 as follows: The findings of the ISR will be 
reflected in the wording of the SSB's report that is included in the Islamic bank's annual report. 
3. The Information Environment and the Role of Industry Supervisors 
There is substantial empirical support for the proposition that small investors (of whom IAH are 
a category) do not pay much (if any) attention to financial reporting information of companies in 
which they invest. Rather, they rely on information intermediaries to study such information. 
Hence, in the absence of adequate information intermediaries (e. g. financial analysts publishing 
report, or rating agencies) covering Islamic banks, the issue arises of the role of banking industry 
supervisors in protecting the interests of investors, especially small investors. 
4. The Role of the Bank Supervisors In improving the Information In the Financial Reports 
The weak information environment in which IIFS operate tends to have implications for this 
issue. Arguably, there is a 'chicken and egg' situation in which information intermediaries are 
rare because there has been a lack of good quality information, while AAOIFI Standards should 
have improved this situation (Al-Baluchi, 2006). Hence, there is a need for a 'bootstrapping' of 
the information environment by supervisory authorities, i. e. by enforcing AAOIFI and IFSB 
Standards that promote the provision of better financial reporting and governance. But to what 
extent do supervisors recognize this. 
The banking industry supervisors will play an important role in protecting minority shareholders 
as well as the UH. Among other things, banking supervisors recognize the need to improve 
financial reporting of Islamic banks, even if there is currently only a very limited amount of 
information intermediation. 
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11.2 The Impact of Shareholders Concentration 
By examining the four case studies we see that in two banks (Khalifa Bank and Sara Bank) there 
is shareholders concentration [Tbis mean that more than 50% of the share capital is held by one 
institution or by one family]. In the other two banks (Ahmed Bank and Mohammed Bank) there 
are no shareholders concentration. 
In the case of Ahmed Bank (see table 11.1) and Mohammed Bank (see table 11.2) shareholders 
did earn a relatively higher rate of return when compared to the returns of the IAH. 
In Khalifa. Bank (see table 11.3) shareholders are receiving returns almost equal to the IAIL In 
Sara Bank (see table 11.4), there is shareholders concentration; shareholders are receiving returns 
more than IAH. 
The above suggests that the shareholders concentration (or the existence of a dominant 
shareholder) is not necessarily the main factor that enables the shareholders to be paid a higher 
rate of return compared to IAH. The PDF and the level of the Mudarib share of IAII profit are 
the factors that result in the distribution of higher rates of return to shareholders compared to 
LAH Yet, these factors do not seem to be influenced by the degree of shareholder concentration. 
The PDF is discussed in more detail in Section 11.3 below. 
These issues are discussed in more detail below. 
11.3 Analyses of the Impact of Shareholders Concentration on the Dividend Yield and IAII 
Returns 
11-3.1 Ahmed Bank 
The following table shows in more details the situation in Ahmed Bank with the impact of level 
of shareholders concentration in relation to returns paid to shareholders and IAII: 
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Table IM: Percentage of ownership vis a vis shareholders and the IAH. 
CM: controlling majority. SS: signiflcant shareholding. 
Total % % % Ratio of No. of Board 
share Shareholding Return Return to SH % No; of Board Members 
capital of CM/SS in to IAH Shareholders return to Members represented 
(in mn) share capital (SEO IAII % by CM/SS 
return 
230 43 4.5 47 10.4: 1 9 2 
249 43 4.5 50 11.1: 1 9 2 
287 43 4.8 50 10.4: 1 9 2 
540 43 6.8 55 08.08: 1 9 2 
As shown in the table 11.1 above, the bank paid very modest returns to IAH compared to the 
dividend yield paid to shareholders. The Government holds a significant interest (43%), but its 
representation in the Board does not reflect its actual holding in the bank's share capital. The 
Government is usually a passive shareholder, and hence would tend not influence the 
management for its own interest. 
We can see that in the case of Ahmed Bank, even in the absence of shareholders concentration, 
shareholders receive much higher returns than IAH. 
11.3.2 Mohammed Bank 
Table 11.2 below shows in more details the situation in Mohammed Bank with regard to the 
impact of level of shareholder concentration in relation to returns paid to shareholders and IAIL 
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Table 11.2: Percentage of ownership vis a vis returns to shareholders and the IAH. 
% % % Ratio of No. of Board 
Share Shareholding Return Return to SH % No. of Members 
ear capital of CM/SS to IAH Shareholders return to Board represented 
(in mn) in share capital (SH) IAH % Members by CAUSS 
return 
no more 1 
38 than 5% 1.48 10 106.7: 1 1 13 1 Not applicable 
40 1 40 1 1.02 
53 1 40 1 1.26 
72 1 40 1 2.76 
10 09.8: 1 10 3 
22 17.4: 1 10 3 
27 109.7: 1 1 10 13 
Table 1.2 above shows that in Mohamed Bank even in the absence of a controlling majority, of 
shareholders, the bank pays the shareholders a very attractive dividend yield and a very low rate 
of returns to LAH. In 2003, one single institution acquired 40% of the capital. In 2004 we 
noticed a jump in the rate of dividend yield. But historically this bank always pays a dividend 
yield much higher than the rate paid to LAH 
In 2005 the interest rate in the country where Mohammed Bank operates went up from 2.00% in 
2004 to 3.84% and in the same period the competitor of Mohamed Bank increased the IAH rate 
of return from 2.10% in 2004 to 4.00% in 2005. 
This suggests that the decision by Mohammed Bank to increase the rate of return for IAH was 
mainly to satisfy IAH, although such an increase was much lower than that of the competitor 
bank. Also during the same period, the total IAH funds increased in 2005 to 198mn from 169mn 
in 2004. Such a situation tends to exist when the IAH act as passive investors and do not move 
their funds around to seek the best available returns. 
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11-3.3 Khalifa Bank 
Analysis and Comparison of the Case Studies 
Table 11.3 shows in more details the situation in Khalifa Bank with regard to the impact of level 
of shareholder concentration in relation to returns paid to shareholders and IAH. 
Table 11.3: Percentage of ownership vis a vis returns to shareholders and the IAII 
% % Ratio of No. of Board 
Share Shareholdin g % Return to 
S11% No. of Members 
Ir capital of CWSS(34) 
Return Shareholders return to IAH % Board represented I (in mn) 
to IAH (SH) Members CAVSS 
return 
61 1 78.3 1 5.48 1510.9: 1 1715 
60 1 78.3 1 2.74 111715 
63 1 78.3 1 2.63 111715 
62 1 78.3 1 4.35 1511.1: 1 15 
In the case of Khalifa Bank, in spite of the presence of a controlling majority (CM) or dominant 
shareholder (DS) (5 out of 7 seats on the board of directors represent the controlling majority 
shareholder), the total return paid to the shareholder during the four year period was 10% 
compared to 15.2% paid to the IAH during the same period. In the case of Khalifa Bank, in spite 
of there being a DS (which held 78.3% of the share capital), the shareholders and the IAH earned 
an almost equivalent rate of retum. 
It is worth noting that in 2003 the net profits reached 1.1 mn compared to 3.2mn in 2002, and in 
2004 the net profits declined to . 318mn. However, it seems that the 
bank decided to pay the IAH 
as good a rate of return as possible, in order to reduce the risk of the IAII withdrawing their 
funds, and at the same time it postponed distributing dividends to the shareholders. Such a 
Practice suggests that the shareholders gave up their Mudarib share of profit to LAI 1. 
(3') Significant shareholding (SS) represents shareholding between 20% and 49% of the voting power. SS has 
the ability to influence the Board of Directors but does not have the ability to control the Board (IAS 27 & 
28). 
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It can therefore be argued that in spite of the presence of a dominant shareholders, this did not 
result in the shareholders to pursuing their interests at the expense of the IAH by influencing the 
way in which profits were allocated, at least in the short term. Rather, the management 
recognised that it is in the shareholders' Ionger-term interests to retain the funds of the IAII. 
11.3.4 Sara Bank 
Table 11.4 below shows in more detail the situation in Sara Bank with regard to the impact of 
level of shareholder concentration in relation to returns paid to shareholders and IAH. 
Table 11.4: Percentage of ownership vis a vis returns to shareholders and the IAII 
% % % Ratio of No. of Board 
tar Share Shareholding Return Return to SIM No. of Members 
capital OfCAVSS to IAH Shareholders return to Board represented by 
(in mn) (SH) IAII % Members CAVSS 
I--- I return 
02 
I--- 
230 50 1.48 35 23.6: 1 8 4 
43 280 50 3.27 35 10.7: 1 8 4 
04 449 50 3.75 40 10.6: 1 8 4 
05 882 50 6.51 100 15.3: 1 8 4 
Table 11.4 shows that the shareholders of Sara Bank have earned a much higher rate of return 
than the IAH. Fifty percent of the shares are held by a group of concentrated shareholders who 
control half of the board of directors. This might suggest that the control exercised by this group 
resulted in the shareholders receiving a much higher rate of return than the LAJ I. 
However, taken together the above four cases do not suggest that the degree of shareholder 
concentration is the main factor that results in the shareholders being paid a higher rate of return 
compared to the IAH, by influencing the PDF and the Mudarib share of profit which have a 
direct influence on the shareholders' dividend payout and the IAH rate of return. To see this in 
more detail, we analyse below the PDFs and Mudarib shares applied by the four banks. 
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11.4 Profit Distribution Formula between the Shareholders and IAH 
Ahmed Bank used the partial commingling approach such that some assets will be financed by 
both the shareholders and IAH, including investment in commodities, consumers finance and 
Afurabaha financing. Accordingly, returns generated on these investments are shared between 
the shareholders and IAH in proportionate to their investments. All other assets were solely 
financed by the shareholders, including investment in other Islamic institutions and real-estate, 
and accordingly returns generated on these investments were paid to shareholders only. 
Also returns generated from investing IAH funds set-aside for liquidity are allocated to 
shareholders. The rationale of this, is that these funds are considered to be liabilities of the bank, 
similar to current accounts. Such information is not disclosed in the bank's contract with IMI. 
On one hand, it might be argued that the method of asset allocation of Ahmed Bank is biased 
towards shareholders since it allowed the shareholders funds to be invested in assets that 
generated higher rate of returns. However, it may be said that the bank was prudent in 
recognizing that IAH are risk-averse and investing the IAH funds in assets that were not highly 
risky. 
The bank invests around 57% of its assets in short-term commodities which are highly liquid and 
carry low risk, but the returns earned on such investments are very modest. In spite of that, the 
bank was able to pay an attractive return to shareholders, thanks to the leveraging effect with the 
Mudarib share, the mechanism of which is described below. 
Prior to 2003, Mohammed Bank commingled the assets financed by the shareholders and the 
1AH. At the end of that financial year the profits of the bank were distributed between the 
shareholders and the IAH in proportion to their share in the investments. In 2004 the bank 
changed to the separation approach, whereby returns generated from investment in real-estate, 
which have generated higher returns than other sources of investments but are also risky, arc paid 
to shareholders only. In addition to excluding IAH funds from investments in real-estate, the 
bank's fee income and returns generated from investing the excess funds in current accounts are 
allocated to shareholders only. Also any returns generated from investing IAII funds set-aside 
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for liquidity are paid to shareholders, following the rationale mentioned above in connection with 
Ahmed Bank. Such information is not disclosed in the bank's contract with IAIL 
It can be inferred that the new management of Mohammed Bank decided to change to its profit 
allocation policy to take account of the greater risk appetite of the shareholders and the lower 
risk appetite of the IAH, by allowing only the shareholders to receive returns generated from 
real-estate which usually generates high returns but is also relatively risky. It may also be 
supposed that the new management decided to change the PDF so as to increase the dividend 
yield in order to show that they were able to pay better returns to shareholders than the previous 
management. Yet there was no control of the board of directors by concentrated shareholders, as 
they were represented by only 3 out of 10 members of the board. 
The method used by Khalifa Bank is similar to Mohammed Bank, except that in Khalifa Bank a 
share of the returns on LAE funds set aside for liquidity was paid to IAH, while in the case of 
Mohammed Bank (like Ahmed Bank) it was paid entirely to shareholders. 
In the case of Sara Bank, all revenues including bank fees and revenues generated from investing 
funds of current accounts were shared between shareholders and the IAII. While in the other 
three banks, fees and revenues generated from funds of current accounts were paid to 
shareholders only. Although the method used by Sara Bank appears to be more equitable when 
compared with the other three banks, the shareholders return is nevertheless considerably higher 
than the returns paid to IAH. This may be attributed to the level of the Mudarib share, as 
explained below. 
Sara Bank allows the IAH to share on all profits generated from all assets (excluding Mudarib 
share). But there is also the issue of whether funds are 100% commingled or not, and whcthcr 
LAR funds are invested in more risky assets such as real-estate. Although this bank uses a "full 
commingling" PDF formula, the shareholders nevertheless received in 2005 100% dividend yield 
(the largest among the four banks) which can attributed to the level of the Mudarib share of IAII 
profits which can be very high (up to 60% in some cases). In all four banks Mudarib fees from 
managing the IAH funds were paid to shareholders. For a comparison between the four PDF (see 
Appendix 2). 
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It can be noted that there is a major common feature in the PDF of the four banks, namely that in 
all four banks the Mudarib share was paid to shareholders and that shareholders benefited from 
the leveraging of IAH. This seems to be the main factor that allowed the shareholders in three 
out of the four cases to receive a much higher rate of dividend yield compared to the rate of 
returns paid to IAH. To understand the leveraging effect of the Mudarib share, we will now 
analyse it more detail, using the illustration in table I I. S. 
Table 11.5: The following example shows the leverage effect: 
Shareholders' funds 10 
LAR funds 90 
Total 100 
Mudarib share 40% 
Return on assets 3% 
Shareholders'profit (3% x 10) + (40% x 3% x 90) 1.38 
Rate of return on shareholders' funds 1.38/10 13.8% 
IAH profit 3% x 60% x 90 = 1.62 
Rate of return on LAH funds 1.62/90 1.9 
From the above table, we can observe that 10 is the total shareholders funds and 90 is the IAII 
funds and the total assets are 100. For simplicity, it is assumed that there are no current accounts. 
(As noted in the case studies above, in most cases, the returns from investing current account 
funds are allocated to the shareholders, but this is not invariably the case, e. g. for Sara Bank). 
In this example net profits are 3 (3% of 100). The shareholders will be allocated 1.08 (40% x 
3% of 90) as Mudarib share plus 0.3 which is the profit on their 10% share in the investments . 
This means the shareholders' total share in the profits is 1.38, which is equivalent to a 13.8% 
return on their investment of 10. The IAH share of the profit after deduction of the Mudarib 
share is 1.62, which represents a return of 1.9% on their investment of 90. This means that 
shareholders of Islamic banks will receive a rate of return more than 7 times the rate paid to IAII. 
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From the above example, we note a major difference in the rate of distribution between the 
shareholders and IAH. This can be attributed to the fact that shareholders are benefiting from 
IAH funds through a combination of a high ratio of IAH funds to shareholder funds (9: 1) and 
also a high Mudarib share of 40%. So what we have is a form of leverage, not in the 
conventional sense of a ratio of debt to total capital, but what we can call Islamic leverage, e. g. a 
ratio of IAH funds to shareholders funds combined with a Mudarib share of the profits on the 
IAH funds. This will typically enable the shareholders to receive a dividend yield much higher 
than the rate of returns paid to IAH (see also Al-Deehani et al, 1999). 
Thus, with a relatively small invested capital, shareholders receive proportionately a large 
Portion of the profits. It is not that their absolute share of profits is bigger than the TAII share of 
profits, but because their investment is much smaller they end up with a much higher rate of 
return on their capital. 
We can thus conclude that generally shareholders of Islamic banks earn a higher rate of return 
compared to IAH due to the leverage ratio of IAH funds to shareholders funds and the Mudarib 
rate. 
11.5 Compliance with Sharilah Rules and Principles 
11-5.1 The Role of the SSB 
As mentioned in the case studies, the role of the SSB is different from one bank to another. In 
Ahmed Bank, the SSB's duties as mentioned in the bank's by-law are more than an advisory 
one, since the by-law states clearly that the SSB responsibility is to make sure that the bank's 
activities are in line with Shariah. 
However, the role of the SSB in the other three banks is more of an advisory one. Theoretically 
at least this means that the management can influence the SSB's report. 
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However, in practise as indicated particularly in Khalifa Bank, the fatwas of the SSB are 
mandatory on the management. If the bank fails to comply with SS13 fatwas, the SSB is 
expected to mention in its report the bank's shortfall on the issue of compliance with Shariah. 
It is worth noting that there was no apparent market reaction to such qualification, in spite of the 
supposed importance of Sharl'ah matters to stakeholders. Rather, as in the case study of Khalifa 
Dank, we noted an increase in deposits during the four years of qualification. This can be 
attributed to weak market discipline. 
As noted in the case studies, each bank published an SSB report different from the others. This 
would make it difficult for the readers of the SSB report to compare between one bank to another 
on the level of Shafi'ah compliance (for more details see Appendix 3). 
Furthermore, the appointment of the SSB members differs from one bank to another. The 
appointment of SSB members in Ahmed Bank, Mohammed Bank and Khalifa Bank is the 
responsibility of the general assembly. In the case of Sara Bank, the appointment of the SSB 
members is the responsibility of the board of directors. This would subject the SSB to influence 
by the board of directors, thereby challenging their independence. 
In the case of Sara Bank, the appointment of SSB members conflicts with the AAOIFI Shariah 
Standard which requires Islamic banks to appoint SSB members by the general assembly based 
on the recommendation of the board of directors (AAOIFI, 1993). 
The remuneration of the SSB members of all four banks is decided by the board of directors 
based on the recommendation of the management. This will tend to question the independence 
of the SSB members since they may be subject to the influence of the management, which could 
lead to weak governance. 
The SSB members in all four banks claimed that their role is to ensure that the banks operate in 
accordance with Shariah. In reality, the SSB's function was limited to reviewing the bank's 
contracts before their implementation (ex ante); however, they do not verify the implementation 
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of the contracts (ex post) since they tend to rely on the ISR to conduct this function on their 
behalf. 
11-5.2 The Role of the ISR 
In all four cases, each bank has established an Internal Shariah Review (ISR). In spite of the 
important role that in principle is played by the ISR, only Mohammed Bank refers to it in its 
report, while Ahmed Bank, Khalifa Bank and Sara Bank have made no such reference. The ISR 
mainly conducts an (ex post) Shariah audit, since the SSB rely on the ISR to perform this 
function on their behalf. So any failure on part of the ISR to detect instances of Shafiah non- 
compliance will affect the accuracy of the SSB report. 
It can be inferred from the case studies that the ISR focussed on Shariah audit, rather than on 
checking whether all stakeholders are treated equitably. In fact, it is not the role of the ISR as 
such to have such a focus, but the issue might be expected to be a concern of the SSB. For 
example, the size of the Mudarib rate and the PDF are issues with regard to whether the 
arrangements between shareholders and IAH are equitable. In three out of our four cases, it may 
be questioned whether such arrangements were indeed equitable. 
This would lead to us question the role of the SSB in such matters. There is also the matter of 
the independence of the ISR. In the case of Mohammed Bank and Khalifa Bank, the salaries of 
the ISR are decided by the management. This would jeopardise the independence of the ISR. In 
the case of Sara Bank, the salaries of the ISR are decided by the chairman of the SEC who is also 
a member of the SSB. Compared to Mohammed Bank and Khalifa Bank, the ISR of Sara Bank 
would be perceived to be more independent from the influence of the management. 
However, the salaries of the ISR of Ahmed Bank are decided by the SSB. This supports the 
independence of the ISR more than in the cases of Mohammed Bank and Khalifa Bank because 
Ahmed Bank! s ISR, like that of Sara Bank, will not be under the influence of the management. 
AAOIFI has issued an auditing standard requiring external auditor to express an opinion as to 
whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the 
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Shari'ah Rules and Principles (AAOIFI, Jan, 1998). This requires the external auditors to 
question whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance 
with the Shariah Rules and Principles. 
The above suggests that any failure on the part of the ISR to carry out their Shariah audit would 
lead to weak governance, especially when the SSB tend to rely on the audit conducted by them. 
11-5.3 The Role of the External Auditors 
Only Mohammed Bank and Khalifa Bank required their external auditors to express an opinion 
as to whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with 
the Shariah Rules and Principles. In the absence of any proper assessment by the external 
auditors of the ISR procedures, as indicated in the case studies of Mohammed Bank and Khalifa 
Bank, to determine its ability to conduct an effective Shariah audit, this could lead to weak 
govemance. 
In reviewing the auditors' opinion of the two banks that are subject to AAOIFI Standards, one 
notes that the auditors' opinion makes no reference to the bank's compliance with Sharilah. This 
is contrary to the requirements of the AAOIFI Auditing Standard No. I on Objective and 
Principles of Auditing (Jan, 199 8 p. 17) which states that: 
"The auditor's report should clearly state the auditor's opinion as to whether the 
financial statements give a true and fair view in accordance with the Islamic Shariah 
Rules and Principles as determined by the SSB of the Islamic bank". 
Furthermore, in all four cases, the SSB relies on the findings of the ISR on the bank's 
compliance. For example, in the case of Khalifa Bank, a Shariah violation by the bank was 
discovered by the ISR which reported the case to the SSB. However, the external auditors of 
Khalifa, Bank made no reference to this in their report, which would not appear to be consistent 
with their duties under the AAOIFI Standards. Specifically, this suggests that the external 
auditors failed in their duties to express an opinion as to whether the financial statements are 
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prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the Shariah Rules and Principles, as 
required by the Auditing Standard No. 4. 
Moreover, unlike accounting standards where the auditors are expected the report the violation if 
the amounts involved are material in relation to the financial statements, the AAOIFI Shariah 
and Auditing Standards relating to the bank's compliance with Shariah are silent on the issue of 
materiality. This suggests that in the case of Shariah violation, the external auditors and SSB 
should report it even if the amount involved is not substantial. However, the SSB and the 
relevant standard setting bodies should be transparent about this matter. 
Moreover, quite apart from the AAIOFI Standards, it should be recognised that since Shariah 
violations may constitute misconduct or negligence, they may have serious financial 
consequences, namely the transformation of IAH funds into liabilities. 
In all four banks, no formal communication is established between the Audit Committee and the 
SSB. In contrast, the IFSB Standard on Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance, which 
was issued in December of 2006, requires the Audit Committee of Islamic banks to communicate 
and coordinate with both the SSB and the proposed Governance Committee (IFSB, 2006b). 
It is worth noting that 50% of the respondents of the survey conducted on LAR said that the SSBs 
report is a tool to provide them with adequate assurance that the bank's transactions are in 
compliance with Shariah precepts. 
11.5.4 The Role of the Bank Supervisors 
The case studies suggest that the supervisors of the banks did not take an active role with regard 
to the extent of their compliance with Shariah rules and principles, which may have encouraged 
the external auditors not to comply with AAOIFI Auditing Standards (in the case of Mohammed 
Bank and Khalifa Bank). In addition, in the case of Ahmed Bank the SSB report is inadequate 
and lacks important information; this shows the importance for the supervisors to urge their 
banks to implement AAOIFI Shariah Standards or to improve on the SSB's report. In the case 
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of Sara Bank, the appointment of SSB is the responsibility of the board of directors this is a clear 
conflict of interest. This also shows the importance of implementing AAOIFI Standards. 
11.6 The Information Environment and the Role of Industry Supervisors 
11.6.1 The Role of the IAH in Assessing the Management Performance 
As indicated by the survey, IAH do not give much attention to the financial statements in order 
to assess the performance of the management. In addition, 53.2% of the IAH provided an 
answer on the type of contractual relationship between the IAH with the Islamic bank that 
Suggests they were not familiar with such a relationship. This shows that the majority of IAH 
lack adequate knowledge of the nature of their transactions with Islamic banks. 
Furthermore, as indicated in the case studies, in spite of the low rate of return paid to IAII 
compared to the shareholders, during the period 2002 - 2005 there was an increase in LAII funds 
in all four banks, including Mohammed Bank. 
It is worth noting that the survey indicated that with regard to the level of satisfaction on the 
returns paid to LAE 13% of the respondents indicated that they were fully satisfied, 37% fairly 
satisfied, 27% less satisfied, 15% fairly unsatisfied, 8% totally unsatisfied. Thus, 50% were 
either fully or fairly satisfied and 50% were less, fairly or totally unsatisfied. 
Furthermore, the survey indicated that 52% of the IAH stated that the prospective rate of retums 
is the main factor that influences their decision to place their funds with an Islamic bank, 
compared to 21% indicating that the main factor for deciding to place their funds is the level of 
Shari'ah compliance by the Islamic bank. 
These findings help to explain why in the case of Khalifa Bank, IAII did not react negatively to 
non Shariah compliance by the bank since the majority of IAII (52%) seems to have given the 
prospective rate of returns more importance than the issue of Shariah compliance in placing 
their funds with the bank. This highlights the issue of the clientele of the bank whether they are 
predominantly economic minded or religiously sensitive (Karim, 1990). 
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However, taking into consideration the importance of the prospective rate of returns to the LAR 
(52%) and the relatively low rate of returns paid to IAH as shown in the four cases (very low in 
one case), we would expect that the majority of the IAH responses on the level of satisfaction on 
their returns to be unsatisfied. As such the survey indicates that majority of IAH not only lack 
the basic knowledge about their transactions with Islamic banks but are also passive and non 
informed investors. 
It can be argued that because LkHs are passive investors this seems to have encouraged the 
management to look after the interest of the shareholders at the expense of the IAH. This is 
clearly noted in analyzing the ratio of shareholder return on equity to IAH return on equity, 
where it can be seen that the shareholders are benefiting from IAH funds through a high leverage 
ratio of shareholder funds to IAH funds combined with a large Mudarib percentage share of the 
profits from investing IAH funds. 
It is worth remembering that, in the survey the IAH were not in agreement in their responses as 
to who should monitor the performance of Islamic banks on their behalf. 27% of the IAII 
indicated that SSB should monitor the management on their behalf, 25% claimed that it is the 
responsibility of bank's supervisors to monitor the management of the bank on their behalf, 19% 
claimed it the responsibility of the external auditors, and 11% indicated it is the responsibility of 
the rating agency. 
11.6.2 The Role of the Financial Intermediaries In Assessing the Bank's Performance 
In the absence of active IAH investors, any assessment made by rating agencies may not have 
any major impact on the treatment of IAH by the management of Islamic banks. As such, an 
intervention by the bank's supervisors may be required to assess the information provided in 
order to hold management accountable. The intervention of bank's supervisors to monitor the 
management would also tend to encourage good governance. 
Hence, even with an adequate number of information intermediaries, effective market discipline 
with respect to ME funds may not be brought about as the IAH are generally passive investors 
and do not tend to react to the information provided to them as indicated in the case studies. 
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Sara Bank is in a country where the banking supervisor requires its approval to be obtained by an 
Islamic bank before transferring any loss to LAR. This provides important protection to the LAR 
and helps to mitigate the possible principal-principal conflict of interest between shareholders 
and UH with regard to risk appetite. Such conflicts of interest may arise because shareholders 
May Prefer the bank to invest in assets with a relatively high risk-return profile, as they would 
benefit from sharing in profits through the Mudarib share, but would not share in LAR losses as 
the Mudafib does not do so, while IAH may be more risk averse. 
The interference of the supervisors is very critical in safeguarding the IAH particularly when 
there is passive IAH, weak governance and ineffective market discipline. 
11.6.3 The Level of Disclosures in the Financial Reports by Islamic Banks 
As we noted in the case studies of at least three banks (Ahmed Bank, Mohammed Bank and Sara 
Bank) they were able to charge a very high, and arguably excessive, Mudarib rate. This situation 
may be partly attributed to the absence of any disclosure of the Mudarib rate actually charged in 
the financial statements (which is not required even by AAOIFI Standards) or in the JAII 
contracts. (As noted below, the Mudarib rate disclosed in the Mudaraba contract is a maximum 
rate). 
Furthermore, even in the cases where the banks have failed to disclose certain information as per 
the requirements of AAOIFI Standards, they were able to obtain a clean opinion from their 
external auditors that their financial statements are in accordance with AAOIFI Standards. 
For example, in spite of the requirements by AAOIFI Standard on Disclosure of Bases for Profit 
Allocation between owners' and IAH, Mohammed Bank and Khalifa Bank failed to state in their 
accounting policies the bases applied by them in the allocation of profits between owners' equity 
and unrestricted investment account-holders. 
Furthermore, both banks failed to comply fully with AAOIFI Standard No. 6 relating to Equity 
of Investment Account-Holders and their Equivalent. The two banks made no reference in the 
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notes to the accounts to the percentage of funds of unrestricted investment account-holders 
which the banks had agreed with them to invest. 
From the financial reporting of at least Mohammed Bank and Khalifa Bank, which didn't fully 
comply with AAOIFI Standards, it seems that there is a failure on the part of the concerned 
supervision authorities to check on the Islamic banks' proper implementation of AAOIFI's 
Standards as well as those issued by the IFSB on transparency and market discipline. 
Enhancing transparency would involve improving the disclosure of relevant information not only 
in the financial statements and notes, but also in the IAH contracts with respect to the PDF. As 
the case studies indicate, the Islamic banks appear to have taken advantage of the lack of 
disclosures to work primarily for the benefit of the shareholders, to the detriment of the interest 
of the IAH. Thus, as a result of the information asymmetry the agency problems between the 
two categories of principals (shareholders and IAH), and between the IAII and the management, 
worked very much to the disadvantage of the IAH. 
11.7 The Role of the Bank Supervisors In Improving'the Information In the Financial 
Reports 
As indicated to the researcher by the supervisors of the four banks, they do recognise the 
importance of developing financial reporting of IIFS in order to develop market discipline and 
good governance. However, such a claim was not supported by the case studies. 
Indeed, if the supervisors of the four banks truly believe in good governance and 
transparency, they need to improve the quality of information in the IAH contract. This 
would enable the IAH to assess the performance of the management and to take the 
appropriate actions which include sanctioning the management by withdrawing their funds 
once the returns they receive is below the risk they take. This is important to establish good 
govemance. 
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Islamic banks are required to state in their contracts with IAH the maximum rate of Mudarib rate, 
which in some Islamic banks can reach 60% of the IAH profits. However, due to lack of 
transparency and the absence of market conduct, this would tend to give the management of the 
banks an opportunity to manipulate the rate of Mudarib from one year to another in favour of the 
shareholders and without informing the LAE. 
For example, in years where the bank profits decline, it is likely to give up part of the Mudarib to 
LAH to avoid IAH withdrawal. This would not enable the LAE to ascertain the actual returns 
generated on their investments, which in turn would not enable them to assess in an effective 
manner the performance of the management in managing their funds. 
In addition, as the case studies indicate, although the adoption of AAOIFI Standards and 
participating in the IFSB technical committee would signal to the market that the supervisors do 
recognise the need to improve financial reporting, nevertheless, the case studies show that in 
practise the supervisors are passive in enhancing transparency. This could have encouraged the 
management to work primarily for the interest of the shareholders. 
11.8 Concluding Remarks 
Ibis chapter has analysed the four case studies with a view to ascertain if there is support to the 
four propositions put forward in this thesis. 
With respect to Proposition 1, the theme emerging from the analysis of the case studies suggests 
that the existence of concentrated shareholders does not necessarily enable the shareholders to 
get higher returns. While, the PDF and the Mudarib rate play a determining role in influencing 
the distribution of returns between the shareholders and IAII to the benefit of the shareholders, 
their overall effect does not seem to be influenced by the extent of shareholder concentration or 
the existence of a dominant shareholder. 
With respect to Proposition 2, the theme emerging from the analysis of the case studies suggests 
that SSBs tend to depend on the findings of internal Shariah review to issue their report to the 
shareholders. This means that attention should be given by both the supervisory authorities and 
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the market players to the work carried out by the ISR since, any failure on the ISR report will 
affect the SSB report to the shareholders. 
With respect to Proposition 3 and proposition 4, the theme emerging from the analysis of the 
case studies would lead us to expect the supervisors to play an important role to protect small 
investors such as minority shareholder and particularly the IAH particularly in a market where 
the LAE are passive investors. However, the theme emerging from the analysis of the case 
studies does not support the proposition that banking supervisors do recognise the need to 
improve financial reporting of ITS even if there is currently only a very limited amount of 
information intermediation since the supervisors are passive in enhancing transparency which 
encouraged the management to work primarily for the interest of the shareholders. 
However, it needs to be recognised that in banking supervision great emphasis is placed on 
depositor protection, which differs from LAE protection in some crucial respects. IAH are not 
depositors and do not benefit from the legal protection afforded to creditors. They are a category 
of equity investor (profit-sharing and loss-bearing) and need the kinds of protection appropriate 
to the latter. Some banking supervisors such as that of Sara Bank partially assimilate IAH to 
depositors (i. e. a type of creditor) in giving them some protection from losses of their capital, but 
this raises the question of whether a cross-sectional approach which recognises the juristic status 
of IAH as equity investors would not be more appropriate. We will return to this issue in the 
concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 12 
Implications and Conclusions 
12.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the implications of the findings of the four case studies for the 
literature on corporate governance, so far as Islamic banks are concerned, and 
presents the concluding remarks of the thesis. 
12.2 The Impact of SharehoIders Concentration 
The findings that emerged from the case studies suggest that the existence of a 
concentration of shareholders does not necessarily have an impact on the agency 
problems (principal-principal and principal-agent) between IAII and shareholders on 
the one hand and IAH and management on the other. In particular the findings 
indicate that the issue of concentration of shareholders is not the influencing factor 
that leads to the high dividend yields enjoyed by shareholders compared to the very 
modest rates of return paid to IAH. The mediating factors are the PDF and the 
Mudarib rate, but these do not appear to be affected by shareholder concentration or 
the existence of a dominant shareholder. Managements of Islamic banks adopt 
policies that produce much higher rates for return for shareholders than for IAII 
whatever the degree of shareholder concentration. The exception to this among the 
four banks was, in fact, one that had a dominant shareholder. 
There are reasonable grounds to argue that management has an incentive to adopt a 
PDF and Mudarib rate in such a way as to serve the interest of the shareholders 
because it is the latter that have the benefit of corporate governance arrangements 
whereby they appoint the management and monitor its performance. 
This has implications for the general corporate governance literature reviewed in 
Shleifer and Vishny (1996) who argued that concentrated shareholders would manage 
the agent (management) more effectively in order to protect the interest of all 
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shareholders and for specific corporate governance issues relating to Islamic banks 
(Archer and Karim, 2006). 
In examining in what way does the PDF and Mudarib rate serve the interest of the 
shareholders, we come across the phenomenon of leverage in Islamic banking, 
Al-Deehani, et al (1999) provide theoretical explanations which show how the 
shareholders tend to benefit through a kind leverage effect, in spite of the fact that 
unlike in conventional banks where deposits are mobilized on the basis of a creditor 
relationship with the bank, IAH are profit sharing contracts. 
The IAH accounts do not increase the liabilities of the bank because according to the 
contract that governs the IAH, it does not expose the bank to a financial risk except 
possibly in the case of misconduct and negligence. Accordingly, the bank would 
attempt to keep its equity at a minimum and maximize IAH funds because this 
enables the bank to benefit from the leverage effect as was demonstrated by the case 
studies. 
However, in order to continue benefiting from the IAH, funds, the shareholders make 
sure that the IAH are satisfied with the bank in terms of the returns paid to them. 
This is what Archer and Karim (2006) call vicarious monitoring. But the 
effectiveness of such monitoring from the IAII point of view depends on there being 
no conflict of interest between the shareholders and IAIL 
One situation where there is an apparent conflict of interest is where the bank 
commingles the funds of shareholders and IAH and invests them in the same asset 
pool as was the case with Sara Bank. This assumes that the risk appetites of the IAH 
and the shareholders are similar, which is not necessarily the case. In fact, it is likely 
that IAH are more risk averse than shareholders. Nevertheless, if both parties are 
exposed to the same risk of the asset pool, they should be entitled to returns that are 
commensurate with their risks. However, we have seen from the findings of the case 
studies that is not the case. The main reason for the discrcpancy in the returns of IAI I 
compared to those of the shareholders is the leverage effect which is incorporatcd in 
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the PDF in conjunction with the high percentage of IAH profits that are payable as 
Mudarib fees. The supervisory authority of Sara Bank attempts to mitigate this 
situation by requiring Islamic banks in its jurisdiction to obtain its approval before 
passing losses on to IAH. The use of separate asset pools for shareholders and TAH 
(Le. no commingling or only partial commingling) provides an opportunity for taking 
account of the differing risk appetites of shareholders and IAH. However, owing to 
the lack of transparency about such matters, it is not clear to what extent, if at all, this 
works for the benefit of the IAH. 
The management of the bank sets out the PDF and the Mudarib rate and is motivated 
by the governance arrangements to favour the shareholders' interests (whether 
shareholders are concentrated or not) Islamic banks are usually opaque about the PDF 
and provide little disclosure about it, as indicated by the case studies. 
These fmdings support the theoretical model in Al-Dehaani et al (1999) which 
suggests that an increase in IAH funds enables the Islamic bank to increase 
shareholders' rate of returns through a leverage effect. It is very much in the 
shareholders' interest that IAH funds be attracted and retained by the bank, but IAII 
appear to be passive and to tolerate a situation in which their rates of return are low, 
especially when compared to those enjoyed by shareholders. IAII do not appear to 
search for the best rates of return available to them on a Shariah compliant basis. 
This would appear to be a feature of an immature market in which the IAII have not 
learned to seek the most competitive returns from the Islamic banks. Consequently, 
the latter have little or no incentive to offer them more attractive returns, and every 
incentive to favour the shareholders. Moreover, the fact that generally there are only 
a small number of Islamic banks in any one country means that these banks do not 
have to compete much between themselves to attract IAII funds. 
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12.3 Compliance with Shariah Rules and Principles 
Implications and Conclusion 
The findings from the case studies suggest that with respect to the issue of the banks' 
compliance with Shariah rules and principles, the structure of the governance 
mechanism that is entrusted to provide this assurance is rather weak. 
In particular, the findings suggest that the independence of both the SSB and ISR can be 
compromised because of their appointment and remuneration process. Borrowing from 
the auditing literature, if the SSB and ISR are to perform their duties in a satisfactory 
manner they should be both competent and independent (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 
Karim, 1990). They should be competent in terms of having the technical knowledge to 
identify any Shariah breaches. They should be independent so that they are free to 
report these breaches. 
If the SSB and ISR lack both characteristics, this would not give assurance to the clients 
of the bank that it is adhering to the cardinal rules on the basis of which it was 
established. However, one case study (Khalifa Bank) suggests that even when the SSB 
reported Sharilah breaches for four consecutive years, this did not have a negative impact 
on the bank in terms of clients withdrawing their funds. Rather, the bank's deposits 
increased during this period, which suggests a lack of effective market discipline. This 
could mainly be attributed to the passive attitude of the IAII as investors, which 
highlights the need for an active role by the supervisors. 
However, this is not a straight forward issue because supervisors in different jurisdictions 
take different approaches to banks' compliance with Shariah. There are also wide 
variations in the degree of implementation of the standards issued by AAOIFI (and 
possibly the recently standards issued by the IFSB. 
For example, the supervisory authority in a Gulf country believes Shariah 
compliance is the responsibility of the banks. As such, it does not require banks to 
establish a SSB, but rather leaves it to the market to put pressure on Islamic banks to 
establish an SSB. 
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In Bahrain, the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) does not only require Islamic banks to 
establish an SSB, but also requires banks to comply with AAOIFI Governance 
Standards, e. g. Shariah Standards, which means that Islamic banks have to form an 
SSB. 
However, CBB has issued guidelines for Mudaraba contracts and require Islamic 
banks to implement them. These guidelines require Islamic banks to state in their 
contract with LAH the maximum rate of Mudarib, the type of expenses that will be 
borne by the LAE, etc. 
Countries such as Sudan, Pakistan, and Malaysia have established higher Shariah 
boards in their respective central banks. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 
the United Kingdom and the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) require 
banks to establish an effective Shariah compliance system. Such a system includes, 
among others, the establishment of an SSB and an effective Shariah internal review. 
However, the lack of reaction by the IAH to Shariah qualification tends to encourage 
the management not to take the issue of Sharilah compliance seriously. This is a sign 
of weak market discipline. This is exacerbated by the external auditors failing in 
carrying out their duties and the absence of supervisory authorities enforcing 
sanctions on banks that do not fully comply with the AAOIFI Standards, even in 
jurisdictions where these standards are supposed to be enforced by the banking 
supervisory authority. 
The IFSB addressed the issue of Shariah non-compliance as part of the operational 
risk-(") in its Capital Adequacy Standard (IFSB, 2006a). 
(35) Operational Risk: is defined as the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events, which includes but it not limited to, legal 
risk an Shariah compliance risk. Ile proposed measurement of capital to cater for operational 
risk in Islamic bank may be based on either the Basic Indicator Approach as set out in Basel 11 
This definition excludes strategic and operational risks (IFSB, 2006b). 
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Supervisors may need to play a monitoring role on the work carried out by the SSB 
and ISR, including the vetting of SSB and ISR members and adopting AAOIFI 
Governance Standards. We noted from the research that passive reaction by the 
regulations will lead to weak governance. 
12.4 The Information and the Role of Industry Supervisors 
The purpose of Pillar 3- market disciplines - is to encourage market discipline by 
developing a set of disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to 
react to information provided by banks. The Basel Committee recognizes that market 
discipline is increasingly important in a world where banking activities are becoming 
more complex and opaque (Baumann and Nier, 2003, p. 134). 
SiJben (2002 p. 55) argued that a banking system raises an important issue related to 
the availability of information and transparency both for supervisors and market 
participant aiming at an appropriate judgment of the soundness of the bank. 
Because, unlike conventional bank depositors, IAII place their funds on a profit. 
sharing and loss-bearing basis, the issue of transparency is more important for Islamic 
banks than conventional banks. The absence of any control rights for IAII enabling 
them to intervene in the bank's investment policies (Archer and Karim, 2006 p. 136) 
in no way reduces the importance of transparency, as they need this to be able to 
make decisions about placing and withdrawing their funds. 
The findings of the case studies suggest, however, that IAII are passive and 
information intermediaries are weak. In addition, there is lack of implementation of 
AAIOFI Standards and possibly of IFSB Standards. This combination of passive 
investors and a weak information environment leads to very weak market discipline. 
This situation has encouraged the management to work primarily for the interest of 
the shareholders by using mechanisms of financial leverage that give the shareholders 
far better returns than the IAH. Furthermore, while IAII, like any investors, are 
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expected to monitor the bank's choice of risk because their capital is exposed to 
losses, the lack of adequate disclosure of relevant information makes this a difficult 
task for LAE, thereby fin-ther reducing their ability to exercise market discipline 
(Archer and Karim, 2006 p. 143). 
However, as a result of weak governance, the management of Mohammed Bank 
changed the PDF method; this resulted in paying high divided yield compared with 
very modest IHA returns. 
Furthermore, Islamic banks charge excessive Mudarib rate. This aim to increase the 
shareholders returns and reduces the IAH returns. Such practices exist in a weak 
governance and ineffective market discipline. In a well established financial market 
an effective market discipline exist we would expect that the IAH to withdraw their 
funds and place their funds with another Islamic bank charging lower Muda? lb rate. 
Archer and Karim (2006) further argue that IAH lack the means of signaling to the 
market their assessment of the risks taken by the Islamic bank in order to put pressure 
on the bank's management via the capital market. 
It can be argued that applying regulations that are designed primarily for conventional 
banks on Islamic banks may have encouraged banks to treat IAII as normal deposits 
(although the IAH contract says its profit sharing) and hence, pay them returns below 
the risk that they are taking. 
Furthermore, the lack of the ingredient of closer monitoring in Islamic banks does not 
exist to help the market to regulate itself or to react to the information provided by the 
Islamic banks. The findings of this study suggest that the weakness of the market 
discipline means that the supervisors cannot take light supervisory approach, as 
supposed by Pillar 3 of Basel II. In other words, whereas Pillar 3 assumes that while 
the market is good enough to discipline the banks through more disclosures and 
market discipline, in the case of Islamic banks this would not seem to be a realistic 
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assumption as is demonstrated by the four case studies. Rather, the implication is that 
bank supervisors would have to play a more active role. 
Basel 11 does not address the issue of investor protection for LAE because it is 
oriented towards conventional banks which have depositors whose contracts with the 
bank are debt contracts, not IAH with profit-sharing contracts. The supervisors of 
conventional banks are concerned with depositor protection. However, due to the 
nature of Islamic banks, banks' supervisors should be concerned with both depositor 
protection and investor protection, which implies a broader, more cross-sectoral, 
approach to supervision. However, this raises the question of the balance to be struck 
by supervisors between these two kinds of concern. The issue also affects the capital 
adequacy of Islamic banks, since insofar as IAH are treated as being similar to 
depositors, the assets financed by their funds need to be included (on a risk-weighted 
basis) in the Islamic banks' risk weighted assets for the calculation of their capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR). Hence, in its Capital Adequacy Standard (IFSB, 2006b), the 
IFSB introduced a factor 'alpha' into the 'supervisory discretion' formula for 
calculating the CAP- The value of 'alpha' may range from 0 tol. If the supervisor 
opts to treat IAH as pure depositors, i. e. the bank is required to make good any losses 
of their capital, then alpha = 1. If the supervisor opts to treat JAH as pure profit- 
sharing and loss-bearing investors, then alpha = 0. However, alpha may take a value 
between these two extremes, depending on the supervisory treatment of IAIL 
On the role of financial reporting, even with the full implementation of AAOIFI 
Standards, it is difficult to claim that an effective market discipline will be developed 
unless AAOIFI improves its standards. This is because the existing standards don't 
require important information, including the expenses to be bome by the TAII and the 
actual returns generated on IAH funds in addition to information required by IFRS 7 
which the IFSB Transparency and Market Discipline Standard recommends its 
disclosure. 
In addition, in order to develop market discipline there is a need to enhance 
transparency. This requires a proper mechanism to act as a watchdog on the 
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implementation of both AAOIFI and IFSB Standards by the Islamic banks since any 
shortfall in applying these standards would not help the IAH and shareholders to 
assess the performance of the management. 
IFSB and AAOIFI recognise the importance of obtaining wider acceptance of their 
standards. This requires the regulators to recognize these standards. So far only four 
countries use AAOIFI Standards, n=ely Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar, and Jordan. 
12.5 Why the Findings of this Research are Highly Significant 
The background to this study is the Basel II document, and especially its Pillars 2 and 
3. The Basel 11 approach to the supervisory review process (Pillar 2) and to 
transparency and market discipline (Pillar 3) is based on a number of assumptions 
about the operation of market forces and the information environment which are 
generally justifiable in the case of developed market economies, but this may not be 
the case in the emerging market environments in which the vast majority of Islamic 
banks are situated, including the four banks used in this study. 
In fact, the findings of this study cast considerable doubt on the applicability of these 
assumptions in emerging market environments, with particular reference to: 
1. The ability and/or willingness of IAH to carry out monitoring of management on 
their own behalf, and of shareholders to do so on behalf of the IAII; 
2. The attention paid by IAH and shareholders in at least one of the four countries 
studies to failures of Shariah compliance. 
In both of these areas, it was clear from the case studies that market discipline was 
ineffective. Hence, it is not clear that even a major improvement in transparency 
would lead to effective market discipline. This has major implications for the 
supervisory review process and the role of banking supervisors in such countries. It 
is concluded that while they should insist on improvements in transparency, they also 
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need to play a more active, hands-on role in supervision than that which may be 
implied by Basel II (and than the role that they may have been playing up till now). 
In addition, this research provided empirical evidence pertaining to some major issues 
in the corporate governance of Islamic banks, with respect to the position of the IAH. 
Attention to these issues has been drawn in the literature, notably by Archer and 
Karim (1998,2005 and 2006) as well as in the IFSB's Corporate Governance 
Standard for Islamic banks (IFSB, 2006b). However, the findings of this research 
clearly illustrate how problematic these issues can be from the IAH point of view, and 
arguably from the banking supervisor's perspective also. 
12.6 Research Limitations 
The essential limitation of the research performed for this study lies in its exploratory 
nature. The mainstream literature on corporate governance is only very partially 
applicable to Islamic banks, which raised problems in constructing the theoretical 
basis for this study, although the Agency Theory framework provided a valuable 
starting point, and the literature also contains a few more specialised publications on 
the corporate governance of Islamic banks that were highly relevant. In addition, the 
issues to be researched required data, much of which was not available from 
secondary sources. For these reasons, a case study approach was chosen. Case 
studies, even when carried out using a multiple embedded case design, as in this 
research, do not provide a basis for empirical generalisations. Instead, they permit 
generalisation to theory. This is much more feasible if there is already a relatively 
well-developed body of theory. However, this was not the case for the corporate 
governance of Islamic banks. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, the research was able to reach the significant findings 
that were noted above. 
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12.7 Recommendations for Future Research 
This research covers only four banks in three countries. Future research should 
increase the s=ple of Islamic banks in different countries. Such research would 
assist in determining the extent to which the PDF, the excessive Mudarib rate, and the 
leverage of the IAH have an impact on the distribution of returns to shareholders and 
IAH. 
Furthermore, the survey of this research covers IAH in four banks. Future research 
also is needed to extend the survey on IAH in more banks in different countries to 
determine whether the IAH in countries like Malaysia, where the financial market is 
relatively more developed, would react differently to the information from the sample 
of IAH in the four banks of this research. 
Also future research is needed to cover countries like the UK where at least one 
Islamic bank is operating in order to that the research proposition in developed 
markets discipline tend to exist, whether the management strategy in such 
environment would also work primarily for the interest of the shareholders like in the 
case of immature markets. 
12.8 Concluding Remarks 
The concentrated shareholders not necessarily influencing factor that enable the 
shareholders to work for their own interest. 
Rather, there are other factors such as the PDF and the excessive Mudarib rate. This 
has implications for the general corporate governance literature reviewed and for 
specific corporate governance of Islamic banks particularly with regard to the 
importance of leveraging effect to enhance the returns paid to shareholders. 
However, lack of transparency encouraged the management to establish PDF to 
favour the shareholders. Also the passive reaction of the IAH to the very modest 
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returns paid to them by withdrawing of 1ýheir funds to research for better returns 
encouraged the management to continue paying very modest returns to IAH and pay 
very high dividend yield to shareholders. 
Islamic banks operate in a weak governance and ineffective market discipline. In 
such environment, the bank supervisors needs to take an active role to protect the 
interest of the IAH; this is important to establish some discipline to the market and 
gives signal to the management of the Islamic banks that any failure in their fiduciary 
duties towards the IAH will result in certain measure against the bank. 
Such approach is against the Basel Committee new approach which encourages less 
government intervention in regulating banks and be replaced with adequate 
disclosures, good governance and effective market discipline. 
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Appendix 1.1 
Interview Questions with the Management of Islamic bank 
L Given that you have a statutory duty to shareholders and a fiduciary duty to 
Investment Account Holders, to whom are you accountable? Please explain. 
A. To the shareholders B. To the Investment Account Holders 
C. To all stakeholders 
2. Do you rely on the rating agencies in assessing other Islamic banks performance? 
3. Do you think the shareholders interest differs from the interest of the Investment 
Account Holders? Please explain. 
4. What is the percentage of concentrated shareholders in your bank? 
5. How many of the board members in your bank represent the concentrated 
shareholders? 
6. How do you manage your liquidity? Is the liquidity invested for the shareholders or 
the Investment Account Holders? 
7. Can you explain the formula you use in allocating the return of the Investment 
Account Holders from those allocated to shareholders? 
8. How important is allowing a block of shareholders "concentrated shareholders" to 
monitor the management of the bank on behalf of Investment Account Holders? 
Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Very important 
2. Fairly important 
3. Less important 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
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Interview Questions with Shareholders 
What is the contractual relationship between the shareholders and the Islamic bank? 
Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
A. Mudaraba Contract B. Agency Contract C. Debt Contract D. Unaware 
2. Are you satisfied with the amount of dividends you receive on your investment? 
Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Satisfied 
3. Less satisfied 
4. Not satisfied 
5. Undecided 
3. Since the Investment Account Holders bear the risk of loss like shareholders, do 
you think it is important for the Investment Account Holders to be given a 
monitoring role like the shareholders to monitor the management to cater for the 
interest of the Investment Account Holders which is as important as that of 
shareholders, given that both are equity holders? Please tick the one which you 
think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
4. To what extent do you think it is important to allow a block of shareholders 
44 concentrated shareholders" instead of small shareholders "dispersed shareholders" 
to monitor the management of the bank on behalf of all other stakeholders including 
the small shareholders & Investment Account Holders? Please tick the one which 
you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Very important 
2. Fairly important 
3. Less important 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
5. Because the salaries and other incentives of the management are decided by the 
Board of Directors/Shareholders. Do you think this will make the management 
more bias to the shareholders? Please explain. 
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6. Do you think the ownership structure, e. g. concentrated shareholders, will have 
influence on the management to take decisions for the benefit of the concentrated 
shareholders? Please explain. 
7. Do you think the appointment of non-executive Board Members will be for the 
benefit of the Investment Account Holders? Please explain. 
8. Do you think the ownership structure, e. g. concentrated shareholders, will have an 
influence on the level of disclosures on the financial statements of the Islamic bank? 
Please explain. 
9- What are the following factors you will consider before investing in an Islamic 
bank? Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. The main shareholders 
2. The main Investment Account Holders 
3. The percentage of dividends 
4. The level of compliance with Shariah 
5. Non of the above. Please specify and explain 
10. Since the management is appointed by the shareholders, which of the following is 
more important for the management to meet? 
L The management primarily will try to meet the expectations of the 
shareholders and the Investment Account Holders; 
2. The management primarily will try to meet the expectations of the 
shareholders; 
3. The management primarily will try to meet the expectations of the Investment 
Account Holders; 
4. The management will try to meet the expectations of all stakeholders; 
5. Undecided. 
How important are the financial statements as a tool to provide you with adequate 
level of information to enable you to assess the performance of the management e. g. 
Return on Equity, Return on Asset? Please tick the one which you think is 
appropriate and explain why: 
1. Very important 
2. Fairly important 
3. Less important 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
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12. Have you heard of AAOIFI as standard setting body for Islamic financial 
Institutions? With regard to your investment with the bank, to what extent are you 
satisfied with the level of information disclosed by the bank prior to the adoption of 
AAOIFI standards, particularly with no information disclosed on illegitimate funds, 
priority of investments, expenses charged to Investment Account Holders, 
smoothing of income? Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and 
explain why: 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Fairly satisfied 
3. Less satisfied 
4. Fairly unsatisfied 
5. Totally unsatisfied 
13. With regard to your investment with the bank, to what extent are you satisfied with 
the level of information disclosed by the bank after the adoption of AAOIFI 
standards? Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Fairly satisfied 
3. Less satisfied 
4. Fairly unsatisfied 
5. Totally unsatisfied 
14. In case the bank has not fully complied with AAOIFI standards, to what extent will 
effect your assessment on the bank? Please tick the one which you think is 
appropriate and explain why: 
1. Will effect considerably 
2. Will effect to a fair extent 
3. A little effect 
4. No effect 
5. Don't know 
15. How important is the role which the Shariah Supervisory Board plays in ensuring 
that the bank's transactions are in accordance with Shariah precepts? Please tick 
the one which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Very important 
2. Fairly important 
3. Less important 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
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16. Do you read the Shariah Supervisory Board's report on the bank's compliance with 
Shari'ah principles in its operations? How important is the report as a tool to 
provide you with adequate assurance that the bank is in compliance with Shariah 
precepts? Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Very important 
2. Fairly important 
3. Less important 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
17. How important are the composition and duties of the Shariah Supervisory Board in 
providing stakeholders with adequate assurance that Islamic banks comply with 
Shari'ah rules and principles? Please tick the one which you think is appropriate 
and explain why: 
1. Very important 
2. Fairly important 
3. Less important 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
18. To what extent does the adoption and proper implementation of the governance 
standards issued by AAOIFI that relate to the duties and responsibilities of the 
Shari'ah Supervisory Board give you confidence that the Islamic bank operates in 
accordance with Shariah rules and principles? Please tick the one which you think 
is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Fairly satisfied 
3. Less satisfied 
4. Fairly unsatisfied 
5. Totally unsatisfied 
19. How important do you think is the role of the external auditors in giving assurance 
that the accounts represent a true and fair view of the financial status of the bank? 
Do you think that the external auditor of Islamic banks should also give assurance 
that transactions conducted by the bank are in accordance with Shariah? Please 
tick the one which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Very important 
2. Fairly important 
3. Less important 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
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Appendix 1.3 
Interview Questions with Internal Shariah Reviewers (ISR) 
I. Can you explain what are the responsibilities of the internal Shariah unit? 
2. To whom are you accountable? 
A. Management B. Board of Directors C. Shariah Supervisory Board 
3. Do the bank's by-laws allow you to carry out a Shariah review to ensure that the 
bank's operations are in accordance with Shariah? 
4. Do you carry out an ex ante review, an ex post review, or both, of the bank's 
compliance with Shariah? 
5. To whom do you submit your report? 
6. Does the bank's report state that the Shariah Supervisory Board carries out its 
duties in coordination with the internal Shariah unit? 
7. Please explain your relationship with the Shariah Supervisory Board and external 
auditors. 
8. Do you review the bank's policy and practice of profit distribution between the 
shareholders and Investment Account Holders? 
9. Do you review the bank's liquidity management policy and practices? 
10. Do you discuss the content of the annual report with the external auditors? 
11. Have you adopted the AAOIFI internal Shariah review standard, and if so did it 
help you in performing your Shariah audit? 
12. The internal Shariah review or unit is an integral part of the organs of governance 
of the bank, does this achieve independence for the unit? 
13. What is your role if the bank practices income smoothing, use of Profit Equalization 
Reserve and foregoing Mudarib share? Please explain. 
14. Do you agree that the Shariah Supervisory Board's role is to protect the interest of 
the Investment Account Holders since the interest of the shareholders are protected 
by the Board of Directors? Please explain. 
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Appendix 1.4 
Interview Questions with External Auditors of Islamic bank 
I. As an external auditors to whom are you accountable? Please tick one of the 
following which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
A. To the shareholders B. To the Investment Account Holders 
C. To all stakeholders. 
2. Do you think that the management of an Islamic bank considers the interest of the 
Investment Account Holders as important as the shareholder's interest? Please 
explain. 
3. Do you think that the interest of the management differ from those of the 
shareholders and Investment Account Holders? Please explain. 
4. Do you think by allowing a certain group of shareholders (concentrated 
shareholders) to hold a significant stake that will enable it to have a monitoring role 
on the management will work for the interest of the Investment Account Holders 
and minority shareholders in a way better than a group of dispersed shareholders, 
and why? 
5. Do you think the appointment of non-executive Board Members will be for the 
benefit of the Investment Account Holders? Please explain. 
6. How do you assess your relationship with the Shafilah Supervisory Board with 
regard to the bank's compliance with Shariah? Please explain. 
7. Do you review the internal systems and procedures of the internal Shariah unit? 
8. Given that the articles of association of most Islamic banks state that the bank shall 
conduct its business in accordance with Shariah rules and principles, to what 
extent are you concerned with the level of Shariah compliance by the Islamic 
bank? Please explain. 
9. In a conventional banking system, the role of the external auditors is to ensure that 
the accounts represent a true and fair view of the financial status of the bank? Do 
you think the external auditor that audits Islamic banks should also ensure that the 
transactions conducted by the bank is in accordance with Shariah concepts to 
provide such a true and fair view, and why? 
10. Do you audit the profit allocation between shareholders and Investment Account 
Holders, if so how? 
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What is your role with regard to income smoothing, use of Profit Equalization 
Reserve and foregoing Mudarib share? Please explain. 
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Appendix 1.5 
Interview Questions with the Supervisors of Islamic bank 
1. What are your main responsibilities in supervising Islamic banks and in what ways do 
they differ compared to conventional banks? 
2. How do you see your role as supervisor in protecting the interests of Investment 
Account Holders, especially unrestricted Investment Account Holders, given the 
potential conflicts of interest between Investment Account Holders and shareholders? 
3. Insofar as the Investment Account Holders bear a risk of loss (like the shareholders), 
do you think Investment Account Holders via one or more representatives should be 
given an opportunity to monitor the bank's performance? If so, how do you think this 
monitoring role should be carried out? 
4. How do you evaluate the significance of information intermediaries such as rating 
agencies play in drawing attention to the performance of Islamic banks: 
1. For shareholders 
2. For Investment Account Holders 
3. Minor role 
5. Do you think financial intermediaries e. g. rating agencies play a significant role in 
protecting the interest of the Investment Account Holders (e. g. by Investment 
Account Holders reading their ratings)? 
6. In the absence of an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) rating, or reports 
from other information intermediaries what alternative means are available to 
Investment Account Holders to help theý in assessing the bank's performance? How 
important do you think banks' financial reports are for this purpose? How do you see 
the supervisor's role in this? 
7. How do you see the role of AAOIFI accounting standards in 
" protecting the interests of the Investment Account Holders 
" facilitating the task of External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) 
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Appendix 1.6 
Interview Questions with the member of the Shariah Supervisory Board 
L What are the responsibilities of the Shafi'ah Supervisory Board? 
2. To whom are you accountable? 
A. Management B. Board of Directors C. Shareholders D. Stakeholders. 
3. Does the bank by-law allows you to carry out a Shariah review to ensure that the 
bank's operation is in accordance with Shariah? 
4. Do you carry out an ex ante Shariah review? 
S. Do you carry out an ax post review on the bank's compliance with Shariah? 
6. To whom do you submit your report? 
7. Is the banks'Shariah report state the role played by Internal Shariah Review? 
8. Do you review the bank's formula of distribution between the shareholders and 
Investment Account Holders? 
9. Do you review the liquidity policy of the bank? 
10. To what extent do you rely on the bank's internal Shariah audit? 
11. To what extent do you rely on the service of the external auditors on issues relating 
to the bank's compliance with Shariah? 
12. What is your role if the bank practices income smoothing, use of Profit Equalization 
Reserve and foregoing Mudarib share? Please explain. 
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Appendix 1.7 
Interview Questions with Investment Account Holders 
What is the contractual relationship between you as an Investment Account Holders 
and the Islamic bank? Please tick the type of contract which you think is 
appropriate and explain why: 
A. Mudaraba Contract B. Agency (Wakala) Contract C. Debt Contract 
D. Unaware. 
2. Are you satisfied with the level of returns paid on your investments? Please tick one 
of the following which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Fairly satisfied 
3. Less satisfied 
4. Fairly unsatisfied 
5. Totally unsatisfied 
I What criteria or benchmark do you use to decide whether you are satisfied? 
1. Previous years' returns 
2. Other banks' returns 
3. Return on your funds 
4. Level of service 
5. Other criteria 
4. If you are unsatisfied, what do you do about this situation? 
Withdraw most or all of your funds? 
Other actions? 
5. Do you think it is important for the Investment Account Holders (or their 
representative] to be given a monitoring role like the shareholders in order to ensure 
that the management gives adequate consideration to the interest of the Investment 
Account Holders as it does to the shareholders? Please tick one of the following 
which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Very important 
2. Fairly important 
3. Less important 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
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Appendix 1.8 
Interview Questions with Investment Account Holders 
What is the contractual relationship between you as an Investment Account Holders 
and the Islamic bank? Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and 
explain why: 
A. Mudaraba Contract B. Agency Contract C. Debt Contract D. Unaware. 
2. What is the contractual relationship between the Investment Account Holders and 
the Islamic bank? Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and explain 
why: 
A. Mudaraba Contract B. Agency Contract C. Debt Contract D. Unaware. 
3. Are you satisfied with the level of returns paid on your investments? Please tick one 
of the following which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Fairly satisfied 
3. Less satisfied 
4. Fairly unsatisfied 
5. Totally unsatisfied 
4. Do you think it is important for the Investinent Account Holders to be given a 
monitoring role similar to the shareholders in order to ensure that the management 
gives adequate consideration to the interest of the Investment Account Holders as it 
does to the shareholders? Please tick one of the following which you think is 
appropriate and explain why: 
1. Very important 
2. Fairly important 
3. Less important 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
5. Which of the following factors will you consider before placing your funds with an 
Islamic Bank? Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
1. The main shareholders 
2. The main Investment Account Holders 
3. The level of returns on your investment 
4. The level of compliance with Shariah 
5. None of the above. Please specify and explain 
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6. Do you read the financial statements of your bank? How important are the financial 
statements as a tool to provide you with adequate level of information to enable you 
to assess the performance of the management? Please tick the one which you think 
is appropriate and explain why: 
I. Very important 
2. Fairly important 
3. Less important 
4 Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
7. In case you do not read the financial statements, whom of the following, do you 
think should monitor the bank's performance on your behalf? 
1. Bank supervisors 
2. Rating agencies 
3. External auditors 
4. Shariah Supervisory Board 
5. Board of Directors 
6. None of the above 
8. Do you read the Shariah Supervisory Board's report on the bank's 
compliance with Shariah principles in its operations? How important is the 
report as a tool to provide you with adequate assurance that the bank is in 
compliance with Shariah concepts? Please tick the one which you think is 
appropriate and explain why: 
1. Very important 
2. Fairly important 
3. Less important 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
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Appendix 1.9 
Survey on Investment Account Holders (IAII) 
I- What is the contractual relationship between you as an Investment Account Holders 
and the Islamic bank? Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and explain 
why: 
a- Mudaraba b- Agency (Wakala) c- Debt d- Unaware 
Contract Contract Contract 
48% 12% 21% 19% 
2- Are you satisfied with the level of returns paid on your investments? Please tick one 
of the following which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
a- Fully b- Fairly satisfied c- Less d- Fairly e- Totally 
satisfied satisfied unsatisfied unsatisfied 
13% 37% 27% 15% 8% 
3- What criteria or benchmark do you use to decide whether you are satisfied? 
a- Previous b- Other bank's c- Return on d- Level of e- Other 
_year's returns returns your 
funds service criteria 
20% 31% 16% 25% 8% 
4- If you are unsatisfied, what do you do about this situation? 
a- Withdraw most or all of your funds? b- Other actions? 
51% 49% 
5- Do you think it is important for the Investment Account Holders for their 
representative] to be given a monitoring role like the shareholders in order to ensure 
that the management gives adequate consideration to the interest of the Investment 
Account Holders as it does to the shareholders? Please tick one of the following 
which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
a- Very b- Fairly important c- Less d- Not very e- Not at all 
important important important important 
44% 29% 13% 10% 4% 
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6- Which of the following factors will you consider before placing your funds with an I sl i( slamic bank? Please tick the ones which you think are relevant and explain why: 
a- The b- The identity of c- The d- The level e- Other. 
prospective main shareholders identity of the of Please 
level of returns main IAH. compliance specify and 
on your [Could they with explain 
investment know this? ] Shariah 
52% 16% 11% 21% 0% 
7- Do you read the financial statements of your bank? How important are the financial 
statements as a tool to provide you with adequate level of information to enable you 
to assess the performance of the management? Please tick the one which you think is 
appropriate and explain why: 
a- Very b- Fairly important c- Less d- Not very e- Not at all 
important important important important 
35% 
I 
33% 
I 
14% 
I 
7% 
I 
11% 
--- 8- In case you do not read the financial statements, which of the following do you think 
should monitor the bank's performance on your behalf? 
a- Bank b- Rating c- External d- Shariah e- Board of f- None 
Supervisors Agencies Auditors Supervisory Directors ofabove 
Board 
25% 11% 
1 
19% 
1 
27% 
1 
11% 
11 
7% 
9- Do you read the Shariah Supervisory Board's report on the bank's compliance with 
Shari'ah principles in its operations? How important is the report as a tool to provide 
you with adequate assurance that the bank is in compliance with Shari ah a 
precepts? Please tick the one which you think is appropriate and explain why: 
a- Very b- Fairly c- Less d- Not very e- Not at all important 
important important important important 
50% 20% 15% 8% 7% 
Survey covered 350 IAH. 164 respond. Represent 47% 
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Appendix 1.10 
Interview Questions with the Supervisors of Islamic bank 
1. What are your main responsibilities in supervising Islamic banks and in what ways do they 
differ compared to conventional banks? 
2. What would be your responsibility if the Islamic bank undertakes to give priority to 
meeting the shareholders' expectations over those of Investment Account Holders? 
3. Unlike conventional banks, the Investment Account Holders bear the risk of loss like the 
shareholders, do you think Investment Account Holders should be given a monitoring role 
in the bank like the shareholders e. g. representation on the board, appointing of 
management etc.? 
4. Are you satisfied with the role financial intermediaries play in assessing the performance of 
Islamic banks? 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Satisfied 
3. Less satisfied 
4. Not satisfied 
5. Undecided 
5. How important is the role of financial intermediaries in protecting the interest of the 
Investment Account Holders? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
6. In case Investment Account Holders do not use the service of the rating agency to help 
them in assessing the bank's performance, who should play that role? 
1. Board of Directors 
2. Shareholders 
3. Shariah Supervisory Board 
4. External Auditors 
5. None of the above 
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7. How important is the role of financial reports of Islamic banks in monitoring the 
performance of management? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
8. How important do you think the role plays by AAOIFI you think financial reports plays a 
role in protecting the interest of the Investment Account Holders? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
9. How important is the role played by AAOIFI accounting standards in protecting the interest 
of Investment Account Holders? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
10. How important is the role played by the banks supervisors in protecting the interest of the 
Investment Account Holders? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
1. In order to supervise the Islamic banks more effectively, how important is it for Islamic 
banks to adopt AAOIFI and Islamic Financial Services Board standards on disclosures? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
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12. How important is the role played by AAOIFI and Islamic Financial Services Board 
standards in assisting the rating agencies? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
13. How important is the adoption of AAOIFI Shariah standards in assisting the role of the 
rating agencies? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
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Appendix 1.11 
Interview Questions with the Rating Agency 
Do you think Islamic banks should be rated differently than conventional banks? 
If so, what are the main differences? 
2. Islamic banks do not have debt (except for current accounts). Is the concept of 
'default' applicable to Islamic banks? If so, how is it to be applied? If not, is there 
another concept that can be used in its place? 
3. If the Islamic bank fails to pay Investment Account Holders their profits, would you 
consider the'Islamic bank to be in default? 
4. Are you satisfied with the level of information disclosed in the financial reports of 
Islamic banks? 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Satisfied 
3. Less satisfied 
4. Not satisfied 
5. Undecided 
Are you satisfied with role played by the banles supervisors in terms of enforcing 
sound and prudent practices? 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Satisfied 
3. Less satisfied 
4. Not satisfied 
5. Undecided 
6. Are you satisfied with the role that other financial intermediaries play in assessing 
the performance of Islamic banks? (Please explain more): 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Satisfied 
3. Less satisfied 
4. Not satisfied 
5. Undecided 
202 
7. How important do you 
assessing the ability o: 
fiduciary duties? 
think financial intermediaries e. g. rating agencies are in 
an Islamic bank to meet its obligations and fulfill its 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
8. How important do you think financial reports play in monitoring the performance of 
management? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
9. How important do you think financial reports play in protecting the interest of the 
Investment Account Holders? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
10. Who should playa monitoring role in assessing the performance of management on 
behalf of the Investment Account Holders? 
1. Board of directors 
2. Shareholders 
3. Rating agencies 
4. Bank supervisors 
5. None of the above 
1. Are you satisfied with the role played by Shariah Supervisory Boards of Islamic 
banks in giving assurance that Islamic banks operates in accordance with Shariah? 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Satisfied 
3. Less satisfied 
4. Not satisfied 
5. Undecided 
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12. How important is the adoption of AAOIFI Shariah standards by Islamic banks? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
13. How important is it for the Investment Account Holders to use the services of the 
rating agencies in assessing the performance of Islamic banks? 
1. Very important 
2. Quite important 
3. Undecided 
4. Not very important 
5. Not at all important 
14. What should be the role of rating agencies in enhancing Market discipline, taking 
into consideration that Investment Account Holders are not sophisticated investors? 
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